Media reports surfaced earlier this month that Libya’s eastern-headquartered parliament, which is aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, was considering ratifying a maritime agreement with Turkey that grants Ankara access to a vast economic zone in the Mediterranean.
In 2019, Ankara and the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli signed the demarcation memorandum of understanding (MoU), which sparked significant controversy with Greece and other regional actors for excluding them from exclusive economic zones.
At the time, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, along with Libya’s eastern-based authorities, strongly rejected the pact as illegal, arguing it breaches international maritime law and infringes on their territorial waters.
Tobruk-based parliament speaker Aguila Saleh previously declared the Turkey-GNA boundary deal “null and void” since it was not approved by the assembly, calling it a violation of Libyan sovereignty. But reports claiming that the Libyan House of Representatives (HOR) is set to review the disputed agreement suggest a potential shift in position.
The signing of the Libyan-Turkish memorandum on maritime sovereignty came amid increased tensions as forces loyal to Commander Khalifa Haftar launched a renewed campaign to seize the capital, Tripoli. At the time, the GNA signed another security pact with Ankara, allowing Turkey to provide military support to repel the offensive, an offer the Tripoli government accepted.
In an interview with The New Arab, Tim Eaton, a senior MENA research fellow at Chatham House focusing on Libya, observed that while the deal was initially a political move, since then Turkey has expanded its ties in eastern Libya and now maintains broad relationships across the divide.
“This shift reflects a broader political reality: Turkey is no longer seen with hostility by the east, but as a partner to court and influence,” he said.
A rethink of the maritime accord by General Haftar and his allies could bring eastern Libya in line with Ankara’s maritime claims.
More than a tactical adjustment, the eastern bloc’s renewed stance on the agreement seems to show Turkey’s ongoing efforts to build up its relationships with eastern partners over time, Eaton indicated.
Although Haftar-controlled eastern Libya has long opposed Turkey’s influence, backed by Egypt and the UAE, ties between the military strongman and Ankara have begun to ease in recent years.
Turkey deepens roots in Libya
Turkey has been stepping up its engagement with eastern Libyan authorities in recent months. In early April, Haftar’s son, Saddam, was received by the Turkish defence minister and other top military officials. Saddam’s visit to Ankara marked the peak of Turkey’s evolving strategy in Libya since the cessation of hostilities in mid-2020, starting with outreach to the legislature in the east and the swift revival of Turkish trade in Benghazi.
Turkish construction firms have gradually returned to eastern Libya, signing contracts with the Haftar-run Libyan Reconstruction and Development Fund. The Turkish consulate in Benghazi was reopened late last year. Turkey’s expanding presence in the east reflects both economic ambition and a shifting geopolitical calculus.
“They’ve been courting each other,” Anas El Gomati, founder and director of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, told The New Arab, referring to the Turkish-east Libya thaw. “The relationship is about insurance, not a true rapprochement. The Turks are hedging their bets in case the government in Tripoli collapses,” he contended.
Haftar’s self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) have provided relative stability in the east and south, home to much of Libya’s oil wealth, whilst the Turkey-aligned western camp lacks a unified military command and political leadership and remains fragmented.
This has driven Turkey’s pragmatic pivot toward eastern Libya and its de facto recognition of the LAAF as a legitimate military actor while maintaining ties with its allies in the west of Libya. By engaging both eastern and western camps, Ankara is consolidating its foothold in Libya to protect its interests and assert itself as a key regional player.
Talking to The New Arab, Rhiannon Smith, director of the think-tank Libya-Analysis, explained that the HoR's reconsideration of the maritime accord is linked to recent political unrest marked by clashes between rival militias in the Libyan capital in mid-May.
As protests followed in Tripoli against PM Dbeibah, head of the now Government of National Unity (GNU), and calls for his resignation grew, the HoR seized on public pressure by intensifying its efforts to appoint a new prime minister to lead a unified governing body.
“If a new government can guarantee the Turks their same strategic interests -military bases in western Libya and the maritime agreement - Ankara has little reason to remain tied to the GNU if it becomes untenable,” Smith stated, suggesting that a revaluation of the deal by the Libyan parliament is aimed at convincing the Turks to relinquish their support for the Dbeibah administration.
Yet, the eastern authorities seem unlikely to move forward with enacting the protocol as their U-turn appears to be a tactical manoeuvre in an ongoing internal power struggle.
“Aguila Saleh is dangling the idea to lure Turkey away from supporting Tripoli’s embattled prime minister,” Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told TNA, pointing out that eastern factions are courting the Turks as they sense weakness in Dbeibah's government.
Harchaoui also claimed that the HoR’s speaker has a long record of floating schemes he never enacts, and said he expects no imminent ratification.
Similarly, Smith believes the parliament is using the agreement as leverage to pressure Turkey to withdraw support for the GNU amid ongoing political uncertainty.
“It's more about signalling a willingness to reopen talks with Turkey,” the Libya analyst said. She indicated that the authorities in the east might try to renegotiate or amend it, and validate a revised version to soften its impact.
Observers see these overtures as part of a broader strategy to cement Turkish influence in Libya and secure rights over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The step by Libyan authorities in Tobruk to reevaluate the maritime deal is anticipated to bolster Turkey’s push to position itself as the leading maritime power in the region while entrenching its presence across Libya’s political fault lines.
Sadeq Institute’s head emphasised that Ankara is seeking to guarantee long-term leverage in Libya as well as to reap a “dividend” from the accord as a regional energy broker, therefore a geopolitical actor. “That would reposition Turkey not only as a prime player in Libya but as a kingmaker in the East Mediterranean,” he affirmed.
He also remarked that Libya’s east-west standoff is shifting toward a scramble for new realignment whereby Turkey aims to land a “diplomatic coup” by securing eastern Libya’s backing on the maritime memorandum. That way, Ankara would claim the MoU is no longer unilateral but endorsed by both sides.
Energy vacuum in the Eastern Mediterranean
On the other hand, such a development would directly challenge Athens’ bilateral maritime agreement with Egypt. The Greeks would view it as a betrayal and attempt to undermine the credibility of the Turkish interpretation, while Cairo may push back.
Smith said that moving forward with the deal could spark controversy and mark the start of a renegotiation or rebalancing, as shifting dynamics begin to reshape regional relations and impact the Eastern Mediterranean energy space.
“With Turkey and Libya eager to advance energy exploration, tensions are likely to grow in the coming period,” the Libya researcher anticipated.
Greece, which in 2020 signed a rival maritime delimitation accord with Cairo in response to the Turkey-Libya arrangement, is now reportedly preparing to lobby Egypt to help stop Haftar or eastern Libya's parliament from endorsing the 2019 MoU with the GNA.
As recently as 2019, Turkish President Erdogan refused to recognise the legitimacy of his Egyptian counterpart Sisi, however, ties have since improved. A push by Cairo to rally against the contested memorandum could therefore strain this fragile détente.
Chatham House’s Eaton noted that while players like Greece and Egypt, who oppose the deal with Turkey, lack influence in Libya, Ankara may capitalise on their disunity or inattention to push its interpretation of the MoU as a de facto reality, leveraging its prominent role in the North African country.
“Libyan power brokers see building strong relations with Turkey as key to advancing their own goals,” the MENA researcher said, stressing there is closer coordination with Ankara in Libya’s east. “Turkish support is considered critical by anyone seeking control in Libya,” he added.
El Gomati highlighted the transactional nature of alliances in Libya, claiming that Haftar will side with the Turks if he sees a better deal, and has obtained all he can from the Egyptians and the Emiratis.
He also mentioned that passing the maritime pact could also legitimise broader involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean energy space, as more countries would seek to tap the region’s natural gas reserves.
The Libyan analyst criticised the realignment of regional powers involved in Libya’s conflict in the last few years, noting it does not signal a reset but rather underscores the unlikely prospect of such actors coexisting while backing opposing sides.
“It’s a deeper reflection of how paralysed and divided the country is,” he argued. "If the same regional states have truly reset ties, why do their rival forces, mercenaries, and military bases remain in Libya?”
Alessandra Bajec is a freelance journalist currently based in Tunis
Follow her on Twitter: @AlessandraBajec