Who is sabotaging Syria's recovering gas network?

A second act of sabotage against Syria's gas network in six weeks has raised questions over who is targeting the country's recovering energy infrastructure as Damascus attempts to restore electricity production after years of war.

A fire broke out on Monday evening on a gas pipeline between al-Shola and Deir al-Zour following an explosion at an isolation valve, according to the Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC), which said the blast was caused by an act of sabotage.

The attack halted the flow of gas from the Jbeissa plant in Hasakah to electricity-generating stations, while emergency crews isolated the affected section of pipeline as pressure in the network fell.

No group has claimed responsibility and Syrian authorities have not identified any suspects.

However, the incident follows another attack on infrastructure connected to Jbeissa on 18 August, when an explosion struck the plant's gas export pipeline.

The SPC said an investigation into that incident found it had been caused by "deliberate sabotage", forcing the company to halt pumping and affecting supplies to several electricity-generating turbines.

The two incidents come as Syria's new authorities attempt to revive an energy sector devastated by more than a decade of war, sanctions and the fragmentation of the country's oil and gas fields between rival armed groups.

Jbeissa has become an important part of those efforts.

In January, the SPC began pumping raw gas from the Jbeissa fields in Hasakah to the Furqlus gas plant in Homs province, with around 1.2 million cubic metres passing through the network each day to support electricity generation.

Damascus has also been working to reconnect other major eastern gas facilities to the national network.

Earlier this month, gas began flowing from the al-Tabiya facility, commonly known as the Conoco gas field, in Deir al-Zour after rehabilitation work on wells and pipelines damaged or left unusable during the war.

The facility is expected to produce around 1.5 million cubic metres of gas per day, with much of it destined for electricity generation.

The rehabilitation drive follows a major shift in control over Syria's energy resources earlier this year, when the government took control of key oil and gas fields previously held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast.

That has given Damascus access to resources that could play an important role in restoring electricity supplies and rebuilding an economy battered by years of conflict.

It has also left a sprawling network of wells, processing facilities and pipelines requiring protection across areas that remain vulnerable to armed groups.

Who could be behind the attacks?

There is currently no public evidence linking either act of sabotage to a particular group.

One possibility authorities will have to consider is the Islamic State group, which retains cells in eastern Syria despite the collapse of its territorial "caliphate" in 2019.

Deir al-Zour remains one of the group's principal areas of activity in Syria. ISIS attacks have continued in the province during 2026, particularly against security forces, amid concerns that changing territorial control in the northeast has created new security gaps.

However, ISIS has not claimed either of the attacks on the Jbeissa network, despite regularly publicising its operations.

The complicated security landscape of eastern Syria also leaves other possibilities.

For years, Deir al-Zour was divided between competing forces and contained an extensive presence of Assad regime forces, Iran-backed armed groups, tribal formations, the SDF and ISIS cells.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad and subsequent expansion of the Sharaa government's control have transformed that landscape, but networks established during the conflict have not necessarily disappeared.

Whether remnants of former regime or Iran-aligned networks retain the ability or incentive to target energy infrastructure is therefore one question surrounding the attacks, although there is currently no evidence connecting them to either incident.

Local disputes provide another possible explanation.

Control of oil fields, smuggling routes and energy resources has long been intertwined with tribal, armed and criminal networks in eastern Syria. Clashes between local gunmen over control of oil wells have continued during the post-Assad period, while unidentified armed groups remain active across Deir ez-Zor.

Sabotage therefore does not necessarily point to a centrally directed insurgent campaign.

Why target Syria's gas network?

Whatever the motive, the attacks expose the vulnerability of infrastructure central to Damascus's plans for economic recovery.

Syria has recently reported a substantial increase in electricity generation, while the government is attempting to rehabilitate damaged fields, pipelines and processing plants and attract foreign companies back into the country's energy sector.

Restoring eastern gas production is central to that strategy because additional domestic gas can be fed directly into power generation.

Repeated attacks on pipelines could therefore have consequences far beyond the immediate damage caused by an explosion.

They could interrupt electricity production, increase repair costs and complicate attempts to convince foreign investors that Syria's energy infrastructure can be operated securely.

Two incidents in six weeks are not enough to establish that Syria is facing a coordinated campaign against its gas network.

But with Damascus attempting to bring some of the country's most valuable energy assets back into production, the attacks demonstrate that repairing Syria's pipelines may prove easier than securing them.