The latest bout of nationwide demonstrations in Iran, which has drawn thousands to the streets in the hopes of challenging the regime, is escalating amid a total communication blackout by authorities as they try to control the flow of information.
While estimates of those killed by security forces range from 2,000 to 20,000, all reports paint a consistent picture of a brutal campaign to suppress the mass demonstrations. The number of those arrested is also in the thousands, with Iran’s judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei promising swift public trials.
The protests were sparked in late December by public anger over a sharp spike in the cost of living in the country’s sanctions-weakened economy. Localised demonstrations quickly grew into mass rallies across all 31 provinces, with tens of thousands of Iranians chanting for the downfall of the Islamic Republic.
Despite these threats and the brutal official response, protests continue to spread, and unrest shows no sign of subsiding. Economic hardship, political discontent, and social fractures have converged to create sustained unrest, with exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi gaining prominence and foreign powers, including the Trump administration, weighing potential intervention.
Observers say the country’s future hinges on how the regime responds, the ability of society to organise, and the influence of international actors.
Masoud Haray, an Iranian political analyst, says the current demonstrations differ fundamentally from previous waves of unrest in Iran and can no longer be understood through the traditional lens of economic or sectoral demands.
“Widespread loss of trust in political legitimacy and in the future of governance has pushed the protests beyond social grievances into a structural and political confrontation,” he told The New Arab.
The slow erosion of the regime's power
This assessment aligns closely with economic analyses of Iran’s current condition. Mahdi Ghodsi, a senior economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, believes that the prerequisites for the collapse of the political system are now “almost fully in place” in Iran.
“We are facing an accumulation of crises at the same time…a financial crisis resulting from more than 15 years of sanctions, a system of governance that has ignored national interests and public welfare, and a government that has effectively lost control over the economy,” he told The New Arab.
According to Ghodsi, the income of large segments of the population has fallen to one-third or even one-quarter of pre-sanctions levels. Inflation has reached such heights that the government’s responses are limited to short-term improvised fixes.
He also notes that the participation of bazaar merchants in the protests is “a particularly significant signal,” as it shows both the depth of the economic crisis and the widening rift between the state and its traditionally conservative social base.
Ghodsi argues that an “evolutionary revolutionary process” has been underway for years. Over roughly the past 17 years, gradual defections among political, economic, and intellectual elites have steadily weakened the foundations of the system.
“Iranian society today is multilayered and multi-coloured in intellectual, political, social, and economic terms,” he added. “While this diversity complicates coordination and leadership, it also reflects the depth and breadth of dissatisfaction across society.”
Repression, concessions, or intervention?
After more than two weeks of sustained protests, analysts have outlined several main scenarios for what may come next. The first is intensified repression, a path the Islamic Republic has taken before. Many argue, however, that the cost of this option is now significantly higher than it was in the past.
Siroos Mirzaei, a human rights activist and Iranian nuclear medicine specialist based in Austria, believes the possibility of a coup by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) cannot be dismissed.
“In my view, the regime will inevitably fall, but the scenarios differ. Perhaps there is a 30 percent chance that the opposition comes to power, and a 70 percent chance that the IRGC stages a coup and takes control, turning Iran into something resembling Pakistan.”
Mirzaei emphasises that fear has largely dissipated among the population. Regional developments, including the weakening or loss of Iran’s proxy forces such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, as well as the killing of several Iranian officials during the brief escalation between Iran and Israel in June of last year, have altered public perceptions of the state’s strength.
The scale of violence has already triggered international reactions. Countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, the Czech Republic, Belgium, and Portugal have summoned Iranian ambassadors to demand explanations for what they described as “horrific and brutal killings” of protesters.
A second scenario involves limited concessions or changes at the top of the political hierarchy without altering the fundamental nature of the system. But critics warn that such measures are unlikely to pacify the streets and may only postpone further unrest.
“In many authoritarian systems, the state can buy time through repression,” Nader Rajabi, a sociologist and researcher of social transformations, told The New Arab. “But when the majority of society can no longer imagine a future within the existing order, repression loses its deterrent effect and merely normalises violence.”
Iranian society, he argues, has entered a phase in which protest is no longer a spontaneous emotional reaction but part of everyday life. Sporadic strikes, civil disobedience, and the participation of new social groups from marginalised youth to segments of the urban middle class signal a shift in the pattern of resistance.
“Iran is approaching an inevitable transformation, but the form, timing, and cost of that change remain uncertain. What is clear is that society will not move backwards, even if politics lags behind society for a time.”
The third scenario increasingly discussed in analytical circles is foreign intervention, particularly as the death toll continues to rise. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to intervene in support of protesters in Iran, warning of unspecified “strong action” if the country executes demonstrators.
In response, Iranian officials have urged regional allies, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey, to prevent any US attack, while suspending direct contacts with American envoys and vowing to defend the country’s sovereignty against foreign interference.
Ghodsi points to the United Nations’ “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, adopted in 2005.
“If a government not only fails to protect its population but engages in mass killings, the international community has a legal basis for intervention. In practice, however, Russia and China’s veto power remains a major obstacle.”
On the question of foreign intervention, Mirzaei is more cautious, arguing that it would be effective only if carefully targeted.
Indiscriminate bombing, he says, would ultimately harm domestic activists, while strikes aimed at the regime’s top decision‑makers and core centres of power could have a meaningful impact.
The role of Reza Pahlavi
Against this backdrop, Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah, has gained renewed prominence, both domestically and internationally. His supporters hope for a restoration of the monarchy, but analysts caution against equating visibility with consensus.
White House envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly met secretly over the weekend with Pahlavi to discuss the ongoing protests, marking the first high-level contact between the Iranian opposition and the Trump administration since demonstrations began two weeks ago.
Mirzaei argues that Pahlavi currently plays the role of a transitional leader rather than a monarch-in-waiting.
“After Reza Pahlavi’s calls, people’s presence in the streets became more visible,” he says. “But this does not mean that Iranian society is monarchist. Leadership during a transition means guiding the process and then allowing people to decide through the ballot box.”
Mirzaei rejects the notion that Iran’s future must necessarily be a monarchy.
“Iranian society today has far greater political awareness than it did during the 1979 revolution,” he told The New Arab. “I have faith in this society’s ability to decide its own future after the fall of the Islamic Republic.”
Even if free elections are held, the monarchy would not necessarily command a majority. However, he adds that if Reza Pahlavi were to run for president, he would have a strong chance of winning.
Ghodsi echoes this assessment, noting that while many Iranians do not explicitly seek a return to monarchy, they have responded to Pahlavi’s messages and calls for action.
“His role at this moment is significant,” Ghodsi agrees. “Even some republican factions within the opposition have acknowledged that Pahlavi enjoys a tangible social base, with proposals such as forming a National Transitional Council emerging.”
Saeedeh Fathi is a journalist with over two decades of experience writing on Iran
Follow her on X: @fathi_saeede
This article is published in collaboration with Egab
Edited by Charlie Hoyle