What a new Black Sea grain crisis means for the Middle East

Ukrainian drones struck Russian cargo ships carrying stolen Ukrainian grain in the Sea of Azov in April.

Since then, drone attacks by both sides have intensified in the Black Sea region, continuing throughout the summer months.

"For Ukraine, targeting Russia’s oil revenues - and particularly the so-called shadow fleet that enables Moscow to circumvent sanctions - is an important part of increasing the economic cost of the war and degrading Russia’s ability to finance and sustain its military operations," Dr Yevgeniya Gaber, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program, told The New Arab.

In August, two Turkish-owned civilian ships, the Yaşar and the Nadezhda, were struck by drones after departing from the Russian port of Novorossiysk. In response, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry called for the safe passage of commercial shipping through the Black Sea.

“Russia has fewer sea drones, but it is using both planes and drones to track the Ukrainian navy. For Russia, the Black Sea is now mainly used to strike southern Ukraine and protect their own commercial shipping, since their fleet is now hidden in ports,” Clément Molin, an open-source analyst following the Ukraine conflict, told The New Arab.

“Ukraine’s UAVs are being constantly used to track Russian ships, and more than 200 commercial ships have been targeted, mainly from [Russia’s] ghost fleet,” he said.  “Ukraine has barely any navy but managed to create a new dimension of the war at sea with drones.”

No ceasefire in sight

On 13 August, Ukrainian drones hit the Russian port facility of Novorossiysk, damaging two grain export terminals. It wasn’t long before Russia carried out a wave of strikes in Ukraine’s Odesa Oblast, hitting food storage infrastructure.

“Russian forces have targeted Ukrainian ports, grain terminals, silos and export infrastructure throughout the war. What has changed is the scale and intensity of the pressure, including more attacks on civilian commercial vessels, warehouses and food-related infrastructure,” Gaber said. 

“The consequences are particularly serious for agricultural exports and, therefore, for food security well beyond Ukraine. Between 1 and 26 August, Ukraine exported only 822,000 tonnes of grain - around 21 percent of what it could normally have exported with functioning logistics," she added.

"Total agricultural exports, including grain, oilseeds, oils and meals, amounted to approximately 1.4 million tonnes, only around one-third of Ukraine’s potential export capacity during this period, according to the Ukrainian government."

On 27 August, The Wall Street Journal reported that wheat prices had reached a three-year high as the Black Sea fighting disrupted grain exports, with Odesa and Novorossiysk losing export capacity.

In late August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Russia was not ready for a ceasefire on grain shipments in the Black Sea. Moscow reportedly sought to include an end to attacks on Russian energy infrastructure in the agreement.

The Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have been a key way for Kyiv to bring the war back home to Russia after four and a half years of the full-scale invasion.

“The problem is not limited to attacks on ships themselves. Russia is targeting the infrastructure that makes maritime trade possible: ports, grain silos, warehouses, railway connections and other logistical nodes,” Gaber told The New Arab.  

“In July alone, Russia carried out 67 attacks on Ukrainian seaport infrastructure, 35 attacks on civilian vessels in ports, and 22 attacks on vessels operating through the Ukrainian maritime corridor.”

The attacks come as both Russia and Ukraine are in peak harvest season, and the grain will go to waste unless it is exported soon. Major commercial shipping firms are suspending operations due to the threat of drones in the Black Sea.

“This creates longer-term economic damage as well. Ukrainian farmers lose revenue from exports and face higher logistical costs, reducing the capital available to invest in the next planting season,” Gaber said.

Diplomatic tensions

The Turkish Foreign Ministry warned that the attacks could have “multifaceted negative repercussions”, including for food security.

“We therefore reiterate our call to all relevant actors, particularly the warring parties, to urgently implement concrete measures to ensure the safety of navigation in the Black Sea.”

The collapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which Turkey had helped facilitate, effectively ended in the summer of 2023. However, Ukraine and Russia were still able to ship their agricultural products to the international market by staying close to the coastlines.

To mitigate any diplomatic blowback, Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics at University College Dublin’s Clinton Institute, told The New Arab that Ukraine could signal that “we don’t want to be in this situation…of having to counter-attack against the Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The Russians put us in this situation”.

The politics surrounding grain shipments from the Black Sea to the Middle East have become an increasingly sensitive issue. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry noted that stolen grain exported by Russia was reaching Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria.

In April, Ukraine and Israel exchanged accusations over a Russian shadow fleet vessel that arrived in Israel carrying grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories.

“Diplomatically, Ukraine has limited means to stop these attacks as long as Russia is unwilling to respond to calls for de-escalation. Kyiv has repeatedly called for a ceasefire and negotiations to end the war, while Moscow has continued to intensify attacks on critical infrastructure," Gaber said.

"This is why Ukraine argues that diplomacy has to be backed by greater economic, political and military pressure on Russia. Middle Eastern countries also have an interest in making this message clear.”

Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and commercial shipping are not simply a bilateral Russian-Ukrainian issue, she said, as they directly affect the reliability and cost of food imports and therefore regional food security.

Syria and Egypt's food security

Over 90 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural exports are shipped through seaports, with countries in the Middle East especially vulnerable to prolonged disruptions in the global food supplies. Many have taken steps to mitigate these risks. In the spring, for example, Egypt reached a deal to receive grain shipments from Russia.

“In the case of Egypt, [it depends on] how much backstop they have from the Gulf States. Do they have alternative sources for supply?” Lucas told The New Arab.

Roughly 80 percent of Egypt’s wheat imports came from Black Sea ports in the first half of 2026.

The Emirati company Al Dahra Agriculture Trading and Egypt’s General Authority for Supply Commodities recently signed a five-year, $500 million wheat supply agreement. Egypt’s government has also imposed price controls on unsubsidised bread since March. In mid-August, Egypt expanded a cash subsidy scheme to cover more food items.

“Anytime you get a disruption to grain supplies, especially in countries that are already in a tenuous economic situation, you have to run it on a case-by-case basis on how well these countries prepared for such a shock. 2010 is a reminder of what can happen quickly,” Lucas added.

A poor harvest and high food prices in 2010 contributed to the uprising against the former regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, which lasted nearly 14 years.

“A lot of countries don’t want Syria to fail,” Lucas said, explaining that Syria could likely rely on Turkish and US assistance since the Trump Administration is interested in maintaining Syrian stability.

Likewise, Ukraine has sought to build up its own avenues of cooperation with the new Syrian government. 

“During President Zelensky’s visit to Damascus in April, food security was one of the issues discussed with President Ahmed al-Sharaa, alongside broader security and trade cooperation. Ukraine has offered to support Syria through initiatives such as Grain from Ukraine,” Gaber told The New Arab.

Syria has made progress in increasing its own domestic production of wheat. Benjamin Fève, a Senior Consultant at Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, told The New Arab that for now, Syria’s food supply was relatively safe.

“Syria had a very successful harvest. Its strategic reserves have been replenished, and Syria will be much less dependent on imports. Even if the food supplies are secure in the short term, in the medium and long term, they are not, given the huge variability in harvests and wheat production overall,” he said.

“In order to make Arabic flat bread, a staple food in Syria, you need 80 percent of soft wheat and 20 percent of hard wheat,” Fève added.

“Syria exports its surplus of hard wheat at a premium and imports less expensive soft wheat. Depending on where Syria sources its soft wheat, disruptions could cause food insecurity.”

Restarting negotiations

Changing weather patterns, conflicts, and high fuel prices are still significant concerns and could affect the food security of tens of millions of people dependent on the international grain trade. Still, the possibility of talks or a new Black Sea Grain Initiative between Russia and Ukraine appears distant.

“While Ukraine is offering additional grain supplies to countries that need them, Russia is attacking the ports, storage facilities and logistical infrastructure required to produce, store and export that grain,” Gaber told The New Arab.

The risk for the countries in the Mediterranean region and beyond remains present as long as the conflict shuts down the grain transits through the Black Sea.

“For Ukraine to play a stabilising role in food security across the Middle East and Africa, it first needs to be able to maintain production and secure access to the Black Sea. At present, Russia remains the principal obstacle to both," Gaber added.

Lucas noted that Ukraine has to find a way to get Russia to the negotiating table. “That hand was played very well by the Turks in supporting Ukraine in 2022. Can you do the same thing here?”

But while Ukraine has indicated that it wants to negotiate, Russia continues to pursue maximum demands.

The United States and the international community would have to put more pressure on Russia to reach an agreement. “If you can get that type of political strategy, you can put the onus on the Russians,” Lucas said.

Christopher Solomon is a Middle East analyst, researcher, editor, and writer based in the Washington, DC area. He is the author of the book In Search of Greater Syria (Bloomsbury)

Edited by Charlie Hoyle