What is Egypt's role in the new regional security order?

Egypt's current absence from the collective security pact signed between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, dubbed the ‘Mecca Agreement’, has brought renewed attention to Egypt’s security strategy towards its regional allies and the wider region.

While speculation surrounding Egypt’s absence from the agreement abounds, understanding Cairo’s position requires looking beyond the Mecca Agreement.

Egypt’s regional security posture has historically been shaped by a preference for strategic flexibility, driven by the recognition that its interests often require maintaining relationships with competing regional and international actors.

Today, this approach is being tested by an increasingly volatile regional environment marked by state and non-state threats, from Israel’s expanding regional wars to the US-Israel-Iran war and its fallout.

The complexities of this geostrategic environment have compelled Cairo to emphasise diplomacy, mediation, and issue-based security cooperation over concrete, bloc-based alignments.

Its rapprochement with Turkey, expanding security ties with major regional players including Saudi Arabia, and maintenance of diplomatic backchannels with rival actors underscore Egypt’s efforts to diversify its security partnerships while preserving the flexibility to engage across regional fault lines.

Security through diplomacy

A 1955 telegram from the US Embassy in Cairo to the US Department of State documented a tense exchange between then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and then US Assistant Secretary of State George Allen over Egypt’s acquisition of Czechoslovak arms.

During the exchange, Nasser expressed doubts about Washington’s reliability as a security partner and raised concerns about Israel’s growing influence and territorial ambitions, particularly the influence of the Herut party, the predecessor to today’s Likud.

The exchange reflects a key feature of Egyptian strategic thinking. Cairo has long been sceptical of overreliance on a single external security umbrella, preferring instead to preserve room for manoeuvre.

That instinct remains salient in Cairo’s approach today. "Egypt has largely focused on managing and balancing its bilateral relationships with all major regional players to address growing instability and threats,” Liam Karr, Africa Team Lead at the Critical Threats Project, told The New Arab.

Egypt’s security is increasingly being tested by instability beyond its immediate borders, primarily driven by Israel’s expanding regional wars and now compounded by the US-Israel-Iran war. Previously assumed to be relatively shielded from these developments, Egypt has increasingly found itself directly exposed to their consequences.

Israel’s war on Gaza heightened Egyptian threat perceptions, particularly amid Israeli calls at the time for the displacement of Palestinians into Sinai, a scenario Cairo repeatedly identified as a red line.

The war also brought Israeli incursions closer to Egyptian territory. Throughout the war, Israel repeatedly asserted control over the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow strip along the Egypt-Gaza border whose security arrangements have been shaped by the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and subsequent agreements.

“Egypt’s threat perception has been shaped particularly by Israel’s unilateral security expansionism. This perception led to a greater emphasis on mediation across regional fault lines, while balancing against Cairo’s rivals, first and foremost Israel,” Ahmed Aboudouh, Associate Fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told The New Arab.

Egypt’s response focused heavily on diplomacy. Alongside Qatar, Cairo maintained a central role in efforts to mediate between Israel and Hamas, positioning itself as an intermediary capable of communicating with multiple sides.

Earlier this month, US special envoy Jared Kushner met a Hamas delegation led by Khalil al-Hayya in Egypt, in a rare direct high-level meeting, to discuss implementation of the Board of Peace’s roadmap, namely the question of Hamas’s disarmament.

A durable end to the war on Gaza is vital to Egypt’s economic and security stability, particularly as the conflict continues to generate pressure along its border and across the Red Sea. Egypt’s economic vulnerabilities have raised the stakes. The Suez Canal, one of the country’s main sources of foreign currency, saw revenues collapse by roughly two-thirds at the height of Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.

The resumption of attacks on Red Sea shipping and rising regional tensions stemming from the US-Israel-Iran war further jeopardise Egypt’s economic security. Cairo also remains heavily reliant on Gulf investment and financial support, making stability across the Gulf and Red Sea increasingly inseparable from its own economic security.

The Egyptian economy has, however, shown some signs of recovery. In July, the IMF reinforced confidence in Egypt’s economic reform program, unlocking an additional $1.8 billion in funds after Cairo completed its latest review. That said, underlying vulnerabilities remain.

The widening geography of the US-Israel-Iran war was underscored in late July, when a drone struck Egypt’s Damietta port. The incident marked the first attack on Egyptian territory since the outbreak of the war, illustrating the interconnectedness of regional conflicts and directly exposing Egypt to new security threats. It also highlighted the urgency of reaching a durable resolution.

Egypt’s diplomatic leverage derives in large part from its ability to maintain relationships across divides. Earlier this year, Egypt used its diplomatic backchannel with the IRGC, an increasingly prominent decision-making actor in Iran, to help preserve a line of contact during a moment of heightened tension. Given the trajectory of regional dynamics, these channels are likely to remain important.

Egypt has also demonstrated a willingness to extend military support to its regional partners. During Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s visit to Abu Dhabi in May, he visited an Egyptian fighter detachment stationed in the UAE comprising Rafale jets and Egyptian pilots, alongside reports of Egyptian defensive deployments in Saudi Arabia.

Gulf security is closely aligned with Egyptian interests, but Cairo’s current absence from the Mecca agreement may reflect a recognition of the risks that a more hardened posture could invite, as well as a preference for maintaining strategic balance.

Issue-based cooperation over bloc alignment

Egypt maintains robust security relationships with all three members of the Mecca Agreement. Its current absence from the pact should therefore not be interpreted as a rejection of closer regional security cooperation.

Egypt and Turkey have considerably expanded their security cooperation as part of their broader political rapprochement. In June, the two countries conducted joint F-16 drills, the first exercise of its kind in almost two decades, building on the momentum generated by their 2025 joint maritime exercise, “Sea of Friendship.”

Ankara and Cairo have also pledged greater coordination on regional files including Sudan, Libya, and Gaza. Additionally, defence-industrial cooperation has expanded. Ankara and Cairo signed agreements worth approximately $350 million earlier this year aimed primarily at expanding joint production efforts.

These initiatives serve Egypt’s immediate defence needs while simultaneously enhancing regional strategic autonomy.

Cairo’s relationship with Riyadh is similarly deep. Egypt was among the 14 founding members of the Saudi-led Red Sea security maritime force. Its participation also builds on extensive experience in collective maritime security initiatives, including its current command, for the second time, of the Combined Maritime Forces’ Combined Task Force-153, the Red Sea focused task force.

“Egypt wants to be a central leader to regional approaches in its backyard, as shown by its involvement in the Sudan Quad, various multilateral security initiatives in the Red Sea, and the Libya and Palestine peace processes,” Karr told The New Arab.

Diversified partnerships

Participation in a formal collective security pact could strengthen deterrence, but it could also narrow Egypt’s room for manoeuvre and constrain its ability to mediate across regional divides.

“Egypt will maintain its cautious, defensive and risk-averse approach to avoid antagonising any party with leverage to pressure its direct national interests,” said Aboudouh.

Egypt will likely continue diversifying its security partnerships rather than committing to formal blocs. In line with this posture, China and Egypt are currently hosting the second iteration of their joint aerial exercise, "Eagles of Civilisation," from mid-August to early September, following the inaugural exercise held in 2025.

Strategically, Cairo will also have to guard against military overstretch as it manages simultaneous pressure across two turbulent fronts, the Middle East and the Nile Basin. Ethiopia's plans for three additional dams on the Nile have already drawn strong opposition from Cairo.

Managing these competing pressures will reinforce Egypt’s preference for diversified partnerships and strategic flexibility, allowing it to deepen cooperation where its interests converge while avoiding overreliance on any single security partner.

Hana Elshehaby is a Senior Research Assistant for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Options

Follow her on X: @hanaelshehaby_

Edited by Charlie Hoyle