What could an international security force in Gaza look like?

The push to implement an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza is gathering pace at the United Nations, with diplomats preparing a Security Council resolution that would grant the mission a UN mandate without turning it into a classic peacekeeping force.

The model under discussion, led by France, Britain, and the United States, borrows from Haiti’s multinational security mission: robust powers to police armed groups, but outside of the UN’s traditional blue-helmet architecture.

At the centre of the plan is Egypt, expected to lead the force given its shared border, intelligence links, and Arab legitimacy - though Cairo is still haggling over mandate, duration, and leadership, and has signalled preferences that range from a US-headed mission to insistence on Turkish participation under a clearly capped deployment.

Washington and European capitals are courting Muslim-majority contributors - with Indonesia publicly willing to deploy in large numbers and Azerbaijan floated as a politically convenient partner - while Israel pushes back hard on any Turkish boots on the ground.

Parallel to the security track, negotiators are sketching a civilian architecture: a Gaza International Transitional Authority of Palestinian technocrats, overseen by an international “Board of Peace,” to sequence disarmament, policing, and reconstruction.

Yet the biggest hurdles remain unresolved: who decommissions Hamas’s weapons, under what verification, and with which rules of engagement - all against a reconstruction bill north of $67–70 billion and a volatile ceasefire that could unravel the day any mandate proves too weak or too political to enforce.

From ceasefire to stabilisation

What began as a scramble to consolidate the latest ceasefire has evolved into a bid to internationalise Gaza’s security. In mid-October, US and European diplomats started drafting a UN Security Council text to authorise an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) with robust policing powers - not a classic blue-helmet mission, but a Haiti-style mandate able to confront armed groups and secure key nodes.

The force is nested in President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, which sequences hostage releases, a phased Israeli military pullback, and the handover of internal security to the ISF, alongside a civilian track that would empower a technocratic Palestinian committee under an international “Board of Peace”.

The political rationale is clear: neither Israel nor neighbouring Arab states want a security vacuum; Western capitals need a framework that looks multilateral; and donors require a baseline of order before pledging tens of billions for reconstruction.

But the operational mechanics remain hazy. Diplomats have yet to settle on whether the mandate sits under Chapter VII (enforcement) or a softer formulation; which rules of engagement would authorise searches, arrests, and weapons seizures; and how to structure de-confliction with Israeli forces as they step back from urban centres but keep a buffer zone.

The disarmament file is the biggest gap. British officials have floated Northern Ireland-style decommissioning - third-party verification, phased disposal starting with heavy weapons - to avoid the optics of surrender. Egypt has argued the force should stabilise, not wage counterinsurgency, and has linked its participation to a time-bound mandate and a sustained truce long enough to let armed factions transition into politics.

Parallel proposals, including a Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA), aim to align security with governance, but the PA’s role - reformed partner or political third rail - remains unresolved.

Finally, there is force generation. Names are circulating - Egypt at the centre, Indonesia publicly willing to deploy, Azerbaijan under discussion, Gulf states leaning toward funding and training - yet few have made concrete pledges. Until countries commit troops, settle the mandate, and define how Hamas weapons are verified “beyond use,” the ISF lives more on paper than on the ground.

Who will join the mission?

At the heart of the emerging security blueprint lies Egypt, widely expected to command the International Stabilisation Force. As Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty confirmed, the prospect for Cairo is double-edged: it offers prestige and strategic leverage, yet also a burden that could entangle Egypt in Gaza’s chronic instability.

Egyptian officials have already outlined conditions - a UN-approved mandate, a clearly limited duration, and a mission focused strictly on stabilisation, not counter-insurgency. As per media reports, Cairo wants the ISF to safeguard a long-term truce of up to ten years, allowing Hamas and smaller factions to demilitarise and re-enter Palestinian politics under international supervision.

The operational draft envisions a force of 4,000–5,000 troops, with Egypt providing the bulk and Muslim-majority partners filling out the ranks. At the UN General Assembly on 23 October, Indonesia pledged as many as 20,000 soldiers, contingent on a clear UN mandate; Azerbaijan is considered a symbolic yet diplomatically convenient contributor; Pakistan and Malaysia have signalled possible involvement; and the UAE and Qatar are likely to limit their roles to funding and training.

Western militaries like Australia, Canada, France, and Cyprus have also reportedly shown interest in contributing to the ISF, while providing advisers and logistical support from Israel, including British officers assisting a US cell that coordinates the mission’s rollout.

For Egypt, leading the ISF is less about Gaza itself than about shielding the Sinai border and reasserting its claim as the Arab world’s security anchor. Cairo views this as an opportunity to hard-wire its “red lines” into Gaza’s future order: no refugee spillover into Sinai, no re-arming of Hamas, and no external force acting without Egyptian oversight.

Yet the same role could backfire. The risks of being blamed for mission failure - or of becoming enmeshed in Gaza’s fragmented militias - may outweigh the diplomatic gains Egypt hopes to secure.

Turkey's ambitions and constraints

If Egypt embodies the pragmatic core of the Gaza stabilisation plan, Turkey represents its most polarising variable. Ankara has repeatedly signalled willingness to participate in the International Stabilisation Force, portraying itself as both a guarantor of Palestinian security and a bridge between the Muslim world and the West.

Richard Outzen, a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, told The New Arab that “Ankara under President Erdogan’s AK Party has a long-standing affinity for the Palestinian cause,” and that its motives for volunteering troops are “dual: to take visible and practical steps to protect civilians; and to enhance credibility as a regional security provider”.

Turkey’s participation, he adds, would also serve a deeper ambition: to reassert itself as a regional power after years of diplomatic isolation and strained relations with Western allies.

Economically, Erdogan’s construction-aligned business elite is already eyeing contracts in Gaza’s vast reconstruction drive; politically, the president seeks to reclaim his self-fashioned image as protector of Palestinian rights - a narrative that resonates domestically.

Yet as Outzen points out, “the very bad blood between President Erdogan and Prime Minister Netanyahu creates deep mistrust and makes it highly unlikely that Israel would agree to Turkish military participation”.

Even within NATO, Turkey’s open embrace of Hamas and its tense relations with Israel have weakened perceptions of neutrality essential for any peacekeeping mission.

Still, Outzen reminds that “Ankara has long been one of the largest contributors to multilateral peacekeeping in the Middle East and beyond,” suggesting that in another context, its participation could have bolstered, not undermined, the mission’s legitimacy.

Ultimately, Turkey may still shape Gaza’s reconstruction and diplomatic track - not through soldiers, but through influence. As Outzen concludes, “Ankara’s evolving defence diplomacy increasingly focuses on building partner capacity rather than simply observing or calming - a factor that makes Israel even warier of seeing Turkish troops in Gaza”.

Israel's calculus and security red lines

For Israel, the proposed international force cuts to the heart of its post-war doctrine: maintaining security control without formal occupation. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has cautiously endorsed US-led discussions on the ISF but continues to reject any Turkish involvement, calling it incompatible with Israeli security.

“By accepting the Trump plan, Netanyahu has agreed to the establishment of the ISF. Israel wants the US to clearly be the one in charge of this endeavour, and is generally reluctant toward UN intervention,” Nimrod Goren, President of the Mitvim Institute, told The New Arab.

For Tel Aviv, the hierarchy of control matters as much as the mission’s composition: Israel is determined to ensure that any UN resolution “does not challenge American dominance of the ISF”, he added.

Goren underlines that Israel’s priorities remain constant: “the disarmament of Hamas and making sure that Hamas does not play a role in future governance of Gaza”. This explains why Egypt’s leadership of the force - rather than any multilateral UN apparatus - is viewed as the least problematic path forward.

“Israel values Egypt’s involvement in Gaza-related issues and its capacity on this file,” Goren adds, noting that strategic cooperation during the war “brought tangible benefits, including hostage releases”.

Israeli defence planners see potential in the ISF as a temporary “firewall” against renewed Hamas activity, provided that coordination with the Israeli army remains tight. But, as Goren warns, long-term success would depend on more than just tactical cooperation.

“For genuine transformation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, progress toward a two-state solution is necessary. Israel’s current far-right coalition is not a partner for this, though - the 2026 elections will therefore be key.”

In short, Israel’s acceptance of the ISF is conditional: it must reinforce, not dilute, its security primacy. US mediation remains the linchpin - ensuring, as Goren puts it, that Israel “plays along with the plan and does not jeopardise it”.

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors

Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi