The arrest of Lebanon’s drug kingpin Nouh Zaiter last week, accused of trafficking Captagon and other narcotics, marked the latest push by the government to dismantle the drug networks that have poisoned its ties with Saudi Arabia.
In a major effort to dismantle drug networks, the Lebanese army has seized around 100 million Captagon pills in recent months across multiple raids, along with large quantities of chemical precursors used in their production.
The crackdown on Captagon aims not only to restore state control over areas long dominated by trafficking groups but also to mend ties with Saudi Arabia, whose relations with Beirut have been strained over the use of Lebanon as a hub for smuggling the drug from Syria into the Kingdom.
Hezbollah, security, and reforms
Such efforts have begun to bear fruit, as Saudi Arabia is cautiously exploring trade and investment ties with Lebanon.
However, full re-engagement will likely only come under strict security and political conditions, as the Saudis are wary of Lebanon’s persistent security challenges, political dysfunction, and its issue with Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Any real Saudi comeback will ultimately hinge on Beirut maintaining a steady drug crackdown, restoring security across the country, addressing Hezbollah’s arms, and pushing through concrete reforms.
“Saudi Arabia is more optimistic about Lebanon than before, but it is still adopting a very cautious approach,” David Wood, International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Lebanon, told The New Arab.
“This is best seen in its policy, like other potential donors, of withholding large-scale reconstruction aid until certain conditions are met, including the total disarmament of Hezbollah and Lebanon implementing the structural reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a financial rescue package.”
Saudi Arabia’s first signals of re-engagement with Lebanon emerged in mid-November, when reports indicated that Riyadh planned to boost commercial ties after Lebanese authorities curbed drug smuggling to the Kingdom.
Earlier this year, Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun’s March visit to Riyadh, his first state visit, signalled a renewed effort to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia.
Saudi re-engagement with Lebanon took shape last week, when a delegation led by Saudi envoy to Lebanon, Prince Yazid bin Farhan, visited Beirut. There, he met with Lebanese officials, and the delegation attended the “Beirut One” conference, set up to create a platform to attract foreign investment. The discussions also touched on the potential lifting of the ban on Lebanese exports.
On X, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Nawaf Salam renewed the pledge that “Lebanon will not be used as a platform to undermine the security of its Arab brothers or as a conduit for the smuggling of drugs or any other contraband”.
Regional geopolitics
Saudi Arabia’s push to re-engage with Lebanon is part of a high-stakes regional game for Lebanon.
Since last year’s Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, Beirut has pledged to implement reforms to gain US and international support, contingent on Hezbollah’s disarmament - a demand the group rejects.
However, Lebanon’s path towards change remains constrained by instability, with daily Israeli strikes and growing US pressure to disarm Hezbollah.
Lebanon is also part of US President Donald Trump’s efforts to stabilise the region after Gaza’s fragile ceasefire, with Saudi Arabia potentially playing a key political and economic role in supporting Lebanon’s recovery.
In recent years, Saudi-Lebanese relations have had ups and downs. Saudi Arabia helped broker the 1989 Taif Agreement that provided the basis to end the Lebanese civil war, invested billions in Lebanon’s reconstruction following civil war, and backed Sunni leaders like the Hariri family to counter Iran’s growing influence and Hezbollah’s rise.
Ties, however, worsened with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, a key political ally of Riyadh, and further deteriorated after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, after which Hezbollah consolidated its power in Lebanon.
Another political crisis hit in 2017 when Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced his resignation from Riyadh, widely viewed as Saudi pressure over Hezbollah’s dominance.
Relations further deteriorated in 2021 after a Lebanese minister criticised Saudi involvement in the war in Yemen, leading Riyadh to withdraw its ambassador, ban Lebanese imports amid Captagon smuggling concerns, and impose a travel ban on its citizens that deepened Lebanon’s economic strain.
In 2022, however, Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, announced that it was reinstating its ambassador to Beirut, a signal of a cautious diplomatic thaw.
Lebanese exports to Saudi Arabia exceeded $200 million annually between 2016 and 2020, before falling sharply to around $124 million in 2021 and collapsing in 2022–2025, according to data from the Lebanese Customs. A revival of trade between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon could provide a significant boost to the Lebanese economy, which remains under severe strain.
Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, told TNA that recent Saudi signals are cautious yet genuine.
“Riyadh wants a path back into Lebanon, and it sees an opening to erode Iranian influence,” he said. However, “it will not gamble serious money while Hezbollah remains powerful within the government and continues to obstruct governance reform,” he added.
“The instinct is to test the waters, build options, and move only when risk falls to a level that commercial logic can defend.”
Saudi Arabia’s conditions for Lebanon, however, are likely to extend beyond curbing Hezbollah and Iran’s influence in the country. Riyadh may also expect the Lebanese government to implement political and economic reforms as a prerequisite for potential investment in the country.
Wood explained that Lebanon wants to re-engage with Saudi Arabia to improve its economic outlook, but, as well as the issue with Hezbollah’s disarmament, there are major domestic obstacles that still block the reform package.
This is due to “various vested interests in Lebanon, various financial and political elites, who still do not seem to have reached a consensus that they need to support this reform package, even though one of the potential prizes of implementing these reforms could be more engagement from Saudi Arabia, including financial support”, Wood said.
Some of Lebanon’s long-delayed reforms have begun to move forward. In April 2025, Parliament passed a strengthened banking-secrecy law that allows judicial and regulatory bodies to access up to a decade of bank records.
Lawmakers have also approved a long-stalled bank-restructuring bill, though its full implementation still depends on the separate “financial gap” law that would determine how Lebanon’s massive estimated $80 billion in financial losses are shared. Meanwhile, broader reforms urged by the IMF, like as a loss-distribution plan and capital controls, remain unresolved.
These steps are crucial not only for unlocking an IMF program but also for restoring investor confidence, including from Saudi Arabia.
“These measures are not ideological totems,” Krieg said. “They determine whether cash flows are bankable, whether money can be kept away from political capture, and whether external partners can trust the state to deliver.”
Israel's threats toward Lebanon further complicate Saudi Arabia’s economic re-engagement.
A potential Israeli escalation in Lebanon, aimed at countering Hezbollah’s alleged rearmament efforts, risks deepening instability and deterring investment.
“Saudi Arabia would understandably be very reluctant to invest in reconstruction in Lebanon until there’s a permanent end to the war,” Wood said.
This likely applies not only to Saudi Arabia but also to other investors, who need the southern front to stabilise before they can assess risks and determine the viability of their investments.
“Each episode of fire across the border or a deep strike resets insurance, unsettles logistics, and chills tourism and trade,” Krieg said. “Riyadh will look for calm that is monitored and durable, along with practical steps that reassert state authority in sensitive areas. Without that baseline, even cleverly structured projects will struggle to proceed.”
Despite its caution, Saudi Arabia has never fully severed ties with Lebanon. It repeatedly condemned Israeli aggression on Lebanon and publicly stated its support for the country. France is also trying to convince Riyadh to support and host a conference to strengthen the Lebanese Army.
Krieg explained that Saudi re-engagement could pick up if Lebanon shows real progress, but any renewed violence, stalled reforms, or resumed smuggling would quickly reinforce Saudi red lines.
“On present evidence, Saudi policy will remain phased and hardheaded. There is intent, rooted in a desire to curb Iranian sway, yet there will be no leap of faith,” he said.
This cautious stance contrasts sharply with its approach to Syria, where Saudi Arabia is going all-in, pledging to invest more than $6 billion in infrastructure, energy, and telecoms to expand influence, counter Iranian influence, and curb Captagon manufacturing and trafficking.
In Lebanon, Saudi’s approach is a “wait and see”; in Syria, it is a high-stakes bet.
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights
Follow him on X: @DarioSabaghi