In recent years, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have pursued security diversification as a core pillar of their defence strategies.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s recently announced Mutual Defence Agreement exemplifies this trend.
The pact, which marks a significant upgrade in their bilateral relationship and declares that an attack on one nation would be an attack on both, positions Pakistan as a key regional security partner and reflects the increasing complexity of Gulf security dynamics.
Navigating an increasingly volatile regional security environment, Gulf states are evolving their strategies to diversify partners, accelerate domestic capability development, and strengthen intra-regional cooperation.
The guarantor model in the Gulf's security strategies
Saudi Arabia’s selection of Pakistan as a security partner illustrates the continued centrality of the United States in the Gulf’s security frameworks.
“Saudi wanted to signal to the US that if Washington cannot protect them, they will look elsewhere, but interestingly Riyadh picked a US ally,” Rob Geist Pinfold, Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College in London, told The New Arab.
The Gulf states are responding to an evolving global and regional landscape while accounting for the deep embeddedness of the US as the region’s foremost security partner.
Rashid Al Mohanadi, Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, highlighted that “the intertwinement of the US in the GCC’s defence ecosystem(s) makes sudden shifts difficult”.
These challenges are compounded by minimal engagement from other major powers.
China, for instance, is often cited as a viable alternative partner. Yet Beijing has so far shown little inclination to extend security guarantees. More broadly, its physical global security footprint is limited to only one overseas base in Djibouti.
A broader Chinese role is complicated by a number of factors. Beijing’s strategic priorities lie in the Indo-Pacific, its domestic politics have grown increasingly contentious in recent years, and its foreign policy is underpinned by non-alignment and non-interference principles, all of which constrain its ability to extend security commitments.
Although the Gulf states are among China’s primary energy suppliers and all six GCC states are party to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s foremost concern is securing its economic interests, not entanglement in the region’s complex geopolitics. China also benefits from the US security umbrella in the region, which indirectly helps safeguard its investments.
For the Gulf, China has yet to demonstrate a tangible effort to uphold regional security. Its most notable contribution to the war on Gaza was convening rival Palestinian factions for the signing of the Beijing Declaration in 2024, a largely symbolic endeavour.
Beijing’s notable absence during the 12-day war between Iran and Israel further reinforced its reluctance to engage in regional security. These factors challenge the prospects of China emerging as a comprehensive regional security partner.
Doubts surrounding the future of Washington’s role in Gulf security should therefore not translate to expectations of a broadened Chinese role, at least not in the short to medium term.
The Gulf states’ diversification drive will likely continue with a focus on attracting established military powers into the Gulf’s orbit.
“In the foreseeable future, it appears as if the GCC states will remain dependent on more militarily muscular foreign powers for their national defence and increasingly look to Pakistan and Türkiye,” Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk consultancy, told The New Arab.
However, a sustainable Gulf security architecture must be imagined beyond the confines of great power competition and instead focus on enhancing regional mechanisms and drawing on allies’ longstanding experience to build domestic capabilities.
GCC ripe for security integration
The Gulf’s recent push for enhanced cooperation, signalled by the launch of the GCC’s Vision for Regional Security in 2024, could accelerate momentum for collective frameworks, support fostering intra-regional trust, advance joint security initiatives, and integrate defence industrial capabilities.
The 2001 GCC Joint Defence Treaty already contains language mirroring collective defence commitments, with Article 2 stipulating that “member states consider that any attack on any of them is an attack on all of them and any threat to one of them is a threat to all of them”. The Pakistan-Saudi defence agreement is critical in that regard.
It “is significant because it introduces a mutual-defence pledge which marks one of the strongest formal commitments Riyadh has entered outside the GCC,” Elham Fakhro, Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Middle East Initiative, told TNA.
Bolstering the Peninsula Shield Forces, the military arm of the GCC, which was established in 1984, will be essential to coordinating joint responses. The force held its first large-scale exercise, “Takamul 1”, in Kuwait in 2023, with the next planned for 2027 in the UAE.
In February 2025, Major General Abdulaziz bin Ahmed Al Balawi was appointed as the force’s new commander. These steps all indicate progress towards institutionalising the force, which will be vital to cementing the frameworks necessary for a collective defence posture.
They can be supplemented by exploring avenues to “jointly defend and survey GCC airspace, conduct joint multi-domain operations, and effective intelligence sharing,” noted Al Mohanadi.
The Gulf is also advancing industrial defence cooperation. Earlier this year, UAE defence conglomerate EDGE struck its largest deal in the MENA with Kuwait. The $2.4 billion deal will see Kuwait acquire eight naval patrol vessels.
Albeit limited in scope, these initiatives promote intra-regional collaboration by leveraging financial capital for the joint development of defence R&D and production across the Gulf.
Expanding ties with countries that have invested in enhancing their strategic autonomy can inform the Gulf’s individual and collective defence trajectories. Pakistan’s growing role as a major security partner is a case in point.
Earlier this month, Bahrain’s Chief of Defence Staff General Thiab Al-Nuaimi met Pakistan Air Force Chief Marshal Zaheer Sidhu to discuss multi-domain operations. This follows Pakistan’s deployment of the Chinese J-10C fighter jet in combat in June, which marked the jet’s first operational use and highlights the Gulf’s awareness of emerging security players and adaptability to shifting dynamics.
Intra-regional trust will be indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of durable cooperative frameworks. UAE President Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed’s near-immediate visit to Qatar, in the aftermath of Israel’s attack on Doha, accompanied by a delegation which included Defence Minister Sheikh Hamdan Al Maktoum, is reflective of the Gulf states’ recognition that coordination will be imperative to addressing regional instability.
The cooperation imperative
External powers, particularly the United States, will continue to play a crucial role in the Gulf’s security architecture given the deep historical, technical, and political ties linking the region to Washington. Recent developments underscore this reality.
While the Gulf states are diversifying their partners, they are not seeking to overhaul the US role. “Saudi’s agreement with Pakistan is less about replacing the United States than about hedging risks and signalling that Riyadh does have other options,” explained Fakhro.
The role of external powers, however, should be recalibrated to place greater focus on supporting indigenous defence and security development through knowledge and technology transfer and capacity building.
Overreliance on guarantees is unsustainable since a guarantor’s direct involvement will ultimately depend on its perceived interests and gains from intervention.
Debates over the future of Gulf security should therefore move beyond weighing guarantor effectiveness or seeking substitutes. Instead, Gulf states should prioritise efforts to chart a unified path, rooted in trust, comprehensive cooperation, and strategic autonomy.
Hana Elshehaby is a Research Assistant for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs’ Foreign Policy Program. Her research interests include GCC foreign policy, regional security frameworks, and the Asian powers' expanding political relations with the Middle East.
Follow her on X: @hanaeIshehaby