Since June 2022, when powerful Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ordered the parliamentary bloc's lawmakers to resign en masse, his absence from Iraq's political institutions has created a significant vacuum in the country's Shia-dominated power structure.
With the 11 November elections approaching, speculation has intensified about his next move, fuelling talk of a "strategic retreat" that could precede a dramatic political comeback.
Al Sadr has dominated Iraq's political landscape for over two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, after the March 2003 invasion, wielding influence through a combination of grassroots mobilisation, militia power, and strategic positioning within the country's fractious Shia establishment. Yet his path to prominence was neither inevitable nor swift.
He is the youngest son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, one of Iraq's most influential Shia religious figures until his assassination in 1999, an act widely attributed to agents of Saddam Hussein's regime.
The murder left a legacy of resistance within the al-Sadr family, particularly among followers who saw the elder cleric as a martyr to the dictatorship.
Sadr had announced his withdrawal from Iraq's political process in June 2022 after his bloc, which had won the largest number of seats in the previous October 2021 parliamentary elections, failed to form a government.
Despite winning 73 seats out of 329, the Sadr movement could not assemble a coalition, as competing Shia factions within the Coordination Framework bloc refused to allow the formation of a majority government.
The subsequent confrontation turned violent.
After clashes between Sadr supporters and rival Shia militia groups left 33 people dead and hundreds wounded, security forces imposed a sweeping curfew in Baghdad. Sadr then ordered his followers to withdraw from the Green Zone and parliament within hours, later releasing a televised address expressing regret over the violence.
Not a complete withdrawal
Political analyst Ayed Al Hilali argues that Sadr's abstention from the coming elections represents “one of the most significant variables in Iraq's political landscape, creating both a political and popular vacuum in the Shia arena, particularly given that the movement commands an organised, active grassroots base spread across multiple provinces”.
However, Hilali suggests this stance should not be read as a permanent exit.
“This is not a complete withdrawal from political life," he told The New Arab, "but rather a tactical repositioning aimed at monitoring the landscape and reassessing the balance of power among competing forces”.
According to Hilali, Sadr appears to believe that participating under current conditions would be interpreted as abandoning his reformist principles, so he prefers to remain a "cautious observer" while preserving his political and social leverage.
Waiting for the moment
Analysts close to the Sadr movement suggest he is preparing for a new political project that transcends traditional power-sharing arrangements and aims at comprehensive systemic reform.
They point to signs that even Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani and elements within the Coordination Framework have reportedly offered Sadr the premiership in an attempt to appease or co-opt him - an offer he has apparently rejected.
"Sadr is not outside the political game permanently," Hilali contends. "He is in a state of strategic retreat, waiting for the right moment to return."
He notes that Iraq's volatile political environment, combined with Sadr's substantial popular base, gives him the capacity to reposition himself rapidly should internal or regional dynamics shift.
"If electoral results produce new blocs that threaten the balance of power or seek to definitively exclude him from the political equation," Hilali told TNA.
"Sadr could mobilise street pressure or gradually return through mobilising rhetoric centred on 'protecting the people's will' and 'fighting corruption' - slogans that have consistently proven effective at rapidly remobilising his base."
A powerful absence
Essam al-Fili, professor of political science at Al-Mustansiriya University, emphasises that whether Sadr participates in legislative, executive, or other institutions, he remains the largest force in Iraq's political landscape due to his vast grassroots base spanning multiple provinces, a deterrent force that other political actors must carefully calculate.
According to al-Fili, Sadr appears to be preparing to leverage his popular power against endemic state corruption, a problem he attributes to parties that have repeatedly reproduced themselves through electoral laws without demonstrating genuine reform commitments.
“Sadr possesses important files he may disclose at the opportune moment," al-Fili noted to TNA, "putting traditional political forces before a genuine internal challenge rooted in their mentality of monopolising power and competing for high-resource ministries, without advancing any genuine national project for state-building”.
Sadr's recent manoeuvres
Recent developments have intensified speculation about Sadr's intentions.
In recent weeks, he made a notable visit to the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Najaf, Iraq's primary Shia religious authority. While images and videos circulated widely on social media showing his arrival and departure, the contents of their discussion remain unknown.
The visit carries symbolic weight in Iraq's power structure.
Researcher and academic Mujahed al-Tamimi, who maintains close ties to Sadr's movement, suggests that Sadr is concealing the features of a new project for the future.
“His recent statements and positions reflect anticipation and preparation for a pivotal stance following the announcement of parliamentary election results, particularly given accelerating regional, international, and domestic changes”.
Tamimi indicates that this project likely carries "the blessing of the supreme religious authority in Najaf, represented by al-Sistani," and suggests Sadr is positioning himself "to advance a project that transcends the idea of forming a new government toward comprehensive reform of the entire political system".
Beyond government formation
Political analyst Rafed al-Attwani, who maintains proximity to Sadr's circles, argues that "over the past year, Sadr has been fundamentally reassessing the political landscape from a deeper strategic perspective, seeking to entrench the position of the National Shia Trend (the movement's new official name) in decisions affecting the state's destiny".
According to al-Attwani, even forces considered hostile to Sadr cannot overlook his influence on major national questions, given his substantial popular weight and broad political impact.
Al-Attwani reveals that before al-Sudani was appointed prime minister, the movement rejected an offer to form a complete government, including the premiership and six ministerial portfolios, insisting instead on a majority government as "the sole path to genuine reform".
The Sadrists, he explains, "left the field to the Coordination Framework to test its choices while monitoring developments precisely". But this is not the first time Sadr has announced his withdrawal from politics.
In 2007, he announced his resignation and travelled to Iran in protest against the US military presence and to pursue religious studies, pledging not to reconsider unless the last American soldier left Iraq. Yet in 2010, before the American withdrawal, he returned to politics after his bloc won 39 seats.
After further clashes between his supporters and rival militias around 2013, Sadr announced another withdrawal, only to reverse course shortly after. He withdrew again in 2014 and 2016, and repeatedly threatened to do so on various occasions throughout the past decade.
The external factor
Al-Attwani emphasises that "the Sadr current completely rejects subordination to any external force, whether American or Iranian, and considers decisions that do not serve national interests categorically unacceptable".
He highlights the appointment of a new US envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, as adding another dimension to the political calculation, with Washington seemingly seeking expanded influence through long-term economic partnerships, a development he suggests may motivate Sadr's eventual re-engagement.
According to al-Attwani, Sadr's main intervention in government formation would likely occur only if objectionable or vetoed figures receive nomination, a scenario that could prompt "decisive intervention" from the movement.
The unpredictable variable
As Iraq approaches November elections, the Sadr movement remains the most uncertain variable in an already complex political equation. Analysts largely concur that his current withdrawal represents a calculated pause rather than a permanent exit, one that positions him to reshape Iraqi politics according to his strategic calculus.
Whether he will remain outside institutions or emerge as a kingmaker, reformer, or destabilising force depends on how election results unfold and how other political actors manoeuvre in the coming months.
What remains clear to observers is that no major political settlement in Iraq can be finalised without accounting for Sadr's position and interests, making his next move one of the most closely watched developments in the country's political calendar.
This article is published in collaboration with Egab