On 31 July, Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani travelled to Russia to meet his counterpart Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin.
Al-Shaibani’s visit to Moscow was his first since Russian-aligned President Bashar Al-Assad was ousted in December 2024.
Despite the enduring trauma of Russian airstrikes on Syrian civilian areas and Russia’s years-long labelling of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a terrorist group, the tone of al-Shaibani’s engagement with Russian officials was cordial.
He emphasised Syria’s desire to have Russia “by our side” and Lavrov extolled Russia’s “long-standing friendship” with the Syrian people.
While al-Shaibani’s trip to Moscow is unlikely to stimulate a drastic expansion in Russia-Syria cooperation, it underscores the partnership’s post-regime change resilience.
Syria regards Russia as a valuable hedge partner against Western countries and values Russian energy and agricultural supply chains. Syria also wishes to solicit Russian security assistance against Israel.
Russia has limited willingness to aid Syria in this cause, but it nonetheless sees solidarity with Damascus as a necessary precondition for maintaining its military facilities on the Syrian coast.
The resilience of Russia's post-Assad partnership
During the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, a mood of despondency prevailed in Moscow. An 8 December article in Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti declared, “No matter how you look at it, the situation in Syria is not just bad, but frankly catastrophic”.
The perception that Turkey had outflanked Russia in a zone of critical interest in the Middle East also prevailed. Media coverage of deceased ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir Zhirinvosky’s “prophecy” that Assad would fall to a Turkish intervention circulated widely.
Despite this grim outlook, Russian diplomats quietly sought to establish an understanding with Syria’s new authorities. Within hours of Assad’s demise, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that Russia was in talks with HTS about the preservation of its bases.
These negotiations did not go smoothly. Obeida Arnaout, the HTS-appointed spokesman for Syria’s new government, urged Russia to “reconsider” its military presence in Syria.
Russia responded ambiguously by withdrawing key military infrastructure from its Tartous naval and Khmeimim air bases, while keeping the facilities operational. Russia banked on the fact that continued Western sanctions against Syria and intolerance towards HTS’s heavy-handed treatment of ethnic minorities would lead to a thaw in Moscow-Damascus relations.
This assumption proved correct. In late December 2024, Syria’s new leader, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, hailed Russia as an “important country” and declared, “We don’t want Russia to exit Syria in a way that undermines its relationship with our country”.
Al-Sharaa’s rhetoric convinced Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov to visit Syria in January 2025 to discuss the future of its bases in the country.
Bogdanov’s visit was overshadowed by Russia’s rejection of Al-Sharaa’s push to extradite Assad, but it laid the foundation for a more robust rapprochement. On 12 February, Putin called Al-Sharaa for the first time and pledged his support for Syria’s new leadership.
In April 2025, Al-Sharaa emphasised Syria’s historical dependence on Russia for arms and power plants as a critical factor in their bilateral relationship.
The Russian Foreign Ministry’s strident condemnation of Israel’s “arbitrary use of force in Syria” after the July 2025 strikes on Damascus further aided the improvement of bilateral relations and set the stage for al-Shaibani’s Moscow visit.
Russia's pursuit of economic opportunities in post-Assad Syria
While Russian companies had explored wide-ranging reconstruction opportunities in Syria before Assad’s fall, economic engagement between the two countries effectively ceased with his overthrow.
On 13 December, Russian grain supplies to Syria halted over payment delays, and two vessels carrying Russian wheat did not dock in Syrian ports. Russia also did not compensate for the simultaneous cessation of Iranian oil shipments to Syria’s Baniyas Port.
The legacies of the post-2011 Syrian civil war continue to restrict Russia’s economic presence. Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat and co-founder of People Demand Change, told The New Arab that the Syrian people want Russia to pay reparations, and Russia wants the new Syrian government to pay off Assad-era debts.
Despite these negative headwinds, there have been some recent signs of Russian economic re-engagement with Syria. On 20 April, a ship carrying 6,600 tons of Russian wheat arrived in the coastal Syrian region of Latakia. While this shipment was a tiny dent in Syria’s drought-induced 2.5 million to 2.7 million wheat production shortfall, it had symbolic resonance.
Immediately after Assad’s fall, two Russian vessels filled with wheat did not dock in Syrian ports as planned. Chechnya’s leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, tried to reassure Syrians by claiming that he would personally intervene if Russian wheat shipments were disrupted. Nonetheless, Russia did not resume wheat exports, and Syria turned to Ukraine to ameliorate its food insecurity.
On 13 March, Ukraine’s Agricultural Minister Vitalii Koval announced the shipment of 3,850 tons of flour and declared that it would feed 60,000 Syrians for six months. As President Volodymyr Zelensky wants to convert agricultural diplomacy into a broader expansion of Syria-Ukraine cooperation, Russia leveraged its wheat exports to outflank Kyiv.
Russia is also playing a part in easing Syria’s energy supply crisis. On 23 February, the sanctioned Barbados-flagged Proxima oil tanker sailed from Russian waters and abruptly changed its automatic identification system (AIS) destination from Mersin, Turkey, to Baniyas, Syria.
This clandestine oil shipment was followed by Russia’s supply of Arctic crude in 100,000-ton tranches. This crude plays a crucial role in powering Syria’s oil refineries.
The lifting of Western sanctions is unlikely to torpedo Syria’s revived economic cooperation with Russia. Nikita Smagin, a Baku-based expert on Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East, told The New Arab that Al-Sharaa is concerned that the West could reimpose sanctions over the repression of Syrian ethnic minorities.
Smagin contends that Russia’s lack of sensitivity to these issues will keep it in the fray as a partner for Syria.
Prospects for Russia's security partnership with Syria
Aside from maintaining transactional economic ties with Russia, Syria also wishes to maintain security cooperation with Russia. This fact surprises many Western analysts, who extensively covered Russia’s airstrikes against Syrian civilians, but aligns with Al-Sharaa’s broader multipolar foreign policy vision.
Resul Serdar, a senior correspondent at Al Jazeera English who is based in Turkey, told The New Arab that even a few days after Assad’s fall, Syria was much more willing to engage with Russia than Iran.
When he spoke with a member of the new Syrian government in December 2024, Serdar recalled Syria’s reluctance to expel Russian military bases from the country and desire to avoid overreliance on Western countries.
This commitment to a multi-vector foreign policy has translated into an enduring Russian presence in Syria. Dutch journalist Rena Netjes, who has reported extensively in Syria since the civil war’s inception, told The New Arab that Russia maintains a presence at Qamlishi Airport in northeastern Syria, where Hezbollah also had its headquarters.
Netjes noted that this presence has endured despite credible allegations that Russia supported an insurgency from Assad loyalists on Syria’s coast.
Aside from trying to diversify its security partnerships, Syria hopes that Russia will help it against the threat posed by Israeli airstrikes.
When he spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 28 July, Putin expressed support for Syria’s territorial integrity. Syrian officials also hope that Russia will pair this diplomatic pressure with arms transfers.
The entry of Ka-52 attack helicopters and medium-range Pantsir S-1 air defence systems into Qamlishi airport substantiates this optimism. Nonetheless, the precedent set by Russia's inaction when Israel attacked Iran in June provides ample grounds for sobriety.
While Syria’s path to reconstruction still lies through an influx of Gulf and Western investment, it sees value in maintaining residual elements of its decades-long partnership with Russia.
Through a combination of agricultural exports, energy sales, and open-ended security guarantees, Russia is set to remain a noteworthy player in post-Assad Syria.
Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. Samuel is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin's War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International
Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2