A new Red Sea strategy: Iran, the Houthis, and Sudan's war

In mid-June, Yemen’s anti-Houthi National Resistance Forces (NRF), led by General Tareq Saleh and based in Mocha, intercepted what is said to be the largest seizure of Iranian advanced conventional weapons since the start of the ongoing civil war in March 2015.

The presence of drone engines and other components among the 750 tons of munitions and hardware further illustrates how the flow of Iranian weapons and technology to actors along the Red Sea, including Sudan, sustains a number of threats, not just against Israeli vessels.

The weapons trade in the region continues to adapt in the hands of legacy smugglers and new methods by state actors.

In the decade of conflict since the Houthis took over Sanaa in September 2014, smuggling routes sustaining Houthi arsenals have shifted from overland through Mazyyuna in the eastern province of al-Mahra to the “front door” route and the overt use of commercial shipping from Bandar Abbas, unloading at the port of Salif in Hodeidah.

Early in the conflict, the Houthis and Iran utilised dhows and fishing boats to transfer weapons from mother ships along the Red Sea. Two developments have disrupted this: the establishment of Combined Task Force (CTF) 153 in 2022 and the departure of Iran’s spy ships from the Bab al-Mandab area in late 2014.

These developments, including mounting pressure on Oman from the US administration to contain Houthi activities, have undoubtedly forced Houthis and Iran to shift their operations further west.

While all eyes remain on Iran and Houthi relations with actors across the Horn of Africa, such as Al-Shabab, some Yemeni analysts have observed that the Houthi presence in Sudan goes back to 2001.

The evolving relationship with Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC) is a vital strategic move by both Iran and the Houthis.

Sudan's role

Iran-Sudan rapprochement in 2023 was not only aimed at expanding Iran’s strategic depth, but eventually became vital for TSC chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The STC government based in Port Sudan received Iran’s ambassador in July 2024, signalling a major pivot toward East Africa as Iran sought to project power and box in its regional opponents, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, while reestablishing ties with Sudanese officials and the country’s defence industry.

Since the start of the ongoing civil war in Sudan, the Houthis have expanded their presence, following in Iran’s footsteps. While Iran seeks to increase its influence in Sudan, primarily shaping the conflict through an influx of weapons supplied to the army and intelligence support, the Houthis adopted a business-first relationship involving weapons smuggling to Yemen and the Horn of Africa.

“It seems likely that one of the key motives behind Houthi involvement in Africa is the search for revenue through selling goods, particularly weapons,” says Ari Heistein, a research fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

As Iran builds warehouses and “armed factories” beyond Port Sudan, the Houthis have claimed to focus on the delivery of humanitarian aid and social media campaigns against rivals of the Sudanese army.

The Israeli and US war against Iran has weakened Tehran’s posture, and by extension, its Axis of Resistance. Sudan’s strategic location along the Red Sea and across Saudi Arabia grants Iran an option to project regional and international pressure, as well as compensate for Houthi weaknesses following heavy bombardment by US forces during Operation Rough Rider and a campaign by Israel that has eliminated a number of high-ranking Houthi officials.

Iranian weapons in Sudan

There is much scepticism among international observers over the strength of the relationship with Burhan’s government, which includes a number of Islamist militia groups like the al-Bara’a Ibn Malik Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces, but evidence abounds across battle fronts.

The “bilateral relationship was prominent under al-Bashir, [and] fast forward to today, Tehran is able to capitalise on the chaos to inject their own influence and military hardware,” Dr Theodore Karasik told The New Arab.

Iran’s growing influence in Sudan aims to project power beyond the flow of weapons, as continued sway in the country is vital for maintaining a naval base along the Red Sea.

Tehran considers the SAF as a tactical partner in order to improve relations with Arab states, while granting the Houthis, an integral component of Iran’s strategy in the region, platform options for operations against Israel and to maintain pressure on Saudi Arabia.

The strongest evidence of the relationship lies in the weapons, specifically drones, shared by the Houthis and Sudan, the most common of which includes Iran’s Ababil-2 (Ababil-T), labelled the Qasef-2K by Yemen’s Houthis and Safaroog in Sudan.

The flow of weapons from Iran is said to have been crucial in allowing the army to recapture Khartoum, while high-frequency ‘Fajr-1’ radar systems along the coastal areas north of Port Sudan grant Iran and Houthis expanded capabilities for operations along the Red Sea.

Sudan’s military has also deployed Iranian-manufactured Mohajer-6 drones, used by the Houthis to target Israel, along with Shahed-136 type drones. The number of weapons delivered seems significant enough for Iran to have reportedly built new hangars at the Port Sudan airport to house them all.

Other media reports claim that shipments identified recently were transported covertly to Port Sudan on cargo flights from Iran’s Qeshm Fars Air. Earlier this year, satellite photography reportedly identified deliveries of Iranian Mohajer-4, Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones to Port Sudan.

Dr Theodore Karasik, a non-resident scholar at Jamestown Foundation, points to “two or three ports [that] play a role sometimes,” including along Sudan’s northern borders, to facilitate Houthi trade and commercial activities when “cargo can be suspicious until proven otherwise, given the maritime security environment”.

The Houthis also claim to have set up organisations that deliver humanitarian aid through Port Sudan.

Iranian officials have admitted building facilities across Port Sudan, further supporting links with the Sudanese military beyond verification linking Mohajer and Ababil drone manufacturing to companies operating under Iran's Ministry of Defence.

The flow of such weapons from Iran to Sudan and Yemen aims to shape conflicts beyond the ongoing civil wars, in support of long-term strategic interests across the region.

To disrupt Iran’s gains, regional and Western powers would have to go beyond maritime security operations and increase their efforts to end the wars in Sudan and Yemen.

Because of wider regional conflicts, the civil wars in Sudan and Yemen threaten further conflict - from the Horn of Africa into Central Africa and beyond to Israel - as the Houthis' small arms and drones have now made their way toward Sinai.

Prospects for any such peace efforts, however, could improve if Houthi engagement with Saudi Arabia continues, and Egypt’s diplomatic push for a peace roadmap in Sudan bears fruit.

Fernando Carvajal served on the UN Security Council Panel of Experts of Yemen from April 2017 to March 2019 as an armed groups and regional expert. He has nearly 20 years of experience conducting fieldwork in Yemen and is a specialist in Yemeni politics and tribal relations.

Follow him on Twitter: @CarvajalF