Lessons learned: Is Iran's military ready for a US-Israeli war?

With the United States having assembled its largest and most powerful military buildup in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a war with Iran could ignite any day now.

The US already bombed Iranian nuclear facilities in June during Israel’s 12-day war, and another round of fighting, likely to last weeks, could prove to be much more dangerous.

But while Iran’s military endured punishing strikes in June, it still retains substantial capabilities.

Iran's military readiness

“We are definitely more powerful than before, we have prepared in the past seven, eight months, we found our weaknesses and fixed them,” declared Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, earlier this month.

“We are not looking for war, and we won’t start the war,” he added. “But if they force it on us, we will respond.”

The surprise opening salvos in Israel’s war last year targeted Iran’s military leadership, with Israeli jets destroying several of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers. Despite this, Tehran still managed to launch approximately 500 ballistic missiles at Israel, killing at least 28 people. The barrages strained Israeli air defences and caused significant property damage.

The US dispatched heavy strategic B-2 stealth bombers, which struck Iran’s main nuclear sites with powerful bunker buster bombs on 22 June. Tehran retaliated with a forewarned ballistic missile strike on a US base in Qatar. The war ended with a ceasefire shortly thereafter.

In January, Iran killed thousands of civilian protesters in the bloodiest crackdown on demonstrations in modern Iranian history. US President Donald Trump publicly vowed to punish Tehran, deploying a naval “armada” near Iran alongside warplanes and additional air defences to the region. While Trump renewed nuclear negotiations with Iran, he has refused to rule out another military campaign.

Analysts believe it would be unwise, however, to underestimate Iran’s present military capabilities and readiness.

“In the military hierarchy, Iran today is much more ready than it was during the 12-day war,” Arash Azizi, a visiting fellow at Boston U and author of ‘The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions’, told The New Arab.

“While there are massive risks, including that of near-total destruction, there are some elements in the armed forces who welcome an opportunity to fight back against the US,” he added.

“The way they look at it, a conflict is almost inevitable, and if Iran wants to improve its negotiating hand, it can’t forever escape conflict. They think Iran can win respect and maybe push Trump off his ‘total capitulation’ goal by showing that it can hold itself in a fight.”

James Devine, associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Mount Allison University, believes Iran learned important lessons from last year’s June war.

“First, it’s moved away from using launch silos for its ballistic missiles, which proved vulnerable during last year’s conflict,” Devine told TNA. “It is now leaning toward mobile launchers. More importantly, it has realised how deeply the Israeli intelligence services had penetrated its political and military establishment.”

While it’s not clear whether all intelligence vulnerabilities have been repaired, Iran has at least reduced the risk of leaks.

“If that is the case, decapitation strikes may not be quite so easy this time,” Devine added. “There will likely also be contingencies in place, so decision-making is not compromised as it was for the first hours of the 12-day war.”

Missiles and drones

For decades, Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) paramilitary has focused on developing ballistic missiles and military drones rather than upgrading Iran’s conventional forces.

Iran’s regular air force and army still use a lot of American military hardware imported by Iran before the 1979 revolution. Much of this equipment, such as the air force’s fighter jets, has become antiquated in the decades since.

IRGC doctrine envisages large numbers of missiles and drones saturating and overwhelming enemy air defences. Its navy, meanwhile, relies on swarms of small, fast boats and asymmetrical tactics.

“Besides ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are the other main sources of concern because of their anti-ship capabilities and reach,” Farzin Nadimi, a defence and security analyst and Senior Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told TNA.

“In my opinion, the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman will see the opening scenes of the conflict exactly because of the IRGCN’s (and to a much lesser degree Islamic Republic of Iran Navy) A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial) threat and the US commitment to freedom of navigation in the region,” Nadimi said.

“The coastal areas are a target-rich environment, and they will consume a substantial part of US offensive power,” he added. “Also, the IRGC will do its best to overwhelm missile defences south of the Persian Gulf with ballistic and cruise missiles and drones as early as possible, if they are able to launch enough of them in saturation waves.”

The military expert believes another war could see Iran using “explosive sea drones and explosive aerial drone swarms” against US military forces.

“The regime in Iran will certainly try to launch devastating waves of missiles and drones if they see themselves in an existential war,” he said. “Otherwise, they will limit their salvos and try to launch sniper-style hybrid attacks, trying to get to their targets with drones or cruise missiles, while ballistic missiles try to keep defences busy.”

Asked about potential Iranian capabilities the US military may have overlooked, Nadimi noted the possible use of explosive sea drones similar to those used by Ukraine to destroy 20-30 percent of Russia’s navy.

“Rocket-powered super cavitation torpedoes could be another, and anti-helicopter mines,” he said.

Mount Allison University’s Professor Devine also believes that Iran’s missile arsenal is “at the top of the list of concerns” for the US. He anticipates that Iran won’t necessarily use the same systems it did last time.

“Depending on how a military engagement would develop, it is quite possible that Iran would target Israel again with a similar mix of ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles,” Devine said. “However, Tehran would also target US military forces stationed in the Persian Gulf area.”

Like Nadimi, Devine sees the “maritime component” playing a greater role. He noted that Iran has a “fairly large” diverse navy, “ranging from small attack craft armed with short-range anti-ship missiles and mines, to submarines capable of firing cruise missiles.”

Iran also has naval bases positioned through the Straits of Hormuz, the key choke point in the Gulf.

“Iran does have anti-ship ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles like the Abu Mahdi that might be able to reach a carrier group positioned off the shore of Oman,” Devine said.

Nevertheless, carriers are protected by destroyers armed with very capable missile defence systems that Iran would need to overwhelm to hit its elusive, manoeuvring target.

“If the current situation does turn into a shooting war, the Iranian navy lacks the high-tech sophistication of the US Navy, but it plans to compensate with numbers,” Devine said. “Although they would likely suffer heavy losses, the goal would be to score enough hits to force the US to back off.”

Iran would need to do this with minimal protection from American or Israeli air power since Israel has systematically degraded its air defences in successive strikes on 19 April and 26 October 2024 and during the June 2025 war.

“Iran’s air defences were useless during the 12-day war and will continue to be useless,” Nadimi said.

“I have seen extensive movements of electronic warfare assets around the country, but at best they might prove effective against US drone operations,” he added. “I will be surprised to see if they manage to shoot down any manned aircraft, but it is certainly a possibility depending on the pace of the operation.”

Iran learned it will “have to fight while the enemy has complete control of the airspace above,” which necessitates “extreme measures” to improve the camouflage and concealment of strategic weapons systems.

“They are trying to improve the survivability of their ballistic missile bases and launchers and sustain extended operations,” Nadimi said.

“It might prove easier for them this time, but the tide will turn again if Israel joins the fight and assumes, for example, the role of downgrading Iran’s missile launch capability.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs

Follow him on X: @pauliddon

Edited by Charlie Hoyle