Iraq's elections: A high-stakes vote amid the US-Iran tug of war

In recent years, Baghdad has impressively navigated a delicate balancing act, asserting Iraq’s sovereignty while avoiding alignment with a single geopolitical camp against another.

Amid Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza beginning in October 2023, the 2023–24 Israel-Hezbollah war, and June’s 12-day Iran-Israel war, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government has maintained positive relations with both the United States and neighbouring Iran.

Iraq has carefully reduced its dependence on Iran while maintaining strong ties with the Islamic Republic. By strengthening control over pro-Iran factions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), Sudani’s government prevented this year’s Iran-Israel conflict from spreading into Iraq, which was a clear sign of successful balancing.

Although Baghdad has skilfully contained Iran-aligned groups within its borders, pressure from Washington has increased in recent months, signalling a new test of Iraq’s balancing act.

US pressure on the PMF

On 21 October, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had a phone call with Sudani in which Washington’s top diplomat relayed Washington’s calls on Baghdad to urgently disarm pro-Tehran “militias”.

Interestingly, this was the first time a senior US official unequivocally used the word “disarm” when describing the US position on the fate of these Iran-aligned factions. 

Iraq’s leadership clearly did not welcome Rubio’s message. The prime minister’s office had a readout of the call, which came across as critical of Washington’s “unilateral” measures impacting Baghdad, while insisting on “communication and consultation” instead. This was likely in reference to what Rubio said about the PMF factions.

This call with Sudani underscores a more assertive US posture, linking Iraq’s management of armed groups to broader cooperation on energy and major commercial ventures.

Therefore, Baghdad-Washington relations will likely come under growing strain while being pushed toward a “more transactional footing,” according to Hayder al-Shakeri, a research fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House, who spoke to The New Arab.

“While Sudani seeks to preserve dialogue and coordination, he must also manage competing expectations among Iraqi actors who see these groups as part of Iraq’s power structure. The result is likely continued engagement, but with higher tension,” he explained.

Rubio’s call with Sudani came on the heels of other US measures aimed at curbing Iranian influence in Iraq. In September, the US State Department added four armed Shia groups (Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib al-Imam Ali) to the Foreign Terrorist Organisation list, citing their ties to Tehran and militant activities such as attacks on the US embassy and military bases hosting American and coalition forces.

Additionally, earlier this month, the US Treasury Department put sanctions on a conglomerate that operates under the PMF umbrella called the Muhandis General Company, as well as on various Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated financial networks, which Washington accuses of laundering money on behalf of Iran.

Prior to these new designations and sanctions, the US put much energy into cajoling Iraq into not passing legislation that would put a PMF commission law on the books. Washington’s concern was, as Rubio put it, that such legislation “would institutionalise Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty”.

Ultimately, the Iraqi parliament and dominant Shia factions in the country did not proceed with a vote on this legislation.

Two other notable developments have taken place. First was the appointment of Josh Harris as chargé d’affaires at the US embassy in Baghdad. He is a seasoned diplomat with extensive experience in the Iraq portfolio in various capacities. Second was the naming of Mark Savaya, a close Trump ally with a long-standing interest in Iraqi affairs, as special envoy for Iraq.

Harris and Savaya, assuming these roles, “signal that the administration is now starting to turn its attention to Iraq,” explained Dr Norman Ricklefs, Chairman and CEO of NAMEA Group (an international geopolitical consultancy), in an interview with TNA.

He added that “Iraq can expect that pressure on its ties with Iran, especially in relation to pro-Iran militia groups, financial sanctions evasion, and oil products smuggling, will increase”.

In the wake of last year’s Middle East conflicts, which dealt significant setbacks to Tehran’s foreign policy, the Trump administration views the present moment as a unique opportunity to further diminish the Islamic Republic’s influence in Iraq.

“Following Hamas' 7 October attack on Israel and the subsequent weakening of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Washington perceives Iran as being in a weakened position and seeks to implement a Middle East peace framework according to American and Israeli designs,” Dr Javad Heiran-Nia, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told TNA.

“The disarmament or integration of Iraq's PMF into the Iraqi security apparatus is a crucial link in this chain.”

The stakes of Iraq's upcoming vote

These external pressures arrive at a particularly delicate moment, with Iraq approaching its parliamentary elections on 11 November. The stakes are high for Baghdad’s balancing act between Washington and Tehran, as the vote will serve as a crucial test of whether this strategy can secure legitimacy within Iraq’s domestic political arena.

“For the US, the outcome will signal whether Baghdad remains a reliable partner capable of maintaining stability while containing the influence of armed groups. For Iraq’s political elite, the vote is about preserving access to power and resources under growing external pressure. The result will shape how confidently Baghdad can navigate competing demands after the election,” said Shakeri.

Dr F. Gregory Gause III, a visiting scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, argues that Baghdad’s fragile equilibrium is likely to endure for now because neither Iran nor the United States wishes to be shut out of Iraq and both recognise they cannot expel the other. Although, as he noted, much ultimately hinges on the outcome of the parliamentary elections.

“A strong showing by Sudani might encourage him to push more against the Iranian-supported militias. It would be a risk, but one that the Trump administration would support. However, if Sudani looks like he is on the way out after the vote, I don't see a major change in the balancing game,” Dr Gause told TNA.

According to Dr Ricklefs, two key factors need to be watched closely. The first is voter turnout. The second is about the attitude of the Sadrist movement, which has continued its boycott of formal politics since 2022, toward this election.

“Should the Sadrists declare the elections illegitimate, potentially due to the low turnout and a Sadrist boycott, then there is a high chance of protests which could lead to violence after the election. Ultimately, the political elite, more than two decades after the removal of Saddam, faces an uphill struggle to convince the electorate that they can bring substantial economic improvements, better service delivery, especially electricity, and reduce corruption,” he explained to TNA.

The question of Shia political representation in Iraq stands out as the central issue in next month’s election, explained Srboljub Peović, a research assistant at the Belgrade-based Institute of European Studies.

“Should Washington seek to further narrow the field of ‘acceptable’ Shia candidates, Iraq risks producing a parliament detached from its demographic majority. Such exclusion could drive parts of the Shia population toward extra-parliamentary means of political expression: a dangerous prospect given the history of Shia uprisings and sectarian violence in recent decades,” he noted.

Timing, strategy, and US missteps

Yet, with elections looming, the Trump administration’s push for disarmament of factions under the PMF umbrella risks clashing with Iraq’s domestic realities, raising questions about timing and feasibility.

Such an endeavour would require years of careful negotiation, institution-building, and security-sector reform to carry out responsibly. To push for it now, on the eve of an election and amid deep internal factionalism, is less a demonstration of strategic foresight than an example of reactive, ill-considered diplomacy that risks undermining the very stability in Iraq which Washington claims to support.

“Washington would be wiser to wait until after the election, and Sudani or his replacement would be in a better place to discuss solutions to the militia problem,” Omar al-Nidawi, an Iraqi analyst, told TNA.

Several important considerations arise from Washington’s expectations, observed Nidawi. First, it remains unclear which groups Washington envisions Sudani’s government targeting for disarmament. Many of the armed factions most resistant to US policy, including Kataib Hezbollah, hold formal status within the PMF.

This raises a fundamental question of authority: on what political or legal grounds could Sudani act against organisations that, however controversial, are recognised components of Iraq’s security structure?

Even setting legal complexities aside, the practical and political challenges are substantial. Which branches of Iraq’s security apparatus would possess both the capacity and the willingness to implement such a directive? Any attempt to forcibly confront these pro-Tehran factions risks inflaming tensions and destabilising an already fragile environment, particularly with next month’s election coming up so soon.

Moreover, if the prime minister were to authorise the detention of members of one militia, it is uncertain whether other factions would remain passive or interpret the move as a precursor to broader action, potentially triggering a dangerous cycle of escalation.

“One thing the talk of outright disarmament is certain to do is make the militias more likely to block Sudani’s bid for a second term,” commented Nidawi.

“At stake here are Iraq’s chances to regain sovereignty and assert state monopoly over violence. Achieving this important national goal requires careful planning, thoughtful consideration of risks, and meticulous shaping of political, security, and legislative conditions to slowly and steadily reduce the power of the militias while building the power of the state. Pushing for disarmament without preparation is a recipe for frustration in Washington and chaos in Baghdad,” he added.

The fragile balance endures, for now

Beyond political and security concerns, Iraq faces a complex web of internal pressures - from a swelling youth population and weak public services to pervasive corruption - that shape the broader context in which these balancing acts unfold.

“Iraq's government faces so many challenges that the US-Iran balance is only one of them, and not the most important. The domestic issues, particularly in a falling oil price environment, are the key elements,” Dr Gause told TNA.

Taken together, Iraq’s political, economic, and security pressures underscore the fragility of its position. Navigating between Washington and Tehran will require not just diplomacy but careful timing, political acumen, and domestic legitimacy.

Ultimately, it is impossible to predict whether Baghdad’s leadership will succeed in navigating this delicate path. As Dr Ricklefs noted, given Iraq’s porous 1,450-kilometre border with Iran and the country’s deep political and economic ties, the more pressing question may be whether Iraq even has a choice. In other words, is maintaining this challenging balancing act truly an option for Baghdad?

“Sudani continues to manage competing pressures through careful diplomacy, offering assurances to Washington while maintaining coordination with Tehran. His strategy rests on dialogue and avoiding escalation, allowing each side to see Iraq as a necessary partner,” Shakeri told TNA.

“Tehran, for its part, prefers Iraq to remain stable and outside any direct confrontation with the US, given its own domestic and regional constraints. Still, this balance is fragile: stronger US pressure or renewed regional tension could quickly narrow Baghdad’s room to manoeuvre.”

As the Trump administration pursues ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ on Iran, the absence of any dialogue or understanding between Washington and Tehran further complicates Baghdad’s delicate balancing act. Without meaningful diplomacy between the two powers, Iraq’s position will remain increasingly constrained, caught under mounting pressure from both sides.

Iraq stands at a crossroads, caught between Washington and Tehran, with little room for error. The leadership in Baghdad must navigate this tightrope through shrewd diplomacy, decisive political manoeuvring, and the maintenance of domestic stability without alienating key regional and global partners.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero