Iraqi militias kept quiet in the Israel-Iran war. Will it last?

In Iraq, where US and Iranian interests exist in uneasy proximity, escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran are often felt on the ground.

During last month’s 12-day Israel-Iran war, which entailed Israeli and American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, fears mounted that Iraq’s Tehran-aligned factions would retaliate against American or Israeli targets.

Yet, in a surprising display of restraint, the paramilitary factions existing under the state-recognised Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) umbrella remained largely silent. Their unexpected quietude was not accidental, but rather the result of a complex web of strategic calculations.

When American B-2 Spirit bombers tore through Iraqi airspace en route to attack Iran’s underground uranium facility of Fordo, Kataib Hezbollah, one of the most powerful Iranian-aligned Shia militias, put out a notably muted statement. Rather than threatening retaliation, the group redirected its ire inward, condemning Baghdad for its failure to safeguard national airspace and warning that such lapses leave Iraq increasingly exposed and compromised.

“The American forces in Iraq paved the way for this assault by opening Iraqi airspace,” said the Tehran-backed organisation. “If it is said that we do not want Iraq to be a battleground, then it is incumbent upon us to restrain the role of foreign forces present on Iraqi soil and controlling its skies.”

Iraq’s pro-Iranian factions may still pledge ideological loyalty to the Islamic Republic, but, in practice, they are increasingly autonomous from Tehran. As these groups embed themselves deeper into Iraq’s political establishment -benefiting from Iraq’s state coffers and maintaining sprawling business networks - they have become less inclined to risk their gains by wading into regional conflicts.

With growing political clout and financial stakes tied to the stability of the Iraqi state, these actors now have far more to lose from resorting to violence.

"Since the re-election of President Donald Trump, Iran-aligned armed factions in Iraq have been exercising a notable form of pre-emptive self-restraint,” said Dr Inna Rudolf, a senior research fellow at King’s College London, in an interview with The New Arab.

“They are engaged in a delicate balancing act - on one hand, maintaining their image as champions of Islamic resistance through fiery statements and rhetorical threats, while on the other, working diligently to preserve their hard-won institutional gains within the Iraqi state. This involves avoiding ill-timed armed clashes that could provoke retaliatory strikes or targeted assassinations.”

She explained that to assess the behaviour of these factions, it is essential for analysts and policymakers to examine how they navigate the tension between domestic priorities and transnational affiliations, adding that Iraq’s armed groups operating under the PMF umbrella tend to refrain from claiming actions that fall outside the boundaries of the national command structure.

“This caution is to maintain a working relationship with government bureaucracy. Instead, they may use facade groups to create a smokescreen, avoiding accountability, or simply celebrate the actions of non-PMF affiliated groups like the True Promise Brigades,” Dr Rudolf told TNA.

Lessons from Lebanon

The experience of Lebanon’s Hezbollah during its war with Israel last year has had a notable impact on the strategic calculus of Iraq’s Iran-aligned factions amid the recent escalation of conflict dynamics in the Middle East.

Hezbollah’s sustained exposure to Israeli military strikes in the months leading up to November offered a cautionary tale for other ‘Axis of Resistance’ actors operating within similarly complex political and security environments.

For Iraq’s pro-Tehran groups, Hezbollah’s losses underscored the high cost of direct confrontation with Israel, particularly when such engagements risk triggering disproportionate retaliation without yielding clear strategic gains. As a result, these Iraqi factions adopted a more restrained posture in response to the intensification of hostilities last month.

Their decision-making reflects a desire to avoid the kind of attritional warfare that weakened Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and decapitated its leadership. In short, Iraq’s Iran-linked militias appear increasingly reluctant to expose themselves to Israeli firepower in the absence of a compelling national imperative, opting instead to prioritise political consolidation and the preservation of their assets within Iraq’s state structure.

“Pro-Iran Shia militias in Iraq took duly notice of how the strategic balance between Israel and the Axis of Resistance has changed in the last nine months. The heavy blow inflicted [on] Hezbollah last winter, the collapse of Assad’s regime last December, and the Israeli bombing of Iran last [month] have created a new strategic landscape,” Marco Carnelos, the former Italian ambassador to Iraq, told TNA.

“This is not a consolidated situation because Iran has shown a remarkable retaliation capability, unexpected to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the pro-Iran PMF opted for caution, considering also the heavy US military presence in Iraq and how [trigger] happy…the Americans appear at the moment,” he added.

Iran's interest in restraint

Tehran’s response to Israel’s ‘Operation Rising Lion’ and the US military strikes on its nuclear infrastructure was notably measured. Rather than opting for a broad or aggressive retaliation, Iran acted rationally, choosing to avoid further escalation with two nuclear-armed states at the same time.

In line with this posture, the Iranian leadership probably communicated clear directives to its allies in Iraq and elsewhere across the region, urging them to proceed with caution.

With Tehran appearing intent on minimising the potential for miscalculation or unintended conflict spillover, the Islamic Republic’s calibrated stance reflects not only a desire to manage international pressures but also an effort to preserve the cohesion of its regional alliances while avoiding actions that could provoke overwhelming retaliation.

“Iran’s response to the conflict was itself calibrated and limited, signalling a preference for containment rather than escalation. It’s likely that Tehran has advised its allied militias to exercise caution,” said Omar al-Nidawi, an Iraqi analyst, in a TNA interview.

The path ahead

With the Trump administration having cajoled Israel and Iran into entering a tenuous and highly fragile ceasefire, it is unclear what moves Iraq’s Islamic Republic-backed factions will make next. Although their rhetoric has remained aligned with Tehran, how they would react to the truce collapsing also remains uncertain.

Will they remain restrained to protect their entrenched positions within the Iraqi state? Or will they adjust their posture in response to shifting regional currents? For now, these questions hang in the balance, as Iraq’s armed groups weigh whether to escalate, recalibrate, or remain strategically silent in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

These pro-Iran Iraqi factions “do not wish to be dragged into the war, although the resistance factions are ready to respond,” said an official representing Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, one of Iraq’s main Tehran-backed Shia militant groups, toward the end of the 12-day Israel-Iran war, adding that “this will, however, depend on the course of events and the impact on our country”.

Iraq specialists take this statement seriously. “With the ceasefire in place, Iraq’s pro-Iran armed groups are likely to lay low and avoid major moves. They’ll keep showing solidarity with Tehran in public statements, but they’re unlikely to take direct action unless the situation changes. That said, the ceasefire is fragile, and these factions are keeping their options open. If things escalate again, we could see them shift their posture quickly,” Hayder al-Shakeri, a research fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House, told TNA.

With the ceasefire now in effect, Iraq’s pro-Islamic Republic factions have a rare window to recalibrate their posture, says analyst Omar al-Nidawi. According to him, these groups are likely to maintain their “operational restraint” for the time being, particularly if Tehran signals a preference for de-escalation.

These pro-Islamic Republic factions in Iraq will have an opportunity to reassess their posture while this ceasefire remains in effect, noted Nidawi. He also explained these groups will probably continue their “operational restraint,” especially if the Iranian leadership signals its desire to prevent further escalation in this period.

“However, these groups will remain on standby, positioning themselves for possible reactivation should the situation deteriorate into a fight for the…survival [of the Islamic Republic],” he added.

When asked what might be in store for the Iraqi factions under the PMF umbrella, Carnelos explained that this is difficult to predict.

“Iraq still has huge internal problems in moving along with a functional political system and in ensuring a decent and lasting governance to its people, who are mainly committed [to] moving on with the country’s reconstruction. I would not be surprised if a serious brake is applied to the PMF’s ‘resistance rhetoric and practice,’” the former Italian diplomat told TNA.

Risk of a major crisis in Iraq

If the Israel-Iran ceasefire unravels or the US launches additional strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, Iraq could be thrust into an untenable position - squeezed between an emboldened Iran and an uncompromising Washington, with little room to manoeuvre and much to lose.

“Armed groups might feel compelled to respond, especially if Iran gives the green light, and that could turn parts of Iraq into a battleground. This would place the Iraqi government in a difficult spot, trying to maintain ties with both Tehran and Washington while keeping violence off its territory. The risk of entanglement is real, and it would take careful diplomacy and strong internal coordination to avoid being pulled deeper into the conflict,” Shakeri told TNA.

Iraq’s government wants to maintain positive ties with both the US and Iran - two relationships that Baghdad has deeply invested in over the years. Yet, as Nidawi, notes, “renewed conflict would strain this balancing act, potentially forcing difficult choices that could alienate one side or provoke internal instability”.

While the Iraqi leadership has been clear about its desire to prevent the country from becoming a battleground in hostilities between Washington and Tehran, “its ability to do so will be tested by both external pressures and the behaviour of domestic armed actors,” he added.

Should a war involving Iran disrupt the flow of Iranian gas to Iraq, the consequences for Iraq’s electricity supply would be severe. There would be major repercussions for Iraq’s society and political arena.

“Iraq imports about 1.2–1.5 billion cubic feet per day of Iranian natural gas and 1.3 GW of electricity, covering about 30–40 percent of peak summer demand. Losing access to that would cause not only widespread electricity blackouts but threaten the supply of potable water for millions of Iraqis and also cause the price of diesel to spike due to its use for generators,” explained Dr Norman Ricklefs, Chairman and CEO of NAMEA Group, an international geopolitical consultancy.

He told TNA that such a scenario would “probably lead to civil disorder and would lead to populist politicians improving their position in the upcoming November national elections”. Under such circumstances, the political standing of Moqtada al-Sadr and Iraqi politicians aligned with him would likely gain in their political standing regardless of whether the cleric endorses his movement to stand for the elections in November, according to Dr Ricklefs.

Focusing inward and preserving stability at home

Policymakers in Baghdad seem to appreciate how high the stakes are in this tense environment and are working to prevent Iraq from being pulled into a war. With vested interests in preventing the Israel-Iran truce from collapsing, Iraq will likely join Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states in pursuing diplomatic efforts with the aim of keeping the precarious truce in place, at least for as long as possible.

“Regardless of the future of the ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran, most established armed factions with both institutional presence in the PMF and political representation in parliament are likely to avoid provoking US or Israeli retaliation. They aim to steer clear of dragging Iraq into a regional military escalation, particularly with the upcoming elections in November 2025,” noted Dr Rudolf.

As Dr Ricklefs explained, despite all of the major challenges facing Iraq - from governance issues to corruption - there is a vision shared by Iraq’s political elite in which the country returns to its great power status in the Middle East.

“There is competition and conflict over the riches that Iraq produces, but no one wants to see Iraq return to the bad old days of the sectarian civil war from 2005-2007, or the war against [Islamic State] from 2014-2017. Hence, there are strong forces inside the country working to keep the country unified in the face of considerable pressure from the regional conflicts,” he told TNA.

What is most striking is that so far, Iraq, to its credit, has managed to keep itself largely on the sidelines of last month’s war and the continued hostilities in the Middle East between the US and Israel, on one side, and the ‘Axis of Resistance’, on the other.

In a region where alliances often drag nations into wars not necessarily of their choosing, Iraq’s decision-makers appear increasingly determined to prioritise stability at home rather than battles elsewhere in the neighbourhood.

There is a growing realisation in Baghdad that Iraq’s future cannot be held hostage to regional rivalries, and that true sovereignty means resisting the gravitational pull of foreign agendas. Nonetheless, maintaining this course won’t be easy, especially if the Israel-Iran war unfreezes with a collapsed ceasefire.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero