Iran on the edge: How will the latest mass protests unfold?

In the final days of December, as a new wave of protests swept across Iran, the nature of the dissent - and the Islamic Republic’s response - marked a distinct departure from the upheavals of 2022.

Unlike the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement, which was ignited by the death of Mahsa ‘Jina’ Amini and fuelled by social repression and mandatory hijab laws, the latest unrest was sparked by a relentless surge in prices and the collapse of the currency. Initially, these demonstrations were trade-oriented, rooted firmly in economic survival.

Determined to prevent localised grievances from coalescing into a major national crisis, the government initially adopted a containment strategy notably different from the past.

High-ranking officials described protesting as a "citizen’s right". While security forces remained formidable, their tactics were less lethal than in 2022, and the internet - typically the first casualty of unrest in Iran - remained largely accessible.

On 30 December, the third day of the protests, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian pledged "fundamental measures to reform the monetary and banking systems and preserve the people's purchasing power," emphasising that he had ordered the Interior Minister to engage in dialogue with protest representatives.

Similarly, Government Spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told reporters that the administration recognised the protests and was actively working to resolve the underlying issues.

The tide turns

However, the atmosphere shifted rapidly. The unrest spilled over from bazaars and economic hubs into universities and the streets of cities and villages. As the protests widened, the state’s response hardened.

Taghi Azad Armaki, a prominent Iranian sociologist, highlighted the structural differences between this uprising and the 2022 movement in an interview with the reformist newspaper Shargh.

"If we wish to compare, in previous protests, including those in 2022, the primary forces were largely women and youth, and the issue was specific and more limited," Armaki noted.

"Here, however, the issue stems from a complex set of factors involving multiple social forces. If this situation persists, it could mobilise even more demographics and push Iran into a far more critical condition," he warned.

According to the human rights monitor HRANA, the death toll from protest-related violence had risen to approximately 30 by Tuesday, with no signs of the unrest abating. The report indicates that rallies have taken place in at least 257 locations across 88 cities in 27 provinces.

Return of the iron fist

This escalation was mirrored in the rhetoric of Iran’s top leadership. In a speech on 3 January, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conceded that the market protests were "logical," yet drew a sharp line between protest and sedition, declaring that "rioters must be put in their place".

Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, the head of Iran’s Judiciary, issued a stark warning regarding the ongoing unrest: "Rioters must know that if leniency was shown in previous instances, there will be no such leniency or tolerance this time."

Observers suggest various reasons for this tactical pivot. Some highlight the appointment of Ahmad Vahidi - a prominent Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) figure with a history in the Quds Force and the former Interior Minister during the 2022 crackdown - as the new Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC.

This move is viewed by many as a signal of a shift towards militarised suppression. However, given the IRGC's broader mandate, his presence may also be interpreted in the context of the looming threat of renewed conflict with Israel and the United States.

Geopolitical triggers

What is the true driver behind the spike in violence? The answer may lie in the regime’s heightened threat perception and its shift into "survival mode," driven by fears of foreign intervention under the guise of supporting the protests.

Hamidreza Azizi, a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, links the shift in Tehran’s calculus to the recent US operation in Venezuela and the abduction of Nicolás Maduro.

"The fact that US President Donald Trump posted about Iran on social media 24 hours before launching the attack on Venezuela is not merely a coincidence," Azizi told The New Arab.

"The US intended to send a threatening message. The President, knowing the attack on Venezuela was imminent and observing the protest atmosphere in Iran, published a threatening post against Tehran, subsequently boosting the credibility of that threat through action against Venezuela," Azizi added.

"This has not gone unnoticed by the leaders of the Islamic Republic. My inference is that the events in Venezuela are viewed as a prelude to military action against Iran - whether by Israel with US support, or through limited or extensive direct intervention by the United States."

According to Azizi, the Venezuela operation has fundamentally altered the Iranian leadership's threat perception, directly impacting domestic decision-making.

"The government wants to frame the narrative that the US and other hostile powers are behind the current protests, portraying the situation as a continuation of the 'June 2025 War' to justify the use of force for suppression," Azizi argues.

He further warns that this dynamic creates a dangerous feedback loop. Segments of the opposition in Iran may conclude that practical US intervention is feasible, leading them to adopt violent methods to confront the regime. This could transform the situation from a manageable crisis into an uncontrollable cycle of violence.

"The US and Israel have acted with the knowledge that direct intervention and threats regarding the protests would lead to intensified violence," Azizi suggests.

"This forces the Iranian government to focus on internal turmoil, creating an opportunity for [external adversaries] to strike the regime. Conversely, it is unlikely that the formation of a cycle of violence will serve the interests of the protesters."

An existential dilemma

Iran’s economy has struggled for years with high inflation and low growth. Rooted in massive budget deficits and crippling sanctions that block sustainable revenue and access to funds, these economic woes are nearly impossible to solve in the short term.

Under these conditions, if the Iranian government fails to control the status quo, the protests are likely to become protracted. The United States and Israel may view this as an opportune moment for intervention.

For the Islamic Republic, this scenario represents an existential threat, compelling it to mobilise its full capacity - and maximum force - to neutralise the danger.

This article is published in collaboration with Egab

Edited by Charlie Hoyle