In mid-September 2022, a wave of protests calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic erupted across Iran.
This differentiated the 2022 protests from previous rounds in 2019, 2017, and 2009, where protestors had demanded reform, rather than the collapse, of the current system.
These protests, which occurred in every Iranian province, were sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa ‘Jina’ Amini in police custody after she was detained for an alleged “improper” adherence to Iran’s mandatory hijab laws.
Her death crystallised broader frustrations, with the compulsory hijab serving as a rallying point for discontent that could not otherwise be channelled into demands over Iran’s economic crisis, social and political repression, and foreign policy, in part because no organised movement existed to unify these diverse grievances.
By February 2023, a combination of state repression, the lack of a centralised protest movement, and the rising cost of participation for demonstrators resulted in the cessation of the anti-regime protest wave. However, both what have been termed “formal” and “informal” protests have continued across the country.
“Formal protests, such as labour strikes, are ongoing. ‘Informal’ protests, especially from the younger generation and Gen Z, are also visible in how they choose to dress and their lifestyles,” Javad Heiran-Nia, Director of Persian Gulf Studies at Shahid Beheshti University, told The New Arab, discussing Iran’s current protest landscape.
“These protests occur where formal protest is not possible or where the cost of formal protest is high.”
As in 2023, a lack of centralisation and cohesion of demands continues to limit the protest space.
“The issue with Iran’s protest movement, similar to other twenty-first-century social protest movements, and very dissimilar to the Global South liberation revolutions of the ’60s to ’70s, is that they are not structurally organised and do not have a proposed regime succession plan,” Mona Rahmani, a specialist on Iranian affairs, told TNA.
“Even if there is a strong underbelly desiring revolution, there is no umbrella organisation or leadership proposing clear reform proposals.”
Despite a continued widespread discontent with Iran’s governing system, evidenced by the ongoing “informal” protests in the country, the Iran-Israel war in June demonstrated that dissidents are largely unwilling to mobilise against the Islamic Republic under foreign leadership.
In addition, according to human rights groups, the security crackdown in Iran that followed the war focused disproportionately on areas and demographics that played a key role in the 2022-2023 protests, demonstrating that Tehran still considers them flashpoints for anti-regime mobilisation.
Between repression and reform
Approximately 19,000 people were arrested during the 2022-2023 protests. While most were later released, at least eight demonstrators, including Mohsen Shekari and Majidreza Rahnavard, were executed.
In tandem with violently repressing the protest wave, the regime has increasingly made tacit concessions in some areas of social reform. Since 2023, enforcement of the Islamic Republic’s mandatory hijab laws has become increasingly sparse.
Of note, enforcement further decreased after the Israel-Iran war earlier this year, although hardliners continue to push legislation that further tightens hijab regulations.
The reasons underpinning this shift are multifaceted. Firstly, the continuation of “informal” protests, where women refused to adhere to mandatory hijab laws after the end of the demonstrations in 2023, raised the cost of enforcement for Tehran.
There was also an understanding that the repression of informal protests could lead to the renewal of large-scale domestic protests, at a time when the Islamic Republic was contending with a regional war, a war which eventually arrived at Tehran’s doorstep in June.
In contrast, other drivers of the 2022-2023 protests are also more difficult to address. Discontent around Iran’s ailing economy cannot be adequately addressed without a resolution to the nuclear question and the removal of US secondary sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
The absence of clarity among both the state and the public on how to engage with the West and the merits of acquiring a nuclear weapon after the Iran-Israel war suggests that Iran’s economic situation is unlikely to improve in the short term.
“Currently, the widespread perception within the regime is that, in view of Iran's many problems and high level of popular discontent, plus the still looming threat of another Israeli or US military strike, the best policy is the tolerance of a certain degree of laxity on issues such as women's dress code and hijab,” Iranian political scientist Shireen Hunter explained to TNA.
“However, even now, hardliners are voicing their opposition to this approach. These dynamics demonstrate how the trajectory of domestic reform and international threats to the survival of the regime can inform each other.”
What is clear is that Tehran does not have unlimited time to decide on an approach, both domestically and on the international stage.
“Israel and America's attack on Iran has reduced the distance between the government and society,” Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President at The Quincy Institute, told The New Arab.
“However, whether that will be sustained or not depends very much on whether the government addresses the fundamental problems and injustices in the system. Superficial measures will not cut it. And the window for this is not open indefinitely.”
Political reform: A contested horizon
In the aftermath of the 12-day war, elements of Iran’s reformist movement have called for changes to Iran’s domestic and foreign policy that, if enacted, may amount to the de facto end of the Islamic Republic.
On 17 August, the Reformist Front of Iran, an umbrella group comprising a range of pro-reform factions, issued a statement calling for “the abandoning of hostilities inside and outside the country, with the aim of reforming the governance structure and returning to the principle of people’s sovereignty”.
The statement called for the voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment, which Tehran strongly perceives as capitulation, to facilitate the resumption of US-Iran talks, declaring a general amnesty domestically, the release of political prisoners and opposition leaders, and the removal of military influence from politics, the economy, and culture.
This statement came less than a month after Mir-Hossein Mousavi, leader of Iran’s 2009 Green Movement, who has been under house arrest since 2011, called for a referendum on a constitutional assembly, and argued that the current political system is unrepresentative of Iran’s diverse population.
Of note, these demands mirror the sentiment of the leaderless 2022-2023 protest movement. However, they also remain highly contested by a range of Iranian power centres, including parts of Iran’s reform movement.
In addition, whether this subsection of Iran’s reform movement can act as a scaffolding for a diverse protest movement, some of which rejects all elements of the political class, remains to be seen.
Looking towards the future
Both domestically and on the international stage, the Islamic Republic sits at a critical juncture. Moreover, the trajectory of domestic reform movements and Iran’s foreign policy inform each other.
As such, the course of Iran’s protest dynamics is dependent on the resolution of several outstanding issues, including US-Iran relations, the nuclear issue, intra-regime dynamics, and the formalisation of Iran’s protest space into a centralised movement.
Delaying the resolution of these issues may buy the Islamic Republic time; however, the fracturing of Iranian society along these fault lines presents a threat to the survival of the regime, and, separately, the security of the country at times of conflict or change.
While the 12-day war demonstrated that Iranians are unwilling to mobilise against Tehran under the spectre of foreign invasion, the failure to provide meaningful reform could further polarise Iranian society during future flashpoints, whether regional conflict or a potential succession crisis.
Zahra Ladha is a geopolitical analyst focused on Iran, Iraq, and transnational Shiaism. She holds an MSc in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford
Follow her on X: @zahrariy_