Iran and Saudi Arabia edge closer after Israel's strike on Qatar

Indicating warmer ties with Tehran, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) hosted Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Riyadh last week.

Having severed ties with Iran in 2016, diplomatic relations between the two countries resumed following Chinese mediation in 2023, with the senior Iranian official’s visit a sign of gradual normalisation.

Accompanied by Deputy Secretary for International Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, and Persian Gulf Advisor, Mohammad Ali Bek, Larijani discussed recent regional developments and ways to expand economic cooperation.

Separately, the Saudi Minister of Defence, Prince Khalid bin Salman, also met with Larijani, and efforts to achieve security and stability were discussed.

With this the highest-ranking Iranian delegation to visit the Kingdom since the restoration of ties, relations between Riyadh and Tehran seem to have entered a meaningful new phase.

A European diplomat, speaking to The New Arab on the condition of anonymity, said that Larijani’s Riyadh visit, in his capacity as Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security, could be framed as a “crucial third pillar in a broader strategic sequence”.

The diplomat said that visiting Riyadh after Beirut and Baghdad, each with its own geopolitical symbolism, indicated a “deliberate Iranian effort to consolidate a new regional security architecture”.

Significance of the visit

Symbolically, the ensuing talks were a rare direct engagement between top security officials of two longstanding rivals, confirming Riyadh and Tehran’s commitment to de-escalation.

But the meeting agenda, ranging from security to energy coordination, is connected with a recent spike in regional instability.

Taking place just one day after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met MbS on the sidelines of the Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on 15 September, the timing of these talks was notable.

The emergency conference, convened in response to an Israeli airstrike on Hamas negotiators in Doha, may have helped facilitate further high-level Saudi-Iranian consultations, although Larijani himself was not present at the summit.

However, Dr Theodore Karasik, a fellow on Middle Eastern affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, told TNA that while there was substantial progress, Saudi-Iran ties remain “in a delicate phase, with major differences and a trust deficit remaining, though the optics remain potent for regional neighbours”.

Observing steady improvement in Saudi-Iran ties, Dr Sinem Cengiz, a researcher at the Gulf Studies Center in Qatar, told TNA that Pezeshkian had contacted MbS when Iran launched a retaliatory strike on a US base in Qatar, and this gesture indicated the “intention to preserve the détente with Saudi Arabia”.

Schahriar Hatam, an international relations expert on Iran, told TNA that this was not a routine meeting and Iran seemed to be trying to win over Saudi Arabia. "The fragile rapprochement has developed into a crucial channel for conflict prevention,” he said.

But the expert stressed that geopolitical differences persist and “hardliners within the Iranian leadership” could “reignite tensions” if they resort to proxy actions in Syria or Lebanon.

The fact that the Saudi leadership is seeking dialogue demonstrates, according to Hatam, how “seriously they assess the current situation” and desire de-escalation.

Discussing the larger picture, the European diplomat, speaking anonymously, said that the Larijani visit needs to be viewed in light of recent events, particularly the Israeli strike in Doha.

The incident sent a clear message about the reliability of the US defence umbrella for Gulf states, and Tehran wants to “capitalise on this opening”.

Are Saudi-Iran defence ties possible?

Saudi-Iran ties have proved to be sustainable throughout Israel’s war on Gaza and Tel Aviv’s attack on Iran, and both Riyadh and Tehran have managed to contain any spillover from growing regional instability.

In a positive move, a 2001 security cooperation agreement has also been reactivated.

Larijani had confirmed that defence collaboration was discussed during the recent talks, and that the implementation of previous agreements was reviewed and would be “pursued through working groups”.

Defence cooperation, therefore, cannot be ruled out, although it may be limited.

Pointing out that both sides have agreed to pursue defence cooperation through “dedicated groups” that will take on a “more organised form,” Karasik observed that this is where “the Pakistani nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states may fit into this [Iran’s] security future”.

According to Karasik, security dialogue and risk management need to continue growing, but a formal defence alliance is “unlikely as long as the US remains a security partner”.

In Cengiz’s assessment, there is still “a long way to go” for bilateral defence ties, but the possibility of defence cooperation exists if relevant mechanisms are established.

Hatam said that the possibility of closer defence cooperation will largely be determined by the regional threat landscape, and when Iran would “no longer be seen as a regional rival but a potential ally”. Right now, an official defence alliance is unlikely.

In the European diplomat’s opinion, Tehran not only sees this re-engagement as a way to stabilise relations with Riyadh, but also, potentially, “to facilitate a parallel thaw with Pakistan”.

Given that Iran and Saudi Arabia have often competed for influence in Pakistan, any rapprochement between them could pave the way for “a more cooperative regional dynamic including Islamabad”.

Explaining that Larijani’s visit was not just a diplomatic gesture, but a strategic move to build a “more resilient regional framework,” the diplomat predicted that in leveraging outreach to the Saudis as a stepping stone, Iran would “adapt to the post-conflict landscape with broader regional alignments, involving Pakistan and potentially China”.

Surviving Middle Eastern turbulence

Even though the outlook for Tehran and Riyadh seems positive, there may be unforeseen upsets, especially considering the fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel.

But if the growing momentum between these two regional powers survives ongoing regional instability, it could evolve into a stable relationship, especially through economic cooperation and joint ventures.

Since 2023, there has also been some improvement in economic ties between the two countries, and Iran’s exports rose by around 99% in 2024 compared to the previous year. In 2025, Iran’s annual non-oil trade with Saudi Arabia was around $25 million.

In Cengiz’s opinion, despite visible and real political will on both sides, practical steps are lacking as there are no “joint commissions and conflict de-escalation mechanisms”. But she noted that “it seems we are now entering a GCC-Iran moment” as Israel emerges as the more immediate threat to GCC interests.

There is potential now to create a stable long-term framework if both sides institutionalise cooperation, and, instead of relying on ad-hoc meetings, create standing bilateral committees for trade, security or environmental issues.

“This would depend on how both states use the current turbulence to move beyond pure security issues,” international relations expert Schahriar Hatam told TNA.

The Saudi-Iran détente could be best understood as “a new variant of conflict management systems rather than a new regional security architecture,” Karasik observed, noting that the “addition of nuclear weapons into the Gulf security structure means a race will be on for acquisition and procurement,” and a MAD type architecture against Israel is perhaps taking shape, depending on “umbrella coverage”.

Assessing future scenarios, the European diplomat said that the Pakistan-Saudi agreement was just the “first example” of how regional realignment will take shape.

“Tehran will be seeking to embed itself in the newly evolving regional context, especially in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on Doha,” they told TNA.

This ongoing shift would give Iran a chance to “reshape regional partnerships and expand its influence beyond its traditional spheres”.

Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer, and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Follow her on X: @sabena_siddiqi