Eight months after the abrupt collapse of the Assad regime on 8 December, the hopes of millions of Syrians to see regime criminals brought to justice remain frustratingly distant.
Across the 54-year reign of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar, hundreds of thousands were killed or went missing - many through enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial execution.
Beyond delaying much-needed closure and reparations for survivors and victims’ families, a lack of accountability is adding fuel to sectarian violence in Syria, a political powder keg in a country awash with weapons after 14 years of civil war.
Disillusioned by the slow pace of accountability, some are resorting to violent retribution. In Homs, Hama, and Latakia provinces, attacks by Sunni individuals or groups against Alawite civilians accused of collaborating with the regime continue unabated. Many Alawite communities now live in fear, amid frequent kidnappings and reprisals.
If the interim government led by Ahmad Al-Sharaa fails to contain the violence, experts fear this could spill over, once again, into mass atrocities the likes of which Syria witnessed in its coastal regions in March.
This makes transitional justice and accountability one of the most crucial issues for stability in Syria, and the success of the country’s tentative departure from 54 years of dictatorship.
Gregory Waters, a researcher at the Syrian Archive, says that much of the violence plaguing Syria is not just arbitrary sectarian conflict; it is retribution for past crimes committed by the targeted individuals. Most of these crimes were committed during the civil war, but some disputes are decades old, originating in the sectarian favouritism that began with Hafez al-Assad.
One manifestation of this today - and a particularly intractable problem for the government to solve - revolves around land ownership.
Tracts of land once owned by Christians and Sunnis were historically seized and redistributed to Alawites, the religious minority from which the regime drew its support. As displaced Syrians return, they find themselves impoverished and unable to plant crops on land they claim as their own.
“These are the kinds of local tensions, and that's where a lot of the extrajudicial killings and the crimes are coming from now,” Waters told The New Arab.
“The big problem the government's facing is not only this lack of trust with Alawites, but there's this real growth in Sunni populism and agitation against Alawites that they are clearly struggling to deal with … my impression is the government is afraid of directly addressing this head on,” Waters explained.
“I think the biggest risk is another widespread insurgency attack or attempt, which will fail, and will be met with more massacres of civilians,” he added.
A commission without confidence
On 16 May, the Syrian government announced the formation of the National Commission for Transitional Justice to address past abuses committed by the Assad regime.
While broadly welcomed as a step toward accountability, Syrian civil society organisations, human rights groups, and legal experts have voiced their concerns over its lack of transparency, limited mandate, and exclusion of grassroots actors.
For its part, the government faces an immense challenge. Regime abuses span over half a century, beginning in 1971 with Hafez al-Assad. And the legal system it inherits is riddled with corruption, under-resourced, and hamstrung by missing evidence, much of it torched on the eve of the revolution. Meanwhile, the government has struggled to restrain revolutionary Sunni factions implicated in recent atrocities.
Despite several high-profile arrests, many Sunnis believe that most former regime officials will escape justice. Earlier this year, a wave of sweeping amnesties sowed confusion: it remains unclear who was officially pardoned and who wasn’t.
And in February, outrage erupted when the government released notorious regime commander Fadi Saqr, deepening public mistrust and reinforcing the belief that real justice remains elusive.
But the commission’s opaque processes are undermining trust across sectarian lines. One major flaw in its design is its unwillingness to investigate crimes committed after Assad’s fall, such as those by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or Sunni factions aligned with the new government.
As the country awaits the findings of a separate investigation into the coastal massacres of Alawite civilians, many Alawites already blame the government directly.
In response to the investigation, Kristine Beckerle, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, has called for full transparency. She urged President Sharaa to “commit to publishing the full findings” and “ensure those responsible are brought to justice”.
Further complicating the accountability process, fighting erupted last week in the predominantly Druze province of Suweida, with reports of violations committed by both Druze gunmen and government forces. Syria’s presidency has promised another investigation and to “hold accountable all of those proven to be involved”.
Reform or ruin: The path forward
A recent report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), an independent human rights monitor, has outlined key recommendations. Foremost is the creation of a national accountability body that is independent from the executive.
The report also advocates a more victim-centred approach, sweeping judicial and security sector reforms, and greater inclusion of local experts and civil society.
The commission was established by decree, with almost no public input or explanation of its mandate. Legal experts and human rights organisations warn that its top-down structure gives too much control to the presidency. A truly effective process, they argue, would require a participatory approach that shares power with civil society.
Activists have also criticised the commission’s lack of diversity. They say it fails to reflect Syria’s social mosaic, omitting women and minority voices, including Kurds and Druze. In May, commission head Abdul Basit Abdul Latif pledged to improve inclusion by bringing in victims’ representatives, civil society leaders, and human rights experts. Yet this remains only a promise.
“I don't think there’s been much progress toward accountability … What's happened, actually, is disappointing in my opinion,” Fadel Abdul Ghany, founder of SNHR, told The New Arab.
“We need to build on experience from the past conflict, and we need to learn, because transitional justice is a theory. It's developed over the past 60 years. We cannot ignore all of this literature and the experts in this field,” he added.
Shadi Haroun, of the Association of Detainees and the Missing of Sednaya Prison (ADMSP), agrees that victims and their families from all sides of the conflict, thousands of whom are living in poverty with no support, should be central to any transitional justice process.
“They [the families] hold the decision to decide if there is any amnesty against perpetrators, not the government … We need also an outline for the work of, and this should be shared with all Syrians, because as I told you, Syrians are the right holder for this,” Haroun said, speaking to The New Arab from Damascus.
“For me, as a victim, I need to have a guarantee from the government not to repeat what happened to me again,” Haroun, who was detained for nine years in Assad’s infamous prison network, added.
“If we will not have our justice, there will be no national peace or reconciliation.”
Alex Martin Astley is a freelance journalist based in Beirut, covering conflict, foreign policy, and social justice issues
Follow him on X: @AlexMAstley