
Breadcrumb
On 7 May, tensions between India and Pakistan boiled over into a major military escalation.
Under the codename Operation Sindoor, the Indian Armed Forces began launching missile strikes into Pakistan after a 22 April attack in Pahalgam killed 26 tourists.
After three days of intense hostilities, a US diplomatic intervention helped prevent a major war and facilitated a surprise India-Pakistan ceasefire.
Due to the drastic expansion of India’s commercial presence in the Middle East and the region’s historical ties with Pakistan, MENA regional stakeholders were alarmed by the escalation of hostilities in South Asia.
While Israel displayed immediate solidarity with India, and Turkey aligned firmly with Pakistan, other regional powers cautiously called for de-escalation.
As the India-Pakistan conflict escalated, the flurry of diplomatic outreaches from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries was especially striking. This signifies the desire of GCC states to extend their arbitration roles in Ukraine to other zones of instability across the globe.
As Indian missile strikes rained on Pakistani cities, Israel enthusiastically supported Operation Sindoor. Israeli Ambassador to India Reuven Azar declared, “Israel supports India’s right to self-defence. Terrorists should know there’s no place to hide from their heinous crimes against the innocent.”
Azar’s solidarity was unsurprising as he had praised Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for being the first world leader to offer condolences to Israel after the 7 October attacks.
Turkey’s solidarity with Pakistan was equally pronounced. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed admiration to Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for his “calm and restrained policies.” In a clear rejection of India’s assignment of blame to Pakistan for the Pahalgam attack, Erdogan backed Sharif’s push for an international investigation into the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir.
Israel and Turkey’s diametrically opposed responses to Operation Sindoor were also borne out on the battlefield. India allegedly used Israel Aerospace Industries-made Harop loitering munitions against Karachi and Lahore. On 8 May, Pakistan claimed to have shot down 25 Israeli-made drones over its territory.
India simultaneously accused Pakistan of firing 300-400 Turkish Asisguard Songar drones along the Jammu and Kashmir Line of Control (LOC).
The prevailing reaction from Iran and most Arab governments was to call for an immediate de-escalation of hostilities. Despite their strict official adherence to neutrality, conspiratorial attacks on India and expressions of religious solidarity with Pakistan surfaced.
Former Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Abolfazl Zohrevand attributed the “extremist current” in India to a US-Israeli conspiracy and warned of its potential to threaten South Asia, Central Asia and China.
Oman’s Grand Mufti Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili declared, “We salute Pakistan, our Muslim brother nation, which has bravely confronted aggression with unwavering faith, determination and courage, and by the grace of Allah has emerged victorious.”
The prevalence of these sentiments explains why even countries with strong trade links with India refrained from endorsing Operation Sindoor.
As the US initially maintained a distant approach to the burgeoning conflict and China shored up its partnership with Pakistan, great power mediation efforts did not gain traction. This vacuum of leadership encouraged regional powers in the Middle East to assume arbitration mantles.
Iran was the first regional power to express public interest in mediating the conflict. After a call with his Pakistani counterpart Ishaq Dar on 26 April, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi expressed Tehran’s willingness to “use its good offices” to de-escalate the conflict.
Iranian media outlets were split on the viability of Araghchi’s mediation proposals. While the Tehran Times hailed Iran’s close relations with both countries and track record of conflict de-escalation, Iranian Diplomacy viewed a clearly neutral country like Oman as the optimal interlocutor.
Notwithstanding its diplomatic entreaties, Iran was unable to convert its mediation overtures into an indispensable diplomatic role. Araghchi’s decision to visit Pakistan before India sowed discontent in New Delhi. Ultranationalist TV host Gaurav Arya called Araghchi a “son of a pig”, and the Indian Embassy in Tehran’s public distancing from these remarks did not fully ebb the controversy. Iran’s controversial ties with Indian Shia clerics and the legacy of the 2024 border skirmishes with Pakistan further restricted its mediation potential.
Despite its pro-Pakistan alignment, Turkey also positioned itself as a voice of de-escalation. Turkish officials repeatedly emphasised their aversion to full-scale war in South Asia and denied reports of arms transfers to Pakistan.
While Indian sources claimed that Turkey transferred six aircraft full of weapons to Pakistan, Turkish officials only confirmed the arrival of one transport plane for a refuelling stop. These reassurances received a critical reception in New Delhi and Major General.
While Turkey’s diplomatic influence in the latest conflict was limited, its forays speak to broader strategic ambitions. Omair Anas, an academic at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, told The New Arab that during talks with India and Pakistan over the past few years, “Turkey has found itself among the nations that were relied on for backdoor diplomacy to defuse ongoing tensions.”
Anas noted that in the long run, Turkey “can’t make an either India or Pakistan choice” and suggested Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of strategic relations with India could be a model for Turkey’s future approach to South Asia.
As Iran and Turkey’s mediation gambits flatlined, GCC countries stepped up their mediation efforts. On 2 May, Sharif met with the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait in Islamabad. After articulating Pakistan’s denials of involvement in Pahlagam, Sharif urged “brotherly countries including Saudi Arabia” to pressure India to de-escalate tensions.
The push for Gulf mediation was unsurprising given the historical track record of GCC arbitration in the India-Pakistan conflict.
During the immediate aftermath of the 2019 escalation in Kashmir and India’s airstrikes into Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia played a critical role in defusing the crisis. UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed travelled to India and Pakistan, while Saudi Arabia hosted Modi and then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan in swift succession.
The UAE also had experience in engaging in confidence-building talks between India and Pakistan. In January 2021, Dubai hosted secret talks between Indian and Pakistani intelligence officials that aimed to prevent a new conflict over Kashmir. UAE Ambassador to the US Yousef al-Otaiba confirmed these negotiations and argued that they played a key role in enforcing a ceasefire between the two South Asian rivals.
As Operation Sindoor intensified, GCC countries harnessed these experiences to facilitate a peaceful resolution. Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir’s back-to-back visits to India and Pakistan underscored Riyadh’s diplomatic role. The UAE opted for quieter shuttle diplomacy by engaging with the Indian and Pakistani leaderships on parallel tracks.
The abrupt ceasefire has fuelled optimism about potential future India-Pakistan dialogue in a neutral location. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s 10 May statement, which was swiftly countered by Indian officials, alluded to this possibility.
If these talks transpire, the Gulf could be the venue of choice. Former Indian Ambassador to Libya and Jordan Anil Trigunayat told The New Arab that “I think Riyadh could be a location for talks even though Indian statements do not refer to this.”
Other analysts are more sceptical. Umer Karim, an Associate Fellow at Riyadh’s King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, told The New Arab that Saudi Arabia “can be considered a neutral actor with strong ties with both sides” but was sceptical that India would consider internationalising the diplomatic process by inserting a third-party mediator.
As tensions flare between India and Pakistan, Middle Eastern regional powers are cautiously seeking to preserve their ties with both countries and contribute to de-escalation efforts.
Due to the US’s at-times erratic attention to South Asia, there are many potential opportunities for MENA actors to mitigate this seemingly intractable security crisis.
Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. Samuel is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin's War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International
Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2