How Kurdish groups in Iran are reacting to Israel's war

Amid Israel's war on Iran, Iranian Kurdish parties have called on the people to seize the moment and launch a new phase of struggle against the central government in Tehran.

At this early stage, it is unclear whether the calls are backed by serious intent or whether they are the predictable rhetoric of organisations operating from a weak position.

“As long as this regime remains in power, the situation will only deteriorate,” the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran’s (KDPI) Executive Committee said in a statement on 13 June.

“Therefore, the first and most important prerequisite for saving Iran's citizens from this crisis, destruction and darkness is to completely remove and end this regime.”

Iran is home to between 10 to 12 million Kurds, or as much as 15% of the country’s population. They are its third-largest ethnic group after Persians and Azeris. They mostly live in the mountainous northwestern provinces along the border with Iraq and Turkey, which are among the country’s poorest.

Unemployment is well above the national average, and many areas lack basic services. Within four days of the beginning of the war, there were already worries about the availability of food and fuel.

“Economically, the situation has been quite dire…and the security condition has worsened,” Allan Hassaniyan, a senior lecturer at the University of Exeter, told The New Arab. “We hear a lot of anxiety.”

Yet, there is a sense that the war may prove to be an invaluable moment to advance longstanding Kurdish political demands.

In the chaotic aftermath of World War II, Kurds briefly established an independent state, the Republic of Mahabad. It lasted less than a year and was brutally suppressed by the Iranian monarchy in December 1946, but has inspired every Kurdish movement since.

Today, Kurds face significant restrictions on their culture, language, and political rights. This oppression came to global attention in the wake of the death of Mahsa Jina Amini, an Iranian Kurdish woman who died in custody in September 2022 after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly.

It sparked a wave of protests against the government using the Kurdish-language slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi,” or “Woman, Life, Freedom.”

The KDPI is one of four main Iranian Kurdish parties, along with the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Each has occasionally engaged in armed struggle against the Iranian state, but none were involved in active fighting before the war with Israel started.

All of the parties have bases inside the neighbouring Kurdistan Region, though activities there are restricted by both Iraq’s federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

The KDPI is the oldest and largest party and can trace its legacy directly to Mahabad. It tends to attract a more traditionalist cadre. Komala is a left-wing party and has an appeal based on its more progressive attitudes, particularly towards women. PAK is the smallest of the four and has little presence beyond its cadres based in the Kurdistan Region, where it has close ties with the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Standing somewhat separately, PJAK is the Iranian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and exists within that broader transnational ideological movement. For some observers, there is little distinction between the two.

In the days after the Israel-Iran war began, all four parties called on the Kurdish people to work for the collapse of the Iranian regime. However, some were blunter about whether this should be achieved through immediate armed struggle.

“We call on all forces, parties, and civil society organisations - with Iranian women at the forefront - to launch a new phase of the ‘Jin, Jiyan, Azadi’ revolution. We declare our readiness to help initiate it,” PJAK said in a statement on 14 June.

Far more militantly, PAK leader Hussein Yazdanpana urged Kurdish youth “to seize IRGC and intel bases” in the Kurdish provinces.

Common across their statements was an argument that the Iranian regime has diverted resources from domestic investments that improve the lives of the people in pursuit of policies that have now directly precipitated a war.

In a statement, Komala Secretary General Abdullah Mohtadi said that “for over two decades, [Tehran] sacrificed the people’s livelihood and well-being in pursuit of a grandiose nuclear program, kept the country teetering on the brink of war, and held people hostage to an empty dream”.

Undoubtedly, this resonates with most Iranian Kurds, who want to see major changes to the Iranian state, and is driving intense discussions about what to do next. However, there are numerous challenges and immense risks inherent in trying to seize this apparent moment of opportunity.

First, the disorganisation of the Iranian Kurdish parties is a profound obstacle. The KDPI and Komala are probably the most obvious vehicles from which to start an armed campaign, but their leaderships and cadres are scattered, and they have a limited military presence on the ground inside Iran.

PJAK is better supported as it is part of the PKK, but the latter is undergoing major structural and strategic changes. On 12 May, the PKK announced that it had ended its armed struggle against Turkey and had disbanded as an organisation. The PJAK insists that the PKK’s declaration does not apply in its case, but its actions will nevertheless be affected by the dynamics of its parent group.

Moreover, the PJAK has adhered to a ceasefire with Iran since 2011 and is often notably absent from Tehran’s general rhetoric about Iranian Kurdish parties. This conspicuous arrangement seems to reflect PJAK’s less-than-explicit call for an uprising in comparison with the other parties.

Hassaniyan noted that there had been efforts in the past to create an institutional framework to coordinate between the parties, known as the Coordination Center of Iranian Kurdistan’s Political Parties. But this effort met with limited success. Since the start of the war, however, there have been calls to re-establish the group.

“There is a feeling of urgency from civil society and from the diaspora especially. The situation is very sensitive, so they need to work together,” he said.

Second, the parties must consider the dangers faced by the Kurdish population, which is under threat from both Israeli airstrikes on Iranian military targets in civilian areas and Iranian security forces.

Many of Israel’s attacks have hit targets in Kurdish-majority provinces in the west, particularly Kermanshah. The area is heavily militarised as a consequence of Iranian security operations against Kurdish parties and civil society, with the strategic placement of military bases and missile launchers in areas closest to Iraq and the Levant.

Many Kurds “are really fearful about this situation because they know that…internally [the Iranian state] always has the confidence to quash and randomly attack civilians and accuse them of espionage,” Hassaniyan said.

Third, the parties must consider the broader dynamics inside an Iran under serious external threat. The Iranian Kurdish parties are often accused of separatism, although decentralisation is their stated goal.

Even if opposed to the regime, many Persian Iranians would be extremely wary of what Kurdish demands might mean for the country as a whole. Navigating this tricky national mood will likely require a pragmatic touch.

The Iranian Kurdish parties will “be cautious not to do things in a rush because, especially civil society, will pay a massive price without any gain” if they launch a movement without a real possibility that the Iranian regime will fall, Hassaniyan observed.

Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and analyst based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy.

Follow him on Twitter and Instagram: @wrodgers2