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How the Gaza war tests Europe's commitment to human rights

How Israel's war on Gaza tests Europe's commitment to human rights
6 min read
09 July, 2025
Divisions in the EU have stalled decisive action against Israel during the Gaza war, exposing the bloc's struggle between its alleged values and realpolitik

"It is not the denunciations that are going to stop this inhumane war in Gaza, it is the actions," said Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares at his arrival at the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels on 23 June.

One of the key discussion topics at the meeting of the 27 EU foreign ministers in the Belgian capital was the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which has regulated relations between the bloc and Tel Aviv since 2000. The bilateral framework, which includes a Free Trade Area, is essential for Israel, which conducts 32% of its trade with the EU.

Following the June meeting, in which no major decision on the Association Agreement was reached, foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas stated that "today was the beginning of the debate and not the end".

But this is not a new discussion. Spain and Ireland first demanded a review of the Association Agreement in February 2024. By that time, at least 28,000 Palestinians had been killed in Gaza. By now, the number is 58,000 people in what is likely to be a significant undercount.

Following Spain and Ireland's proposal in early 2024, the conversation stalled. It was not until May 2025 that 17 EU countries voted for a review of the Association Agreement to determine whether Israel complies with its Article 2, which concerns human rights and democratic principles.

Notably, supporting the review does not necessarily mean favouring a suspension of the agreement, as some countries appear to be using the review only to increase pressure on Israel.

The European External Action Service (EEAS), tasked with the review presented to the member countries on 23 June, concluded that "there are indications that Israel would be in breach of its human rights obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement".

In its official reply, Israel denigrated the review as "rife with bias" and even denied that it is occupying Palestinian territories.

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The vote in May 2025, in which nine countries rejected initiating a review, showed that Israel maintains a group of staunch supporters within the EU. Among them are Hungary, the Czech Republic, and EU heavyweights Italy and Germany (the latter is the second-largest exporter of weapons to Israel, after the US).

On his arrival at the Foreign Affairs Council in June, the German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul struck a very different note from his Spanish counterpart. He said, "We need this agreement and should not question it in any way".

Wadephul even advised against "further formal discussions" on the topic. According to Germany's position, the EU is more likely to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza by talking to Israeli officials discreetly than by applying public pressure.

On 15 July, a new meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council is scheduled in Brussels. One of the topics on the agenda will again be the Association Agreement. Having discussed the EEAS' review of the agreement in the previous meeting, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas is expected to present several possible courses of action to the EU foreign ministers.

There is generally little appetite within the EU for sanctions against Israel or even a partial suspension of the Association Agreement, despite the genocide in Gaza. [Getty]

The options will reportedly be five, ranging from a suspension of scientific cooperation or sanctions on individuals such as members of the Israeli government, on the lower end of the spectrum, to a full suspension of the Association Agreement, on the higher end of the spectrum.

To understand the chances of any of these measures being implemented, it is important to note that the institutional configuration of the EU gives significant power to small groups of states, or even individual states, to decisively shape the Union's foreign policy by blocking decisions. For a suspension of the Association Agreement to be approved or sanctions to be imposed, unanimity would be required.

Meanwhile, the suspension of parts of the agreement (for instance, the preferential trade arrangements or scientific cooperation) would necessitate a qualified majority. Such a majority requires 15 out of the 27 member countries, as well as countries representing 65% of the EU's population.

As long as heavily populated Germany and Italy do not change their stance, a qualified majority is beyond reach. Complicating the picture further, the European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, who is traditionally close to Israel, plays a central role in trade policies.

"A qualified majority to suspend a significant part of the Association Agreement looks unlikely,” Martin Konečný, the director of the European Middle East Project (EuMEP), explained to The New Arab.

“Potentially more conceivable in the short to medium term is an EU ban on trade with settlements, floated in a recent letter by 9 EU member states, which could also be done by a qualified majority, though even that would be a heavy lift."

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Michelle Pace, a Professor in Global Studies at Roskilde University, told The New Arab that "Israel's war on Gaza has slowly but surely triggered a discursive re-alignment, pushing a number of EU member states toward more critical positions vis-à-vis Israel".

However, "the fundamental EU/European structural position toward Israel has not radically changed".

Except for Spain and Ireland, there is generally little appetite within the EU for sanctions against Israel or even a partial suspension of the Association Agreement. This could be observed, for instance, in the decreased sense of urgency about the abysmal humanitarian situation in Gaza during the so-called ‘12-Day War’ in June 2025 between Iran and Israel, with the US joining Israel in its strikes against Iranian targets.

During those 12 days, Kaja Kallas and most member states focused on supporting Israel's right to defend itself, ignoring the fact that it was Israel that began the war by attacking Iran on 13 June. Amid the war, France also shelved its plans to recognise Palestine in June.

Of note, when the foreign affairs ministers met in Brussels on 23 June, Israel was still engaged in its war against Iran, suffering Iranian attacks on Israeli soil. This, argues Konečný, was "certainly a contributing factor that helped break the momentum in the EU".

Israel's war on Gaza is in clear breach of its human rights obligations under the EU trade agreement, but member states have taken no action. [Getty]

However, Konečný remarks, "if the EU was truly committed to an international rules-based order, it should have been an additional reason to suspend the Association Agreement, which also refers to the respect of the UN Charter that the Israeli attack clearly violated".

Criticism of Israel, which in May came even from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, has become more muted again in the wake of the "12-Day War".

"The unfolding Israeli conflict with Iran highlights a potentially strategic move by the Israeli government, initiated at a time when Prime Minister Netanyahu's international standing and that of Israel itself appear to be diminishing," Pace noted.

"Israel and Netanyahu have effectively re-secured significant European support through the confrontation with Iran. The latter also served to de-prioritise the Palestinian issue on the global diplomatic agenda."

With renewed talk of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the EU member states closer to Israel might point to the possibility of a stop in fighting as a sign of Israeli intentions to change course on Gaza.

They might even argue that taking any of the five possible courses of action against Israel that Kallas will present would work against chances for peace. As has so often been the case until now, the EU is expected to postpone for a later time any major decision regarding the war on Gaza.

Marc Martorell Junyent is a graduate of International Relations and holds an MA in Comparative and Middle East Politics and Society from the University of Tübingen (Germany). He has been published in the LSE Middle East Blog, Responsible Statecraft, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), Jacobin, and Inkstick

Follow him on Twitter: @MarcMartorell3