How the fall of El-Fasher could cement Sudan's partition

The fall of El-Fasher has marked one of the bloodiest and most consequential chapters in Sudan’s 18-month war.

After a brutal siege that starved, bombed, and trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians, the paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized control of the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur, which may permanently alter Sudan’s map and solidify the country’s de facto partition.

El-Fasher represented the final urban centre in Darfur under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the army’s retention of the territory functioned as a key strategic barrier to the RSF’s western campaign.

Immediately after the RSF’s takeover of El-Fasher, the United Nations warned that “the risk of further large-scale, ethnically motivated violations and atrocities in El Fasher is mounting by the day”.

Horrifying footage of RSF atrocities and news that over 2,000 civilians were slaughtered within 48 hours of the takeover prompted humanitarian warnings of imminent famine and louder international calls for a ceasefire.

It marks a disturbing turn in a war that has ravaged Sudan since the RSF’s split from the SAF in April 2023, killing at least 150,000 civilians and displacing over 11 million.

Hardening de facto partition

In the near term, analysts believe it will embolden the RSF to continue its brutal military campaign.

“It will galvanise the RSF to further expand the war front into other regions now that they have momentum. By capturing El-Fasher, they now have a direct route to the Northern State and the Kordofans and already there are reports of violations taking place in towns and cities like Bara and Tina,” Dallia Abdelmoniem, a Sudanese political analyst, told The New Arab.  

She added that both the RSF and SAF have weaponised humanitarian suffering since the war began, and since there has been no accountability or sanctioning of either side, the massacres could exceed that of the 2003 Darfur war, which saw genocide and mass war crimes committed.

In that war, the SAF and Janjaweed militias committed widespread atrocities against non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, while the Janjaweed were later rebranded as the RSF in 2013.

The incorporation of former Janjaweed fighters into the RSF underscores how years of impunity have allowed the same patterns of violence to persist, continuing under the regime of Omar Al-Bashir, who was ultimately overthrown during the Sudanese popular revolution in 2019.

El-Fasher’s capture gives the RSF not just symbolic dominance but also strategic control, consolidating the group’s supply corridors through Chad and Libya, securing its hold on gold-rich territory, and isolating the SAF’s eastern command around Port Sudan.

On the other hand, the SAF was able to repel RSF forces from the capital Khartoum in earlier 2025, while it also recaptured numerous locations in central and southern Sudan this year.  

In effect, Sudan’s two main military factions now preside over distinct halves of the country.

The RSF announced a parallel administration in February and in August appointed 13 members of a new presidential council, with RSF leader Mohammad Hamden Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) appointed its head.

The takeover of El-Fasher will now harden the country’s fragmentation and de facto partition.

The Quad's faltering roadmap

El-Fasher's capture highlights the failure of international efforts to end the war. In September, the United States, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt (the Quad) proposed a three-stage plan for Sudan: a humanitarian truce, a ceasefire, and a transition to civilian rule. El-Fasher’s fall has weakened that plan.

In particular, the UAE has come under renewed scrutiny over its military, logistical and financial backing of the RSF, with UN experts, US intelligence agencies and rights groups like Human Rights Watch (HRW) noting Emirati support for the faction.

While Abu Dhabi views the RSF as a counterweight to Islamist currents within the army, it also seeks to protect gold mines in which it has large investments, and that the RSF safeguards.

Analysts have also noted that it aims to preserve its influence in Sudan if the country becomes divided, following a similar approach as it did by backing secessionist groups in Libya and Yemen.

Washington faces mounting pressure to rein in on Abu Dhabi, including from within the US Senate after El-Fasher’s fall. However, Donald Trump’s administration currently prioritises mounting Washington’s financial and political ties with Abu Dhabi.

“Washington has been trying to coax an agreement out of the parties to no avail. Trump has not chosen to take a harder line on UAE for fear of putting at risk higher priority issues he has with them,” said Cameron Hudson, a former US government official who previously served with the State Department and National Security Council, adding that crypto, AI, and cooperation over Gaza were chief among these priorities.

He noted that members of the Quad have not taken steps to fulfil the agreed commitments.

Indeed, while the Quad is the only group that has leverage over Sudan’s factions, their diverging goals currently make it challenging to bring an end to the violence.

Egypt views the SAF as essential for maintaining Sudan’s territorial unity and stability along the Nile valley. For Egypt, a west dominated by the RSF poses significant strategic concerns, and fragmentation in Sudan could lead to further instability extending from Chad to the Red Sea.

Although there are reports Egypt has provided military equipment to the SAF, Cairo states its backing is mostly in the diplomatic realm. In the past, Egypt acknowledged its commitment to “supporting the capabilities of the Sudanese army” and sees upholding the Sudanese army’s authority as critical for aligning with its own military-centred state architecture.

“El-Fasher should be read as a validation of an RSF war economy and supply chain in which Emirati networks are central. It doesn’t mean the UAE owns Hemedti, but an RSF-run Darfur increases Abu Dhabi’s leverage over gold, cross-border corridors, and the western flank of the Red Sea,” Andreas Krieg, associate professor at Kings College London, told The New Arab.

“This is part of what I call Abu Dhabi’s ‘Axis of Secessionists’, a strategy that wins by not being defeated, keeping allies resourced and corridors open, and converting time into leverage.”

Dr Krieg also noted that Egypt occupies a mirror position to Abu Dhabi, having staked its interests on the army’s survival.

“A de facto partition is not Egypt’s preference, since fragile borders, armed economies and Russian or Emirati footprints in Darfur are all headaches, but it may be seen as the lesser evil if the alternative is an RSF march on Khartoum.”

Saudi Arabia and the United States have tried to steer between these poles, mediating talks in Jeddah and urging restraint, but their influence has waned as both Sudanese factions harden their positions.

Without coherence inside the Quad, the roadmap risks becoming a diplomatic mirage.

“So long as the RSF can hold Darfur and monetise it through gold and cross-border trade, Emirati influence there is self-reinforcing," said Dr Krieg.

"The Quad can still matter, if it acts in concert, by raising the cost of rearmament and turning those same Emirati channels from ones that sustain the RSF into ones that restrain it.”

Riyadh and Washington now face a difficult balancing act: how to maintain the Quad as a credible framework while reining in or mediating their Gulf partner’s unilateralism.

Many analysts argue that unless the UAE curbs material support to the RSF, any ceasefire will be meaningless. For now, the Quad’s unity is more rhetorical than anything substantial.

Sudan on the brink

The RSF, emboldened by its recent victories, currently has less incentive to negotiate, as it feels that momentum is on its side. Moreover, SAF commander-in-chief Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan pledged his forces were "determined to avenge what happened to our people in El-Fasher" and would "fight until this land is purified" of the RSF, whom he described as "criminals".

Clearly, neither side has the appetite for a ceasefire right now.

Yet for civilians in Sudan, discussions about ceasefires and foreign intervention can feel remote. Their primary concern is simply staying alive. Each new attack complicates efforts at reconciliation if international efforts via the Quad fail to prioritise stability in Sudan.

And while de facto partition already exists in Sudan, further instability could ensue even if the violence ends tomorrow.

“I think RSF control over all of Darfur will expose them for the brutal mercenaries they truly are. They don’t have the capacity to administer a government, and that will become painfully obvious very soon,” said Cameron Hudson.

Dr Krieg added that if Washington and Riyadh cannot translate the Quad’s framework into real constraints on their partners, “El Fasher will be remembered less as a turning point than as the moment Sudan’s partition became the default, which would suit an Emirati approach that prizes survivable influence over headline victories”.

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa

Follow him on Twitter: @jfentonharvey