How strengthened EU-Turkey defence ties are boosting Ankara's influence in regional security

In 2025, Europe is recalibrating its defence strategy, with Turkey emerging as an increasingly pivotal partner.

This shift was highlighted on 30 April, when Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Both leaders discussed bilateral ties across defence, trade, and regional security, focusing on the war in Ukraine, Middle Eastern stability, and migration.

In addition to pledging to increase bilateral trade to €40 billion, a key outcome was the establishment of a joint venture between Turkey's Baykar and Italy's Leonardo to produce unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combining both companies’ respective expertise in the design and technology of drones.

This move, not unique to Italy, reflects Europe’s broader efforts to forge closer ties with Ankara, especially in the defence sphere.

Deeper defence engagement

This year, Turkey's defence ties with the EU have strengthened, marked by its participation in the European Sky Shield Initiative and joint projects, including ammunition production with Poland, vehicle supplies to Romania, and naval cooperation with Portugal.

Erdogan has insisted on Turkey’s participation in EU defence procurement and reconstruction schemes for Ukraine, effectively requesting a seat at the table in European defence planning.

Now, Europe appears to be listening.

Indeed, this shift follows a new era of unpredictable American support for Ukraine and NATO under US President Donald Trump, marked by increased tariffs and a push for European nations to take greater responsibility for their own security.

In response, Europe is turning to Turkey, with many European policymakers now seeming to agree with Erdoğan’s assertion that "European security is unthinkable without Turkey”.

Indeed, Ankara possesses the second-largest standing army in NATO and has vital strategic positioning in the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle East/North Africa regions, enabling it to counterbalance Russia and complement EU security interests.

According to Alper Coşkun, a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US’s decreased reliability have increased Turkey’s value to Europe.

“Turkey's success in developing its defence industry, alongside its combat-hardened capabilities (even if not on par with Ukraine, are definitely more so compared to all European forces) in terms of scale and readiness levels, adds to Turkey's strength,” he told The New Arab.

“This will increase Turkey's leverage, which could yield political benefits,” he added.

Adapting to Turkey's Eastern Mediterranean influence

Over the past decade, Turkey has adopted an assertive foreign policy, which, while seen as a cooperative partner for some European states such as Italy, the UK and Spain, has also wound up in disputes with others, like France, Germany and Greece.

“Turkey will undoubtedly play a role in Europe’s future security architecture - but that role will likely involve Europeans recognising Turkey’s desire for a zone of influence in its own periphery, from the Caucasus to Syria,” Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Visiting Fellow at Brookings, told The New Arab.

“From a defence perspective, a key region where Europeans will need Turkey is the Black Sea. Turkish navy is on par with Russia’s fleet now and can serve as a reassurance force to prevent the region becoming a Russian lake,” she added.

While recognising the importance of aligning with Ankara over countering Russia, there have been mixed reactions to Turkey’s influence elsewhere, such as in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Compared to its European counterparts, Italy has shown greater willingness to engage with Turkey on various issues, including migration management.

Both countries share an interest in Libya, where they have supported the internationally recognised government in Tripoli while also engaging with the rival Eastern government in Tobruk, positioning them to potentially help guide the country toward a long-overdue political solution.

France, despite warming relations with Turkey, has a more tense history with Ankara, particularly given its backing of Greece and Cyprus over maritime disputes and Turkish drilling for gas in contested exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Moreover, Turkey and Brussels clash on the status of Cyprus, with Erdogan recently calling for a ‘two-state solution’ between the northern and southern administrations.

However, this broader divide has softened in recent years, exemplified by France’s recent diplomatic overtures to Ankara, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s talks with French counterpart Jean-Noel Barrot on 2 April, to discuss an alignment on Ukraine but also post-Assad Syria, wherein Paris has eyed a role.

Moreover, France approved the delivery of Meteor missiles for use in the Europe-supplied Eurofighter Typhoon jets, despite Greece's protests for Paris to block these transfers, indicating Paris’s waning backing for the Greek bloc in favour of improved ties with Turkey.

Although a reluctant change of approach, given that in 2020 French President Emmanuel Macron unsuccessfully called for EU-wide sanctions on Turkey for its contentious drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as calling NATO “brain dead” amid Turkey’s expanding regional influence, it certainly marks a strategic shift within Paris.

As a result, even Greek-Turkish relations have seen a thaw. Both sides described their April 2025 talks as “constructive,” with more meetings scheduled. In Brussels, officials have quietly supported these talks, recognising that a lingering Turkey-Greece dispute would undermine the broader goal of a united European security front.

On the other hand, Germany vetoed the Eurofighter agreement in April, citing Turkey’s arrest of opposition leader and Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.

The Eurofighter Typhoon is produced by a consortium of Germany, the UK, Italy, and Spain, therefore, it needed Berlin’s approval, even though the latter three nations have supported the deal.

As for Syria, despite the reticence of European actors like France and Germany, they appear to accept that Turkey’s degree of leverage over Damascus’ new government means they have to cooperate with Ankara to have a say in Syria’s future.

Crucially, these factors will boost Turkey’s regional influence further.

“Overall, Turkey's developing capabilities and deepening ties with Italy and other European partners will strengthen its hand in shaping developments in these theatres [like Libya and Syria] and offsetting counteractions by others,” said Alper Coşkun.

Obstacles to European-Turkish integration

Although Turkey seeks deeper political ties with Europe, many states within the latter would like to stop there and focus on defence ties only. That is particularly germane for discussions over Turkey’s potential membership of the EU, which Ankara has expressed willingness to pursue, although there is still strong opposition in Brussels over admitting Turkey.

Moreover, while a member of the EU Customs Union, Turkey has been advocating for the Union’s expansion to include services, digital trade, and agriculture, although the EU has been hesitant to agree to that.

Even amid these roadblocks, some analysts believe that there will be a need for deeper integration, although balanced with Europe’s own values.

“If the goal is to move beyond ad-hoc deals and make Turkey part of a broader European security strategy, then the EU will need to create more flexible but structured ways to cooperate, something between full membership and full exclusion,” a Riccardo Gasco, Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Bologna and Visiting Research Fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center (IPC), told The New Arab.

“Otherwise, we’ll end up with a patchwork of bilateral deals that work in the short term, but fall apart when real crises hit.”

Turkey's longstanding role in managing migration flows from the Middle East has further cemented its importance to Europe’s security.

While Meloni embodies Europe’s desire to build ties with Turkey, the EU is far from unified, and she has evidently sought to defy the bloc's indecision on how to engage with Ankara.

As with many critical foreign policy issues, the EU has long been hindered by bilateralism and clashing interests among its member states, preventing it from acting as a cohesive bloc.

That will likely hinder efforts to fully integrate European coordination.

And conflicting approaches towards Ankara - ranging from Germany and France’s past grievances, to Rome and the UK’s pragmatic approaches - may still undermine broader cohesion between Europe and Turkey.

“When different member states take different approaches, it weakens the EU’s ability to act as a united bloc,” said Riccardo Gasco. “These kinds of divisions can send mixed signals to Ankara and complicate efforts to build a common policy,” he added, noting that the divergence could also be due to Germany’s transition government.

Mr. Coşkun added that, without breakthroughs on issues such as the status of Cyprus or greater inclusion in EU defense efforts, Turkey's engagement with EU countries will likely continue to be bilateral.

Going forward

Ultimately, Turkey’s geostrategic position and its overtures toward the EU have helped it advance its role as a vital partner.

However, challenges remain, especially regarding the diverging opinions of European states towards Turkey, notably the differences between the EU itself and some of its member states. Still, Europe will certainly feel more pressure to align with Ankara, especially while the war in Ukraine persists and President Trump remains unpredictable

And this growing trajectory of acceptance of Turkey among EU policymakers will no doubt be a boost to Ankara, from Italy’s alignment in Libya to Europe’s recognition of Turkey’s key role in Syria, which could strengthen Ankara’s influence further in these areas.

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

Follow him on Twitter: @jfentonharvey