How durable is the Iran-Israel ceasefire?

On 24 June, the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict was brought to a halt after US President Donald Trump published a post on Truth Social stating that Tel Aviv and Tehran had agreed to a “complete and total ceasefire”.

The announcement came days after the US had directly entered the war and launched an attack on Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear facilities.

The unprovoked Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the 22 June US strikes on Iran came while Tehran had been actively engaging in nuclear negotiations with Washington.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu justified the attack by claiming, as he has repeatedly over the last 30 years, that if not stopped, “Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time”.

After the Iran-Israel ceasefire came into force, Donald Trump stated that nuclear negotiations could resume imminently. However, the US President has also stated that the US would “absolutely” bomb Iran again, if intelligence indicated that Tehran had resumed high-level enrichment.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Tehran requires the US to guarantee that America will not revert to targeting us in a military attack during the negotiations”, before Iran re-engages diplomatically with Washington.

As both Israel and Iran remain sceptical of the viability of Iran-US nuclear engagement, two interconnected questions present themselves: what is next for the nuclear talks, and how durable is the Iran-Israel ceasefire?

A cautious re-engagement

Washington’s de facto support for the Israeli war on Iran, and its direct entry into the war on 22 June, has strengthened existing reservations in Iran about entering talks with the US.

“The mood in Iran has sharply turned against diplomacy. The common view is that Trump was not only engaged in coordinated deception in the last two weeks before the war, but that his entire diplomatic engagement was a deception,” Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President at The Quincy Institute, told The New Arab.

“There is, at the same time, a realisation that the door to diplomacy cannot and should not be completely shut, but the lack of confidence in Trump has created a significant challenge for renewed diplomacy.”

Iran’s cautious approach to renewed diplomacy with the West was also seen in Tehran’s 2 July suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based on the agency’s alleged complicity in the Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Although the law called for the “immediate” suspension of all cooperation with the IAEA, the agency’s inspectors have not yet been asked by Tehran to leave the country. Crucially, Iran also remains a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Since the US strikes on Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz, US President Donald Trump has expressed a willingness to engage diplomatically with Iran, while also stating that Washington’s “obliteration” of Iran’s nuclear facilities has rendered a new nuclear deal unnecessary.  

However, IAEA Chief Rafael Grossi maintains that Iran could restart enrichment within a matter of months. Irrespective of whether Iran can resume enrichment activities, the signing of a deal that provides oversight on this issue would likely aid in preventing a renewed trilateral military confrontation between Israel, the US, and Iran.

“A deal would impose constraints and restore oversight; without it, both sides are locked into a security dilemma where worst-case assumptions dominate,” Francesco Salesio Schiavi, a Geopolitical Analyst and Consultant, explained to TNA.

“As long as there’s no political or verification mechanism in place, the risk of accidental or deliberate escalation remains high. In that scenario, war becomes not a question of ‘if’ but ‘when’.”

Israel's risk calculations

Dynamics in the Trump-Netanyahu political relationship will also impact the longevity of the Israel-Iran ceasefire.

During Trump’s second term, Washington has put some restraints on Israel’s regional wars, presiding over a ceasefire in Gaza in January and negotiating the 24 June Iran-Israel ceasefire. 

However, as evidenced by the resumption of Israeli violence in Gaza and continued Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire in Lebanon, Trump has previously proven unable, or unwilling, to continue restraining Tel Aviv’s actions in the region.

“When it comes to the Israel-Iran ceasefire, the centre of gravity is in Washington,” Giorgio Cafiero, CEO at Gulf States Analytics, told TNA. “If the US stops pressuring Israel, there is every reason to worry about the ceasefire being violated.”

While not impossible, the likelihood of Washington greenlighting renewed Israeli attacks on Iran remains low.

“It is important to recognise that Lebanon is not Iran and doesn't hold the same strategic importance for Israel's American allies. The Trump administration is pushing for a renewed and comprehensive nuclear deal,” Inna Rudolf, Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, explained.

“Netanyahu's risk appetite will likely depend on his interpretation of President Trump's red lines regarding further sabotaging of nuclear negotiations or provoking Iranian military action in response to any Israeli violations of the ceasefire.”

Regional considerations

As Iran-US diplomatic engagement remains the preferred outcome for the rest of the region, Arab capitals are likely to leverage their relationships with Tehran, Washington, Europe, and in some cases, with Tel Aviv, to achieve this outcome.

Even in advance of the 23 June Iranian strike on the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar, which demonstrated how significant an escalation of the Iran-Israel war could be for the  Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the economic losses incurred from the closure of regional airspaces and a deteriorating security situation in the region, saw Gulf capitals commit to a diplomatic solution to the crisis.

In addition, against the backdrop of Israeli aggression in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and now Iran, the threat perception of Tel Aviv in the GCC appears to be shifting.

“It seems the ceasefire will also depend on pressure from GCC members on the US to restrain Israel. These countries are deeply concerned about Israel's ambitions,” Javad Heiran-Nia, Director of Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Shahid Beheshti University, told TNA.

“Even though Gulf Arab states have viewed Iran as their primary threat for many years, they are now having to content with an Israeli state that is driving significant instability in the region through its wars in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran - pursuing a hegemonic order of its own design,” he added.

“Let us not forget that Netanyahu once demanded Saudi Arabia cede part of its territory to establish a Palestinian state. This was not merely a rhetorical pressure tactic - it also reveals Israel’s broader intentions toward the Arab region.”

Diplomacy is the best option

Against the backdrop of unprovoked Israeli and American attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, which also resulted in the deaths of nearly 1,000 Iranian men, women and children, Iran remains hesitant to re-engage diplomatically with Washington. 

However, as emphasised by Araghchi’s insistence that the “doors of diplomacy will never slam shut”, there is a clear acknowledgement in Tehran that a negotiated solution to this crisis remains the best possible option for the Islamic Republic.

Zahra Ladha is a geopolitical analyst focused on Iran, Iraq, and transnational Shiaism. Zahra holds an MSc in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford 

Follow her on X: @zahrariy_