How Bashir-era figures are planning a post-war comeback in Sudan

Loyalists of Sudan’s former ruler Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted from power during the country’s 2019 uprising, are planning a return to power through elections after the war, while deploying fighters during the ongoing conflict.

Ahmed Haroun, chairman of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), which is now outlawed, recently outlined in his first media interview in years his plans for a political system where the army retains significant power after the current conflict ends.

"We have taken a strategic decision to not return to power other than by the ballot box after the war," the ousted leader, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in Darfur, told Reuters in late July.

"The Western model is not practical in Sudan," he said, from a northern Sudan hideout. "We must develop a model for the role of the army in politics given fragile security and foreign greed, as this won't be the first or last war in the country."

The NCP, which is rooted in Sudan’s Islamist movement, ruled under autocrat Omar al-Bashir for decades in Sudan before being banned in 2019.

The announcement came as little surprise to those closely following the escalating crisis in Sudan. Bashir-era figures have been mobilising thousands of fighters in support of the military’s war effort, despite the army leadership's official stance that it would not bring Islamist factions back to power in Sudan.

Behind the official discourse, critics pointed out that Army Commander Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has already been facilitating the return of former civil servants to senior government posts, despite his repeated assurances that the outlawed NCP would not be allowed back into power.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and one of the two main parties in the conflict, have openly accused what it calls "Islamists" of orchestrating the prolonged war, warning that their resurgence threatens regional stability.

According to observers, this move could potentially push the RSF to align more closely with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, two actors that have been crucial in supporting Dagalo since the conflict's onset, heralding further unrest.

The RSF has its origins in the Janjaweed militia, which was accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Darfur against non-Arab communities in the early 2000s.

Last year, international groups such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) said the RSF and allied militias were carrying out ethnic cleansing, and possibly genocide, in the ongoing conflict. The RSF has also been accused of horrific and widespread sexual violence during the war

Earlier this year, in March, Khartoum initiated a legal case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing the Gulf state of violating the Genocide Convention due to its alleged involvement in fuelling the conflict by supporting the RSF.

War exploitation

Political analyst Hafez Kabir, a former Popular Congress Party leader and co-founder of the RSF-led Ta'sis coalition, which formed a parallel government in western Sudan late July, explained that after their public political presence diminished, former ruling party members gradually "returned through several channels".

These included sabotaging, according to Kabir, the 2022 initiative of Sheikh al-Tayeb al-Jad, a prominent Sufi leader from River Nile State, whose efforts aimed to prevent the country's slide into chaos.

They also launched "sustained media and political campaigns" against the United Nations mission led by Volker Perthes, the former head of the UN political mission in Sudan, who had been invited by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to support the democratic transition.

Former regime elements and army-aligned factions rejected Perthes's presence, viewing his support for civilian revolutionary forces "as a threat” to their interests.

"Their staunch opposition to the political process and the framework agreement ultimately culminated in the outbreak of war following the collapse of the settlement efforts," he claimed.

The RSF remains deeply entrenched in Darfur and swathes of southern Sudan, but despite the stalemate in many regions, the Sudanese army has recently regained ground in key areas in Khartoum and central Sudan - achievements which Islamist-linked factions claimed to have helped the military secure.

Reports indicate that approximately 5,000 fighters affiliated with the former ruling NCP are operating within "special forces" units supporting the army. These fighters have played a pivotal role in recent battlefield advances.

This progress coincided with a political resurgence, with many Bashir loyalists and allies appointed to the Cabinet of Prime Minister Kamil Idris, a technocrat installed by the military in May.

The formation of a new government and their return to executive roles, including ministerial portfolios and positions in the Sovereignty Council and various state governments, marks "a clear re-entry into the political scene," according to Kabir.

Elements linked to the former regime have played an “active role” since the war began, Kabir added, through loyal officers in the army and battalions that have recruited young Sudanese to fight, often through “inducement and intimidation”.

Abdul Majid al-Kheir al-Qantouri, a political analyst specialising in Islamist groups, agrees that Sudan's Islamist movement has exploited the ongoing conflict since April 2023, using multiple tools, including the military institution, economy, and media, alongside systematic religious and tribal mobilisation.

He explains that they have returned their cadres to the army under the cover of restructuring the armed forces since the outbreak of war, while supporting the formation of parallel militias loyal to them.

"The movement exploits security and political chaos to portray itself as a potential saviour of the state, despite its direct responsibility for current crises, and uses sharp religious rhetoric to fuel conflict by portraying the war as a battle between Islam and secularism in an attempt to attract youth and tribes," he said.

A calculated re-entry strategy

Abdul Majid Abdul Hamid, an Islamic leader and political analyst, argues that many with ties to the Islamist movement have fought and died in the war without demanding any power in return.

He added that while participation in power presents serious complications for Sudan's current political landscape, citing what he describes as an “undeclared international and regional veto” against Islamic groups across the region, Sudan's movement is distinct.

He notes that it brings with it three decades of governance experience as part of the NCP, which has, in his view, shaped a more pragmatic and flexible leadership capable of navigating both local and international dynamics.

Fears about Islamist participation, he says, come not only from abroad but also from their political opponents domestically, who see their return to power as a direct threat to their survival and influence.

If they do return to power, they will not do so with “old names and facades," Hamid said, suggesting they could participate through "new faces that don't provoke regional and international intelligence sensitivities".

An extended conflict

Former regime elements and the Islamist movement have repositioned themselves within Sudan's political landscape following the fall of the regime in 2019, employing security and military tactics that helped undermine the transitional civilian government and paved the way for al-Burhan's coup in October 2021.

The conflict that followed has since devolved into one of the world's most urgent humanitarian crises, with more than 30 million Sudanese in desperate need of aid.

But the conflict is likely to drag on, according to Kabir, who notes that these groups benefit from their long experience in fighting civil wars, especially in South Sudan, Darfur, and Kordofan, where mass atrocities were committed.

"With their continued rejection of any political negotiations and their bets on military resolution, [they] realise the weakness of their chances in any peaceful process. Therefore, they bet on the continuation of the war, hoping for a complete return to power through 'gun legitimacy,' not through political settlement," Kabir added.

They have maintained their economic networks, he adds, especially in the gold trade and currency speculation, enabling them to finance activities away from official oversight, while controlling media outlets and communication platforms.

Al-Qantouri emphasised that they have also worked to penetrate the political scene through new fronts and manufactured parties, seeking to dismantle any national initiative from within through elements loyal to it.

"The Sudanese street’s awareness and revolutionary forces' cohesion are the biggest obstacle to attempts to reproduce the previous regime," he explains, stressing that "today's battle is not only military but also against the return of the deep state".

The Civil Democratic Alliance of Revolutionary Forces (Sumoud), an opposition bloc formed by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok following the dissolution of the Taqaddum coalition, called in early August for the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Islamic Movement to be designated as "terrorist organisations" both locally and internationally.

The alliance cited what it described as a long record of military coups, genocide, support for terrorism, systemic corruption, and involvement in regional conflicts.

A retired senior Sudanese army officer, speaking anonymously due to security concerns, said Bashir loyalists and Islamists back the military without openly declaring an alliance.

They participate in power discreetly, avoiding party labels, while promoting rhetoric about restoring state institutions, without taking responsibility for their past role in political chaos and corruption.

According to the army officer, many members have been protected by the army since leaving prison, obtaining appointments in state and sovereign institutions without official announcements.

This methodology grants them the ability "to maintain plausible deniability for any direct connection to the military leadership or responsibility for the ongoing war".

This article is published in collaboration with Egab.