Houthis looking to be power behind the throne
Houthis looking to be power behind the throne
Analysis: The Houthi expansion across Yemen continues with each agreement. But the movement wants a government that can maintain a façade of independence.
4 min read
Even the government can't resign without a hitch.
The news tonight that parliament wants an extraordinary session over the attempted resignation of the Yemeni government is only the latest sign of a country where nothing can be taken for granted.
Not resignations. Not alliances. Not agreements.
The offer of resignation - from both the cabinet and President Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi - comes after a deal reached between the Houthis and Yemen's president on Wednesday evening that can barely be described as an agreement. That would imply that Hadi had some choice in the matter – the fact that his residence was completely surrounded, and his presidential palace plundered, says otherwise.
Hadi's residence remains surrounded, as does the prime minister's residence. Houthi militiamen sit in tanks and armoured vehicles patrolling the streets, and their allied 'popular committees' man checkpoints. Hadi's chief of staff, the urbane Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak, is still being held by the Houthis after being kidnapped by one such popular committee.
All of this was supposed to change after yesterday's deal, but, as of yet, there appears to be no move to implement anything. Hadi is the president in name only.
Yet, none of this is new.
The Houthis have been in effective control of Sanaa, and in turn the Yemeni state, since they stormed the city on 21 September last year. If the aftermath of the agreement signed after that outbreak of violence is an indicator of what is going to happen now then the likely outcome is further capitulation by the Yemeni government and further expansion by the Houthis.
The September agreement stipulated that all non-state armed groups would leave the capital and that encampments would be removed. Yesterday's deal does not even go that far, with the Houthis only agreeing to withdraw from military and government locations seized in the two days of fighting.
The Houthis say that they simply do not trust the Yemeni political elite to carry out their side of the bargain. The current demands are to amend Yemen's draft constitution and the proposed six-province federal state, as well as to "secure" Marib province.
The Houthi argument is that they do not want to rule, and merely want to continue the 2011 revolution and root out a corrupt elite that hundreds of thousands of Yemenis rose up against that year. In his televised speech on Tuesday evening, Abdelmalik al-Houthi, the leader of the predominantly Zaydi Shia movement, referred to “cooperation” a number of times.
However, based on recent events, that cooperation only works when everyone else listens to the Houthis. They are effectively having to bully everyone else into getting their way – and bullying in Yemen is done with a gun.
There does appear to be cooperation with one faction. The man the Houthis fought in six wars between 2004 and 2010, and who they rose against in 2011, is sitting comfortably at home in Sanaa while the city implodes around him.
Ali Abdullah Saleh is a wily character, and the reputed alliance between him and the Houthis is now coming out into the open, with talk of a shady “third force” participating in this week's fighting, and a taped voice recording emerging of Saleh and a Houthi leader discussing who they would back for prime minister in October.
To many Yemenis, and despite Houthi protestations that alliances change, this reeks of hypocrisy.
Which brings us back to what the Houthis want and where Yemen is heading?
The Houthi-Saleh alliance is a marriage of convenience, and the two sides will most likely fall out, just as anti-Saleh groups did after 2011. But before that happens, the Houthis have more pressing matters.
The Houthis are moving quickly to integrate themselves into the government, state institutions and the military. They want to be the power behind the throne, but a throne that maintains a facade of independence.
The movement knows that it cannot control the whole of Yemen – they simply do not have the ability or resources. Controlling the north and ensuring that the south does not cause them any problems? They would take that.
If only it were so simple.
The news tonight that parliament wants an extraordinary session over the attempted resignation of the Yemeni government is only the latest sign of a country where nothing can be taken for granted.
Not resignations. Not alliances. Not agreements.
Based on recent events, cooperation only works when everyone else listens to the Houthis. |
Hadi's residence remains surrounded, as does the prime minister's residence. Houthi militiamen sit in tanks and armoured vehicles patrolling the streets, and their allied 'popular committees' man checkpoints. Hadi's chief of staff, the urbane Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak, is still being held by the Houthis after being kidnapped by one such popular committee.
All of this was supposed to change after yesterday's deal, but, as of yet, there appears to be no move to implement anything. Hadi is the president in name only.
Yet, none of this is new.
The Houthis have been in effective control of Sanaa, and in turn the Yemeni state, since they stormed the city on 21 September last year. If the aftermath of the agreement signed after that outbreak of violence is an indicator of what is going to happen now then the likely outcome is further capitulation by the Yemeni government and further expansion by the Houthis.
The September agreement stipulated that all non-state armed groups would leave the capital and that encampments would be removed. Yesterday's deal does not even go that far, with the Houthis only agreeing to withdraw from military and government locations seized in the two days of fighting.
The Houthis say that they simply do not trust the Yemeni political elite to carry out their side of the bargain. The current demands are to amend Yemen's draft constitution and the proposed six-province federal state, as well as to "secure" Marib province.
The Houthi argument is that they do not want to rule, and merely want to continue the 2011 revolution and root out a corrupt elite that hundreds of thousands of Yemenis rose up against that year. In his televised speech on Tuesday evening, Abdelmalik al-Houthi, the leader of the predominantly Zaydi Shia movement, referred to “cooperation” a number of times.
However, based on recent events, that cooperation only works when everyone else listens to the Houthis. They are effectively having to bully everyone else into getting their way – and bullying in Yemen is done with a gun.
There does appear to be cooperation with one faction. The man the Houthis fought in six wars between 2004 and 2010, and who they rose against in 2011, is sitting comfortably at home in Sanaa while the city implodes around him.
Ali Abdullah Saleh is a wily character, and the reputed alliance between him and the Houthis is now coming out into the open, with talk of a shady “third force” participating in this week's fighting, and a taped voice recording emerging of Saleh and a Houthi leader discussing who they would back for prime minister in October.
To many Yemenis, and despite Houthi protestations that alliances change, this reeks of hypocrisy.
Which brings us back to what the Houthis want and where Yemen is heading?
The Houthi-Saleh alliance is a marriage of convenience, and the two sides will most likely fall out, just as anti-Saleh groups did after 2011. But before that happens, the Houthis have more pressing matters.
The Houthis are moving quickly to integrate themselves into the government, state institutions and the military. They want to be the power behind the throne, but a throne that maintains a facade of independence.
The movement knows that it cannot control the whole of Yemen – they simply do not have the ability or resources. Controlling the north and ensuring that the south does not cause them any problems? They would take that.
If only it were so simple.