The Houthi blockade: Will the Red Sea become a new front in the Iran war?

Tensions between the Houthis in Yemen and Saudi Arabia have continued to escalate following their recent standoff over Iran resuming direct flights to the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport.

In a move that could have broader implications for the US-Iran war, the group declared a naval blockade against Saudi-linked shipping and clashed again with the kingdom.

Further escalation or an expanded blockade has the dire potential of opening another front in the regional Iran war, and further disrupting global trade and oil supplies.

Shift in Houthi strategy

Caroline Rose, a senior director at the US-based Soufan Centre, believes this may mark the "most consequential Houthi response" against maritime shipping seen in the past three years.

"While the blockade is not fully in effect, it does show a significant shift in the Houthis' strategic intent, timed right as there are major restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz," Rose told The New Arab.

“Already, we have seen a change in behaviour with commercial vessels routing through the area, particularly after the Houthis have sought to enforce this embargo with the striking of two Saudi oil tankers."

These moves have "threatened a tinderbox" for any vessel seeking passage through the narrow strait. And it’s already proving costly, with oil prices reaching $100 per barrel.

Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the Middle East and North Africa at the risk intelligence company RANE, believes the Houthis' escalation reflects "several converging factors".

"Firstly, the group has likely been emboldened by Iran’s more aggressive regional posture," he told The New Arab.

"Secondly, the group has probably assessed that sustained disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, which has increased Saudi reliance on the East-West Pipeline and Red Sea export routes, has made Riyadh even more reluctant to resume a costly conflict."

That in turn may have "reinforced the Houthis' expectation that Saudi Arabia would prefer de-escalation".

"Finally, and although the Houthis have not explicitly linked the two theatres, their actions are also likely a response to Iran's recent calls to close Bab al-Mandab and intensify pressure on regional shipping and the global economy," Khoueiry said.

End goal

"They see this as a strategic moment - a move that could distract the US from its front with Iran and degrade their overall campaign against the Iranian regime and its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz," Rose told The New Arab.

"This decision reflects the Houthis' continued understanding and appreciation of the political pressure that maritime trade hold-ups can mount on political leadership, particularly the US," she added.

"This is a tactic to try and mount that pressure on Washington."

Sherwan Hindreen Ali, Middle East Research Manager at the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), isn’t surprised by these attacks. He noted that it was unlikely the Houthis wouldn’t have followed up an announcement of a blockade with attacks.

The group previously did this after announcing their blockade of Israeli ports following the onset of the Gaza war in 2023.

"Saudi Arabia is likely to respond to this escalation," Ali told The New Arab. "This response can take multiple forms - including possible military strikes - and unfold over the coming days."

Khoueiry sees the Houthi blockade as a serious "coercive threat" but believes it may not result in a "complete physical closure" of Bab al-Mandab. The group’s move has already "altered tanker routes" and its expanded attacks are enough to deter shipping and achieve their objectives.

"Escalation is already underway, but while further expansion of the conflict is likely, it is also not inevitable, and will depend on both sides' target selection," he said. "Saudi-led forces have now struck mainly Houthi military positions, beyond the strikes on Hodeidah and Karman, while the Houthis have responded against Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu," Khoueiry added.

"Should Riyadh expand its target selection against the Houthis, or vice versa, to more critical economic, humanitarian and civilian infrastructure, then the cycle would likely escalate."

The demonstrated Saudi willingness to strike also suggests "a declining tolerance for Houthi coercion" and possibly a calculation on Riyadh's part that the "current regional environment" even offers an opportunity to degrade the group's capabilities and reestablish deterrence.

"With the Houthis emboldened by Iranian support and increasingly threatening Saudi exports, Riyadh is viewing military action as necessary to prevent further erosion of the status quo," Khoueiry told The New Arab.

Multifaceted Houthi motives

The Houthis justify their new blockade as a measure to force Riyadh to end its blockade on the Yemeni ports and airports it controls. Still, ACLED’s Ali assesses that the Houthis’ motives are multifaceted.

"The timing of this announcement is undoubtedly connected with the breakdown of the MoU between Iran and the US and the resumption of high-intensity hostilities," he said.

Before the announcement, there were already reports that Iran had asked the group to close Bab al-Mandab if America attacks Iranian energy infrastructure.

"Furthermore, in addition to the pro-Iran Iraqi militias, the Houthis are the only remaining effective Iranian non-state ally with the capacity to threaten other countries in the region," Ali said.

“So the timing of the attacks can be read as a reminder that Iran can disrupt the region on multiple fronts.”

Internal dynamics in Yemen are also likely influencing the Houthis’ decision to escalate. The Trump administration's designation of the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation has imposed "new economic burdens" that have compounded over time.

"Negotiations with Saudi Arabia to end the Yemen war and secure economic aid have been stalling for years," Ali said.

"It is possible the Houthis chose this moment to escalate - when Saudi Arabia is busy with a crisis with Iran - to exert pressure on Riyadh to acquiesce to Houthi demands."

Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz

A nightmare scenario involves the Houthis moving to close off Bab al-Mandab in conjunction with Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which could have wide-ranging economic ramifications far beyond the region.

Soufan Centre’s Rose thinks the Houthis will be prepared for any long campaign and that they recognise such a blockade could incur a maritime coalition and even direct strikes against them.

"The dual closure of both Straits - particularly with no clear alternative route in sight - will impose severe economic costs," she said. "This is the likely intent of the Houthis and their backer, Iran."

Ali expects a total blockade of Bab al-Mandab similar to the ongoing one in Hormuz will have a "significant impact" on both regional and global trade while increasing the Houthis’ leverage.

On the other hand, such an escalatory action could carry huge costs for them, such as inviting a renewed American air campaign.

"So far, the Houthis have been careful to frame their threat to give themselves an offramp if they choose to de-escalate," Ali told The New Arab. “The group stated explicitly that their actions do not amount to a ‘closure’ of Bab al-Mandab, but just a blockade on Saudi ports and ships. Yet even there the group has been inconsistent in applying the blockade."

Two ships carrying Saudi crude bound for China already passed through Bab al-Mandab on Thursday without any incident, suggesting that some ships are presently exempted. Ali reasoned that it may also suggest the group is taking a more "conservative approach" in its escalatory actions.

"There is a clear difference in effectiveness between Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz and Houthis disrupting traffic but never truly closing the Bab al-Mandab," Steven Horrell, a non-resident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defence and Security Program at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, told The New Arab.

"This reflects the capabilities of a state vs a non-state actor, and the overall capacity to sustain attacks of each."

It also, he added, reflects "the differences in the geometry and the geography of the two situations".

A range of weapons at the Houthis' disposal

The Houthis have a substantive arsenal of drones and anti-ship missiles that can threaten shipping. Reuters reported on Thursday that Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has flown in equipment for missiles and drones as well as military advisors to Yemen.

"I think the Houthis need Iranian materials to assemble their weapons, but the Houthis are now experts at employing drones and conducting counter-shipping campaigns," Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and an expert on naval operations and wargaming, told TNA.

"I suspect the Iranian advisors are there in large part to coordinate operations between Iran and the group and provide any lessons learned from Iran’s recent campaign against US forces."

The naval operations expert expects the Houthis would mostly use airborne one-way attack drones like the infamous Iranian-designed Shahed, which they could launch from vehicles and temporary outposts along Yemen’s coast.

"They may not be able to get new missile components from Iran because of the war impeding traffic and Iran’s need for these components itself," he said. "The Houthis can also use maritime drones, which they probably still have in inventory, and mines, which they did not use in their last campaign during 2024 and 2025," Clark told The New Arab.

"Houthi mining of the strait of Bab al-Mandab would be most challenging for the US and allies but would also prevent the Houthis from charging tolls."

CEPA’s Horrell noted that Iran's arming of the Houthis is anything but new, pointing out that "the Shahed type attack drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles in the Houthis arsenal have always been supplied by Iran".

"If there are new shipments even while Iran is embroiled with the US, it speaks to the overall capacity, but also this is a cost-effective way to broaden the conflict and distract the US."

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs

Follow him on X: @pauliddon

Edited by Charlie Hoyle