Will growing Gulf-US security ties impact Israel's qualitative military edge?

US President Donald Trump’s recent visit to the Gulf culminated with a series of major defence agreements signed with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

The deals could see the Gulf states acquire advanced defence systems, some of which will be deployed in the region for the first time. These include General Atomics’ MQ-9B drones and RTX’s Fixed Site Low Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS).

Discussions could also potentially be reopened around the acquisition of F-35 fighter jets, long sought by regional powers.

However, Washington’s expansion of its strategic ties with its Gulf allies, particularly the integration of advanced technology transfers, will largely be shaped by how the administration applies its commitment to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).

Israel's QME over the years

In 2008, the United States codified its commitment to Israel’s military superiority in the region by giving QME legal recognition. This framework ensures that all forms of strategic engagement and arms transfers in the Middle East do not compromise Israel’s status as the region’s most advanced military power.

The Obama administration bolstered this commitment further in 2016 with the signing of the US-Israel MOU on Security Assistance. The MOU formalised various channels to support Israel’s defence capabilities, both in terms of acquisition and development.

The 2016 MOU will expire in 2028, and negotiations for a new agreement are expected to take place under the current Trump administration. But the geopolitical landscape has markedly shifted since 2016.

Supporting Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, particularly amid Benjamin Netanyahu’s ongoing war on Gaza and increasing incursions in the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon, is becoming increasingly costly.

Between October 2023 and September 2024, the US spent at least $23 billion on security assistance to Israel and wider regional operations.

Trump’s growing calls for reducing foreign military spending and revitalising the domestic defence industrial base make maintaining this level of spending both undesirable and unsustainable.

Within six months, the administration has pledged a 13% increase in national security spending in 2026, amounting to a $1 trillion budget, and unveiled plans for a $175 billion missile defence system dubbed the Golden Dome.

Realising these plans hinges on the financial support of US allies, particularly the Gulf states. Earlier this month, the Gulf states committed to investing a total of around $3.2 trillion in the US economy: $1.4 trillion from the UAE, $1.2 trillion from Qatar, and $600 billion from Saudi Arabia.

The Gulf’s support will, however, rest on the US providing more than just arms; the Gulf is seeking comprehensive support for its own security capabilities.

Historically, Israel’s QME has constrained the development of US-Gulf strategic ties. In the 1980s, Israel opposed the sale of F-15 enhancement packages to Saudi Arabia. Although Congress ultimately managed to approve the deal at the time, it was balanced by a $600 million boost of military aid to Israel and the transfer of 15 additional F-15s.

More recently, in 2020, Eli Cohen, then Israeli Intelligence Minister, voiced opposition to Qatar’s request for F-35s. To date, no Gulf state has received the fifth-generation fighter jet, underscoring Washington’s continued prioritisation of Israel’s military edge.

“The Gulf states are no longer passive buyers. They’re saying… if you want to stay our main security partner, you need to offer more - like tech transfer, local defence manufacturing, better training, and even formal security guarantees,” Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor at King’s College in London’s School of Security Studies, explained to The New Arab.

The Gulf leverages a competitive defence landscape

The Gulf states’ push for their respective strategic autonomy is instrumental in shaping their defence posture. UAE defence conglomerate EDGE is expanding globally, and Saudi Arabia is advancing joint production initiatives with the US, China, and Turkey. Washington is cautiously supporting these developments while still upholding Israel's military edge.

“The US is increasingly compensating for withheld platforms with deeper access, modular upgrades, and localised capability-building - signs of a more transactional and layered approach to managing QME under evolving geopolitical circumstances,” Francesco Salesio Schiavi, Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute of Switzerland (MEIS), told TNA.

But Washington’s tight controls on the Gulf’s access to advanced systems will likely come under increasing strain as prospective alternative suppliers demonstrate growing technology capacities.

Pakistan’s deployment of China’s Chengdu J-10C fighter jets in the downing of Indian Rafale jets in May (the number of jets downed remains contested) is illustrative. The J-10C has been likened to the US F-16. Its use, therefore, signals the potential viability of non-Western systems for regional powers. That said, the Gulf states have not yet moved to acquire the fourth-generation Chinese fighter jets.

But neighbouring Egypt conducted its first joint aerial exercises with China last month, which included the Chengdu J-10Cs and is reportedly in talks for procurement options. Egypt’s military ties with the US and West at large are robust, comprehensive, and longstanding - Cairo is the second largest operator of France’s Rafale jets and the fourth largest buyer of the US’ F-16s.

Integrating Chinese aircraft in its systems would therefore be notable. It could also prompt the Gulf to further expand its defence partnerships to fill key capability gaps.

In January of this year, Saudi Arabia explored purchasing 100 KAAN, Turkish fifth-generation fighter jets, which could serve as a substitute for the US F-35. This growing diversification complicates Washington’s position in regional defence markets.

“With multiple defence suppliers competing for influence, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are more capable than ever of securing reciprocal concessions from the US without fully relying on it,” Schiavi noted.

Adjusting the enforcement of QME?

Former CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie recognised the risks of shifting dynamics and trends in 2020. He stated, “We don’t want [US partners in the Middle East] turning to China, we don’t want them turning to Russia.”

As Washington prepares to re-negotiate its security assistance MOU with Israel, it must do so with a newfound understanding of the Gulf’s importance to US strategic interests. The Gulf states are “now shaping US strategy through massive financial contributions, strategic alignment, and growing military capabilities,” highlighted Krieg.

QME will remain a US priority, but the Gulf’s domestic defence development, financial leverage, and a competitive global arms market make a re-evaluation of QME enforcement imperative. This will be central to navigating the future of deepening US-Gulf security cooperation.

Hana Elshehaby is a Research Assistant for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs’ Foreign Policy Program. Her research interests include GCC foreign policy, regional security frameworks, and the Asian powers' expanding political relations with the Middle East.

Follow her on X: @hanaeIshehaby