Gulf tour: Trump sidelined Israel, but how deep is the rift?

When President Donald J. Trump was running for a second term last year, the Israeli leadership did a bad job of hiding their preference for him over then-President Joe Biden or then-Vice President Kamala Harris.

On 24 July 2024, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke before a joint session of Congress while in Washington. Many analysts interpreted that move as the Israeli leader meddling in US domestic politics with the intent of helping Trump in the presidential race.

Then, earlier this year, the Israeli prime minister hailed Trump as “the greatest friend Israel has ever had in the White House”.

Nonetheless, recent weeks have witnessed mounting tension between Trump and Netanyahu. Above all others, the main issue in play has been the Trump administration’s decision to enter into diplomatic talks with Iran over the unresolved nuclear issue - seen by Israel as severely undermining its security and geopolitical interests.

Yet, a few other diplomatic manoeuvres by Trump’s administration are also relevant to the situation.

On 1 May, Trump ousted his National Security Adviser, Michael Waltz. At least one reason for his dismissal was the fact that Waltz angered Trump by engaging in “intense coordination” with Netanyahu over potential military strikes against Iran, which reportedly frustrated Trump amid the US-Iranian nuclear talks which began in April under Omani auspices.

Five days later, the White House agreed to a US-Houthi pact, which Muscat helped broker. This deal did not address hostilities between Israel and the Yemeni rebel movement. The ceasefire agreement profoundly unsettled Israeli officials mainly because it caught them entirely off guard.

In Tel Aviv’s eyes, it was a stark embodiment of the “America First” foreign policy doctrine, executed with scant consideration for the interests or expectations of long-standing allies.

On 12 May, the Trump administration secured the release of Edan Alexander, an American-Israeli dual citizen held captive in Gaza since 7 October 2023. This was an outcome of direct US-Hamas negotiations that did not include Israel.

While in Riyadh earlier this month, Trump announced the cessation of US sanctions on Syria. Notably, Israel had lobbied Washington to keep the stringent sanctions on post-regime change Syria and avoid steps to legitimise the relatively new Syrian government.

The White House delinked Washington’s willingness to advance civil nuclear cooperation talks to Saudi-Israeli normalisation. Essentially, the Trump administration has come to terms with the Kingdom’s decision not to join the Israeli normalisation camp at this juncture and is not going to allow that to slow down the White House’s plans for elevating the Washington-Riyadh partnership to new heights.

Additionally, the decision not to make Israel the fourth leg of Trump’s regional tour this month, despite a request by Tel Aviv, was another sign of the US administration’s sidelining of Israel, at least as some analysts see it.

“The Trump administration has taken a decision to pursue American priorities and interests in the Middle East on the basis of bilateral agreements with the parties concerned, rather than integrating Israel's agenda into its Middle East policies,” Mouin Rabbani, a political analyst and co-editor of Jadaliyya, told The New Arab.

In line with the “America First” mantra, Trump’s administration is pursuing a highly transactional foreign policy strategy and the way it is being applied is not one that Netanyahu necessarily calculated, according to Gordon Gray, the former US ambassador to Tunisia.

Netanyahu and the prime minister’s close confidante and Minister for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer “miscalculated by having too much confidence in their relationship with Iran-hawk Mike Waltz, Trump's first national security advisor in his second administration,” he told TNA.

“Their consultations with Waltz on military action against Iran ran counter to Trump’s instincts and reportedly angered the president. In doing so, Netanyahu and Dermer apparently overlooked Trump’s proclivity to fire his national security advisors,” added the former US diplomat.

Bloodshed in Gaza

When it comes to Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, the Trump administration continues providing Tel Aviv iron-clad support. Since Netanyahu’s government shattered the ceasefire in March, Trump has used some language to signal his desire for the violence to end. But the White House has not applied any real pressure on Israel.

“Israel retains its special relationship with the US. President Trump has given Israel carte blanche to deal with the Palestinians as its wishes, despite considerable pressure from the international community to stop the war,” noted Dr Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, in a TNA interview.

Anna Jacobs, non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, has a similar perspective. While acknowledging “clear points of friction” between Trump and Netanyahu’s administrations, the White House has “made it clear they will not apply serious pressure on Israel to bring the Gaza war to a permanent end,” she told TNA.

Despite Trump’s team working around Netanyahu in order to advance certain American interests, there is no “fundamental rift in the US-Israel relationship”, explained Jacobs.

“The Trump administration was hoping to announce a ceasefire and a bigger hostage exchange during the Gulf trip last week, but that has yet to happen. The Trump administration put pressure on the Netanyahu government to let in aid, which is allegedly going to happen, but it will be a drop in the bucket of what is actually needed,” she added.

The Iran file

The main source of tension between Trump’s administration and Netanyahu’s government stems from starkly opposing views on Iran and how to deal with Tehran’s nuclear program.

While the White House is actively pursuing a new nuclear deal, Netanyahu remains firmly opposed, which explains this clash between Trump’s diplomatic ambitions and Tel Aviv’s hardline stance against any diplomacy with the Islamic Republic.

Ultimately, Trump wants the US to avoid being bogged down in conflicts in the Middle East. Quagmires in this part of the world are draining, and Trump does not see US interests being advanced by future American military entanglements in the Middle East that cost the US much in terms of blood and treasure.

The White House would like the US’s energy and resources funnelled toward efforts to counter a rising China, which helps explain much of the Trump administration’s moves in the Middle East this year aimed at furthering diplomacy, not war.

In terms of Iran, Trump wants to avoid a messy conflict with the country, as do others in his administration, especially Vice President JD Vance who made this point clear on the campaign trail last year. Yet, Trump does not want Iran to become a nuclear-armed power on his watch. Hence, Trump is in favour of a deal that will freeze Tehran’s nuclear program without requiring the US to fire one shot at Iran.

The Gulf Arab states, especially Oman, are productive regional players from the standpoint of helping the Trump administration reduce tensions with Iran and move toward a new nuclear deal. Israel, on the other hand, wants to pull Washington into a war with Iran.

This contrast partly helps explain why the Trump White House seems to be moving the centre of gravity in the US’s Middle East foreign policy away from Israel and closer to Washington’s alliances and partnerships with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, as underscored by Trump’s decision to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates - but not Israel - on his first Middle East tour since returning to the Oval Office.

When it comes to how the White House deals with the GCC states, the Trump administration expects Israel to cooperate or be sidelined.

“Israel is increasingly viewed as an obstacle to US efforts to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East. Arguably Israel has always been viewed this way, but previous US governments deferred to Israeli priorities. Trump is unwilling to do so to the same extent,” explained Rabbani in a TNA interview.

“I also think revelations that former US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and presumably other Trump officials were scheming with Netanyahu to drag the US into a war with Iran that Trump appears to want to avoid did not sit well in Washington,” he added.

When addressing a question about whether Trump and Netanyahu’s differences in relation to the Iranian nuclear file will lead to graver problems in the US-Israeli alliance, Jacobs argued that much will depend on whether Washington and Tehran eventually reach a new nuclear deal. That, of course, remains an unknown factor.

“It's difficult to imagine that Israel would strike Iran while the Trump administration is trying to make this deal happen. The Trump administration probably wants to limit its points of friction with Netanyahu and are likely prioritising the US-Iran nuclear deal and containing potential Israeli military strikes on Iran over pressuring Netanyahu too much on Gaza,” she told TNA.

Netanyahu's path forward

A key question is, how will Netanyahu navigate these dynamics in US-Israel relations amid the era of Trump 2.0?

It is important to realise that with a Republican, specifically Trump, in the Oval Office, right-wing Republicans will not sabotage US-Iran diplomacy as they constantly sought to during Barack Obama’s presidency and would have with either Biden or Harris.

“Trump enjoys much more freedom to manoeuvre diplomatically than did Biden, since he is immune from political attacks from the right wing in the United States. That constituency would have lambasted the Biden administration had it engaged in negotiations with Iran or cut deals with the Houthis or Hamas,” explained Gray.

“Netanyahu has to be careful not to publicly cross Trump in the way he so often did with Democratic presidents. He will use AIPAC and Christian evangelical groups to put pressure on Republican members of Congress to support his policies, but there are limits to their ability to influence Trump,” noted Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, in a TNA interview.

“Now that Trump is in his second and presumably final term, he doesn’t need to curry favour with Christian evangelical and right-wing Jewish voters the way he did in 2016 and 2024. He will maintain the US alliance with Israel in terms of arms sales and intelligence sharing as well as condoning Israel's internal shift to the right, but he will cut his own deals with Israeli adversaries if he thinks it will benefit his family or win him a Nobel prize,” Slavin added.

“He will also continue to cynically use the issue of antisemitism to implement policies that fulfil other aims - expelling immigrants from parts of the world he doesn’t like and reducing the independence of universities and other institutions that oppose him,” she added.

Looking ahead, it is safe to say that Trump will focus on his strategies for strengthening America’s economic position, both at home and abroad. “If a deal that suits US interests is on the table that is good enough for this administration, it doesn't also have to meet each and every one of Israel's demands,” commented Rabbani.

At this stage, is it fair to say that there is a “crisis” in the US-Israel alliance? Probably not. That would likely exaggerate the extent to which there is tension between the White House and Netanyahu’s government.

However, Rabbani does believe that such friction has the potential to develop into a crisis if the Israeli leadership responds to Trump’s decisions that Tel Aviv disapproves of in ways similar to how Israel reacted in the past to previous US administrations, which refused to cater to Israeli demands.

“Trump is very thin-skinned, does not consider loyalty to Israel fundamental to his political survival, and is willing to face down Israel, its lobby, and loyalists within his government should he consider this necessary,” he told TNA.

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics

Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero