Four foreign militaries - Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United States – have all deployed troops in Syria since 2011, when a peaceful civil uprising deteriorated into a protracted war.
The dawning of the post-Assad era was inevitably going to see these foreign powers reassess and recalibrate their respective deployments and objectives.
But what are their goals in the new Syria, and when could they leave?
Israel in the Golan buffer zone
Shortly after President Bashar Al-Assad ignominiously fled Syria, Israel swiftly seized more territory around the Golan Heights, advancing beyond the buffer zone and occupying Mount Hermon overlooking the capital Damascus.
Israel said it distrusted Syria’s new interim president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, who led the Islamist armed opposition group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), viewing him as a potential threat given his past allegiance to Al-Qaeda.
“Israel is the real wildcard,” Kyle Orton, an independent Middle East analyst, told The New Arab.
“As one of the first states that will suffer the consequences if the bet on Al-Sharaa having left his Al-Qaeda ways behind turns out to be wrong, the Israelis have preferred a strategy of impeding Al-Sharaa’s consolidation of control,” he added.
“Beyond distrust of Al-Sharaa and a sense of responsibility for the Druze that is both genuinely felt and inescapable because of domestic politics, there is the issue of the IRGC (Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ paramilitary) network, which launched its first post-Assad attack on Israel from Syria recently,” Orton said.
“It is possible Israel can reach a cold peace with Al-Sharaa,” he added. “But if the Iranian reserve strength in Syria turns out to be greater than it currently appears, the Israelis will not give up their policy of acting directly against it, complicating any effort to de facto normalise relations with Damascus.”
Israel recently began direct security talks with the new Syrian government. Furthermore, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed interest in a US-mediated security deal with Sharaa’s government.
“I think the likeliest outcome will be an informal deconfliction agreement largely managing operations and presence in the contested Golan Heights as well as large swaths of Syria’s south,” Caroline Rose, the director of the Crime-Conflict Nexus and Military Withdrawals portfolios at the New Lines Institute, told TNA.
“Both Israel and Syria acknowledge the risks of any sort of public agreement being reached, despite a swath of reporting and statements that have created an impression that both states are entertaining normalisation,” Rose said.
“By having a private, informal deconfliction agreement managed by an intermediary regional power like Qatar or Turkey, both Israel and the new Syrian government will be able to better manage tensions without a major, publicised bilateral deal.”
Russia hunkering down
The Russian military is undoubtedly in its weakest position since it intervened in the Syrian conflict in 2015 to prop up Assad’s regime.
Russia’s forces are concentrated mainly in two bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast: the Hmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base. Since giving Assad asylum, Moscow has negotiated with the new authorities in Syria to retain access to these strategic facilities.
Hmeimim endured a deadly attack that might have killed some Russian soldiers in May.
“Russia’s position in Syria, always weak, really depends on Al-Sharaa at this stage,” Orton said. “If Al-Sharaa is holding out the possibility of preserving Hmeimim as leverage to pressure the West into deepening its support for his government, then the Russians are probably finished,” he added.
“Al-Sharaa will play the game for a while and then cash in the chip - expel the Russians and reap the political and economic capital.”
New Lines Institute’s Rose believes Russia is “playing the long game” over the future of its presence.
“While, of course, they have transferred a lot of their military infrastructure and have redeployed many of their personnel due to both the Assad regime’s fall and ongoing resource pull from the war in Ukraine, they still retain a presence in Syria,” she said.
“Given the strategic geopolitical importance of Syria’s access to the Mediterranean and few alternatives in the region, I believe that Russia will seek to wait things out and propose a status of forces agreement with the new interim government, promising to support a ‘blind spot’ for the new administration such as overseeing security in the south or supporting counterterrorism operations.”
Turkey reaping strategic rewards
One country that certainly isn’t going to withdraw from post-Assad anytime soon is Turkey. With over 20,000 troops deployed in northern Syria, Turkey has the most significant military presence on the ground by far.
Turkish Defence Minister Yasar Guler recently confirmed Turkey has no plans to withdraw its troops, who will train and help rebuild the new Syrian military.
“Geography alone means Turkey can never have been uninterested in what was happening in Syria,” Orton said.
“The current circumstances - with a powerful PKK presence in Syria, the ongoing challenge of the Islamic State, and the triumph of HTS, which Turkey reached a compact with when everyone else shunned it - reinforce this,” he added.
“Turkey is one of the best-positioned states in Syria after Assad’s fall. Turkey is entrenching in Syria for the long haul, providing assistance and guidance to Al-Sharaa’s government across the political, economic, and security spheres.”
Ankara had hoped to expand its military presence in Syria to the centre of the country, where it eyed deploying drones and air defences in a Syrian airbase.
While Turkey said the deployment was necessary to combat Islamic State remnants, Israel opposed such a deployment and even bombed airbases Turkey was assessing for deploying forces. The two militaries have since held deconfliction talks mediated by Azerbaijan.
“Turkey has not only authorised an influx of its troops into different posts across Syria but has also developed several Syrian bases for an enhanced forward posture and improved air capabilities,” Rose said.
“I think that the status of Turkish compliance with Israeli demands for deconfliction is extremely dependent upon the status of the US-led Counter-ISIS Coalition in Syria,” she added.
“If the Coalition concludes and the US withdraws, Turkey will be able to better justify a heavier forward presence and the positioning of short-range air defence systems.”
US heading for exit
And finally, there are the Americans. The United States first deployed a small number of troops to Syria in 2015 to help its Kurdish-led ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), against the Islamic State. The US beefed up its presence to 2,000 troops late last year as the Assad regime collapsed.
More recently, the US has withdrawn 500 troops since April, bringing the total down to approximately 1,500, and plans to consolidate its presence in the country from eight bases to a mere one. US troops recently left two more bases, Al-Wazir and Tel Baydar, in northeastern Syria’s Hasakah province, Reuters reported on Tuesday.
It seemed the US may retain a small presence in the sprawling, strategically located Al-Tanf in southern Syria, or a base in Hasakah. The latter seems more likely, with Al-Monitor reporting on Tuesday that the last US base where American troops will remain will be in Hasakah’s Rmeilan.
Orton believes that Washington is “heading for the exits”, and it’s only a matter of time before American troops leave the country.
“Quite what the US intermediate steps will be, especially over Tanf, and how long the transitional phase is, nobody can say - sources within the Trump administration, or even public statements from its officials, can be rendered obsolete in the time it takes the president to tweet,” he said.
“But the endgame of an American withdrawal now looks relatively certain.”
Rose similarly believes that the Trump administration seeks “a quick conclusion” to the US military’s forward posture in Iraq and Syria. It also welcomes transferring the counter-IS mission to local actors.
“That being said, I think the draw-down process will be incremental and will mirror what is happening in neighbouring Iraq, where already US forces are consolidating from their position in Baghdad north to the Kurdish Region of Iraq,” she said.
“I only think a SOFA with the new Syrian government could be achieved if US forces do not completely draw down in neighbouring Iraq, as operations are very much dependent upon US air support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance provision from Iraq,” Rose added.
“Even if US forces remain in a limited advisory capacity, I expect it will be well under 1,000 and will have a very limited mandate.”
Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.
Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon