Breadcrumb
On 18 November, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) returned to Washington for the first time since March 2018, receiving a lavish welcome marked by a gunfire salute and a six-jet flyover.
In the Oval Office, President Donald Trump shielded his guest from human rights questions, underscoring his determination to protect and reassure the Saudi leader.
The landmark visit was not only a symbol of the personal rapport between Trump and MbS, but also a reaffirmation of the enduring nature of the historic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
MbS’s visit to Washington underscored how fully he has emerged from the diplomatic isolation in the West that followed the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018.
Despite critics faulting Trump for extending such a warm welcome, the Saudi Crown Prince’s gradual rehabilitation in Washington began well before this trip, most notably when President Joe Biden travelled to Jeddah in July 2022 and greeted MbS with the now-iconic ‘fist bump’.
For Trump, this week’s meeting built on momentum from his May 2025 Gulf tour, where Saudi Arabia served as the first stop. During that visit, he signed numerous MoUs, and MbS’s return to Washington was an important step toward advancing them.
Trump often boasts that he secured $600 billion in Saudi investment for the US economy, with both leaders claiming the ultimate figure could approach $1 trillion.
“Just like Trump's May trip to the Gulf was the Gulf's comeback, this will be MbS’s comeback specifically,” Dr Dina Esfandiary, the Middle East lead for Bloomberg Economics, said in an interview with The New Arab shortly before the Saudi Crown Prince’s arrival in Washington.
“Only a few short years after being disgraced following the Khashoggi murder, this trip will be about showcasing how far Saudi has come and ensuring that its ties to the US are solidified,” she added.
At a White House dinner, Trump announced that Washington would recognise Saudi Arabia as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), making it the fourth GCC state - after Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar - to receive this status. This grants expedited access to US military hardware and deepens avenues for broader defence cooperation.
With MbS in Washington, the United States and Saudi Arabia also signed a strategic defence agreement intended to reinforce their eight-decade partnership and bolster regional deterrence.
Although some details remain unclear, the White House emphasised that the pact would include new Saudi burden-sharing contributions to offset US costs, reaffirming Riyadh’s view of Washington as its principal strategic partner.
The agreement must also be viewed against the backdrop of Israel’s unprecedented 9 September strike on Qatar - an act that rattled every GCC member and sharpened regional threat perceptions of Tel Aviv.
Shortly afterwards, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded a mutual defence pact. Although negotiations had been underway before the attack, the aggression against Doha clearly reinforced Riyadh’s determination to diversify its security partnerships beyond Washington, making nuclear-armed Pakistan an increasingly attractive ally in Saudi eyes.
By signing the strategic defence agreement, granting Saudi Arabia MNNA status, and authorising the controversial sale of F-35s, despite Israel’s insistence on preserving its regional military edge, the White House signalled a clear intent to reinforce an already robust security partnership.
These steps aim to restore Riyadh’s confidence in the United States as its primary security guarantor.
“The failure of the first Trump administration to respond to the 2019 Iranian attack on Saudi oil fields and the abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan, fecklessly negotiated by the first Trump administration and then disastrously implemented by the Biden administration, led the Saudis to seek strategic diversification,” Gordon Gray, a former US ambassador to Tunisia, who is now the Kuwait Professor of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, told TNA.
“But Saudi Arabia understands that only the United States can guarantee its security. China is not interested in doing so and, in any event, cannot project sufficient military power in the Middle East.”
While noting that the “vague language” in the strategic defence agreement falls short of the 29 September executive order signed by Trump, which gave Qatar explicit defence guarantees, Gray believes that MbS will still return to Saudi Arabia with “renewed confidence in the US security umbrella”.
When asked to what extent MbS’s visit to Washington will result in a restoration of Riyadh’s confidence in the United States as a defence and security partner, Dr Christian Koch, the Executive Manager of the Gulf Research Center Foundation Brussels, said “it will to some degree but not completely”.
He explained that “uncertainty about US policy is now a permanent feature of regional security thinking,” adding that “assurances received on this trip are Trump administration assurances and even that will be understood with caveats”.
Dr Esfandiary emphasised that over the years Riyadh has learned lessons about its relationship with the US and now it is “not about restoring confidence, but rather, about finding concrete ways to ensure the US has a stake in Saudi security and prosperity, and will want to continue and expand ties”.
As she put it, “This is why they're pushing business ties with the Trump family business, as well as promising hefty investments in the US”.
With the Trump administration approving the sale of 48 F-35s to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom is poised to join Israel as the only Middle Eastern state operating the jet. When asked whether Riyadh would receive the same model Israel uses, challenging the long-standing US policy of preserving Israel’s “qualitative military edge”, Trump answered in the affirmative.
Unsurprisingly, the decision sparked controversy in Washington. It also underscores Trump’s willingness, in select cases, to defy both the Israeli government and the influential pro-Israel lobby. His administration’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria this year was another case in point.
Nonetheless, experts note that Saudi Arabia’s entry into the F-35 program will happen gradually.
Though Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, told TNA that the sale “will certainly erode Israel’s [qualitative military edge],” she caveated that point by stressing how it will “take time for the Saudis to receive and be trained on the planes” and that ultimately “Israel’s military supremacy will remain for years to come”.
Dr Yasmine Farouk, the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Project Director at the International Crisis Group, made a similar point. “Agreeing on selling the F-35s is significant, but it doesn’t mean the Kingdom will get them tomorrow. There’s a long queue,” the Saudi scholar told TNA.
“Also, it might not come with the same calibre and end-user rights that Israel has, although Saudi Arabia wants that, and rightly so. The Saudi officials, and especially the leadership, are very sensitive to the sovereign rights of Saudi Arabia. President Trump alluded that this is exactly what the negotiations are all about.”
Saudi Arabia’s close ties with China have raised concerns in the Pentagon and among American lawmakers over Beijing’s potential access to the F-35’s advanced technology.
As a result, it remains uncertain which version Riyadh will ultimately acquire and what restrictions the United States may impose. This delicate issue will be a key focus of US-Saudi negotiations. As Dr Farouk noted, the matter also touches on questions of national sovereignty, which are of paramount importance to the Kingdom.
During MbS’s visit, the United States and Saudi Arabia finalised a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, laying the foundation for a long-term partnership in nuclear energy.
As the White House explained, the deal “confirms that the United States and American companies will be the Kingdom’s civil nuclear partners of choice” and guarantees that all collaboration will adhere to robust non-proliferation standards.
Additionally, Trump and MbS signed an MoU on artificial intelligence (AI) that “gives the Kingdom access to world-leading American systems while protecting US technology from foreign influence, ensuring that American innovators will shape the future of global AI,” according to the White House.
Saudi Arabia is striving to position itself as a global leader in artificial intelligence, a vision underscored by its plans to build an enormous, state-of-the-art data centre on the shores of the Red Sea, and Riyadh sees the United States as a key partner.
“Leading US companies such as Amazon Web Services and Nvidia expressed their interest in working with the Saudi AI company Humain during Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia six months ago, so there is already a foundation to build on. More recently, high-level representatives from US technology companies such as Google, Intel, and Oracle attended Saudi Arabia’s annual Future Investment Initiative conference, better known as ‘Davos in the Desert’, at the end of October,” Gray told TNA.
“US-Chinese competition in this field means that significant potential exists for mutually beneficial cooperation in the AI sector between the United States and Saudi Arabia, just as the United States and the UAE are working together in this field,” added the former US diplomat.
“When it comes to artificial intelligence, there was a discussion about data centres, and the transfers of technology and the chips. The Saudis are keen not only on investing in the AI sector in Saudi Arabia, but they are also very keen on capacity building and on the transfer of technology with the same sovereign rights in mind,” explained Dr Farouk.
“There must be a long-term impact on the domestic sector inside Saudi Arabia, but also on Saudi Arabia’s capacity to invest in the sector inside the US. That would allow it to have influence, but also would allow this transfer of knowledge and technology. But even when it comes to this, Saudi Arabia is seeking to have the licenses that would protect its sovereignty as well,” she said in a TNA interview.
Saudi foreign policy has shifted dramatically since MbS’s 2018 visit to the United States. His remarks in Washington this week about Riyadh working to facilitate a US-Iran deal stand in stark contrast to the approach during Trump’s first term, when Saudi Arabia lobbied for “maximum pressure” on Tehran and had severed diplomatic ties with Iran due to the dramatic events of January 2016 that triggered a crisis in Saudi-Iranian relations.
There has been a “fundamental transition of Saudi policy from confrontationist…to one seeking de-escalation and long-term regional transformation,” Dr Koch told TNA.
Where MbS’s foreign policy in the second half of the 2010s was largely shaped by Saudi Arabia’s confrontation with Iran, the Yemen war, blockade of Qatar, and the Saad Hariri saga of 2017, Riyadh’s current foreign policy has entailed a détente with Iran, greater engagement with both pre- and post-regime change Syria, rapprochement with Qatar, and a less militaristic and more diplomatic approach to Yemen.
“There is a readiness of pragmatism and strategic learning in Saudi policy and less ideology,” is how Dr Koch summed it up.
“If you look at Saudi Arabia since the end of 2020, you will see a country that has become a pillar of de-escalation, dialogue, and risk-averse diplomacy. That’s a major difference [from] the period that preceded the early 2020s and the end of 2019 for Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince has shown that he is pragmatic. He can review policies that are not working in the interest of Saudi Arabia, and he has shown that he is laser-focused on building Saudi Arabia’s capacities at home, and then [doing] whatever is needed in foreign policy to achieve that,” Dr Farouk told TNA.
“Today, if you look in Sudan, the Red Sea, Gaza, Iran, and you look at all the different conflicts…you’ll see a country that is looking for diplomatic solutions and is sometimes too risk-averse. There are many demands and incentives for Saudi Arabia to intervene differently in those conflicts, but Saudi Arabia has managed not to get embroiled in regional conflicts that could backfire,” she added.
MbS’s first visit to Washington in seven-and-a-half years speaks volumes about the remarkable transformation of both his international standing and Saudi Arabia’s broader strategic posture.
Riyadh is focused on consolidating its decades-old relationship with Washington while skilfully navigating the world’s increasingly multipolar landscape through a careful diversification of its international alliances and partnerships.
As much as uncertainty still shapes perceptions of the US security umbrella in the Gulf, the agreements signed during MbS’s visit underscore Washington’s continued importance to Riyadh.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s shift from a confrontational and hawkish foreign policy toward one rooted in dialogue, de-escalation, diplomacy, and economic statecraft reflects a more mature and pragmatic regional vision that bodes well for lasting stability in the Middle East.
MbS’s visit to Washington this week was not only symbolic of the Crown Prince’s personal rehabilitation but also of Riyadh’s evolving role on the international stage as a powerful state seeking stability, strategic autonomy, and the technological capabilities necessary to shape the Middle East’s future.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on X: @GiorgioCafiero