Egypt struggles for relevance as Israel moves to conquer Gaza

The catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza has led to unprecedented pressure on Israel from even its staunchest Western allies, including the UK, France, and Canada, with the European Union (EU) considering suspending its trade agreements with Tel Aviv.

Since Israel escalated its offensive in March 2025, the death toll in Gaza has surged. Earlier this month, Israel launched a new military campaign, codenamed ‘Gideon’s Chariots,’ marking a devastating new phase in a war that has pushed the enclave to the brink of collapse.

A total Israeli blockade has choked off humanitarian aid for over three months. With famine looming, the United Nations has warned that more than half a million people face starvation. A recent convoy of just 90 lorries on 23 May barely scratches the surface of what’s needed.

Across the border, the war presents Egypt with both an existential threat and a diplomatic quagmire. The potential for mass displacement through the Rafah crossing is now a central concern in Cairo.

“This is one of Egypt’s main fears - the eviction of Gazans into Sinai,” said Michael Wahid Hanna, US Director at the International Crisis Group. “Gaza’s security is tightly linked to Sinai’s. Egypt has always kept channels open with Hamas for precisely this reason.”

Yet Egypt’s options are extremely limited. “They don’t have leverage,” Hanna added. “They’re boxed in by Israeli and US decisions. There’s no unilateral plan Cairo can implement to alter the course.”

One possible avenue, he suggested, is regional coordination. “If Egypt could align the Saudis, Emiratis, and Qataris behind a single vision, that might strengthen its hand with Washington. But that’s a long shot. The UAE has a different posture entirely.”

Egyptian analyst Ziad Al-Alimy agrees. “The Emiratis see Israel as the anchor of the region’s tech-driven future. They align with it almost completely.”

Egypt has put forward a post-war governance proposal that sidelines Hamas. “They don’t want Hamas in any formal governing role,” Hanna said. “They’ve floated administrative committees and tried to persuade Hamas to stay out of them.”

But regional stakeholders - including the US, Israel, the UAE, and possibly Saudi Arabia - have dismissed the plan as inadequate. Some have even floated the idea of exiling Hamas leaders.

“Cairo knows its proposal is floundering,” Hanna said. “They’re now speaking more openly about alternative plans - but none can move forward without American support.”

Saudi Arabia, for its part, has remained lukewarm. “They don’t like Hamas - not as much as the Emiratis - and they don’t see Egypt’s proposal as viable,” said Hanna. “And they’re probably right.”

From 'favourite dictator' to radio silence

Egypt’s diplomatic paralysis is compounded by a deterioration in its relationship with Trump. In 2019, Trump famously called Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi his “favourite dictator” - a phrase that symbolised a transactional relationship built on flattery and security cooperation. But those dynamics have since shifted.

Sisi has avoided direct meetings with Trump since his return to the White House. “Some in Cairo believe even a short meeting with Trump would expose Sisi to unbearable pressure. So he avoids it,” said Al-Alimy.

Egypt’s absence from the key US-Gulf summit in Riyadh earlier this year - attended by all six GCC states and Syria’s de facto leader - highlighted its growing diplomatic isolation. “Egypt’s leverage used to come from its Gaza policy. But the fallout with Washington is eroding that advantage,” said Hanna.

This marks a stark contrast with Trump’s first term, when Cairo benefited from Washington’s hands-off approach to human rights. “Trump didn’t carry the ideological baggage of democracy promotion,” said May Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Birmingham. “That was a relief for Cairo.”

Still, even then, the relationship had limits. Trump denied Egypt additional military aid, refused to extradite Egyptian exiles, and never fulfilled Cairo’s desire to label the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group. “Sisi mistook Trump’s praise for institutional support,” said Al-Alimy. “But the bureaucracy in Washington never gave Egypt a blank cheque.”

Some in Cairo initially welcomed Trump’s return, hoping for a swift end to the Gaza war.

“They thought he’d pursue de-escalation,” said Darwich. “But he revived elements of his old ‘Deal of the Century’ - including pressuring Egypt and Jordan to absorb over a million displaced Palestinians.”

Trump also demanded unrestricted US access to the Suez Canal as compensation for Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea - demands Cairo firmly rejected.

“These are red lines,” said Al-Alimy. “Displacing Gazans into Egypt risks turning Sinai into a conflict zone. And importing fighters aligned with Hamas is a non-starter for a regime that treats the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat.”

Hanna concurred. “Too many red lines are crossed without coordination. Egypt assumed Trump’s proposals were unserious. But their persistence signalled intent,” he said.

The Palestinian cause, however, remains untouchable in Egypt, Darwich added. “No regime, no matter how authoritarian, can afford to be seen as complicit in its erosion.”

Trump's transactionalism hits a wall

Trump’s Suez Canal request exposed deeper tensions. “He treats diplomacy like a business transaction,” said Gamal Abdel Gawad, an advisor at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. “But Egypt doesn’t see its alliances as commodities.”

“Cairo responded with bureaucratic resistance: delay, deflect, and wait,” said Darwich. The same tactic applied to Yemen, where Egypt declined to join a US-backed coalition against the Houthis.

“The memory of Egypt’s disastrous 1960s campaign in Yemen is still vivid,” she added. “There’s no appetite for another entanglement.”

Ironically, Trump’s team later cut a deal with the Houthis, excluding Israel. “Egypt’s reluctance proved prescient,” said Abdel Gawad.

Now, Cairo finds itself squeezed between contradictory pressures. The US wants it to absorb displaced Gazans. The Gulf wants it to confront resistance movements. Neither demand is politically tenable.

“The Gulf frames resistance as outdated,” said Darwich. “But in Egypt, support for Palestine is central to national identity. Aligning with the Gulf narrative would alienate the regime’s domestic base.”

This tension runs deeper than Sisi’s personal calculus - it’s embedded in Egypt’s military ethos. “The officer corps still draws on the trauma of 1967 and the pride of 1973,” Darwich said. “Giving in to Trump or the Gulf risks shattering that foundational narrative.”

But this defiance carries a cost. Egypt was sidelined at the Riyadh summit, and its role in ceasefire talks has been eclipsed by Qatar.

“Egypt still has a role, especially through the Rafah border,” Darwich said. “But it’s no longer driving negotiations.”

The weakness, she noted, is institutional. “Foreign policy is concentrated in the presidency. The diplomatic corps is sidelined. That limits flexibility.”

Looking east, hoping for a shift

With US influence waning and economic hardships mounting, Egypt is hedging. Ties with France are warming, buoyed by growing European condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza. At the same time, relations with Russia and China are strengthening - at least symbolically.

“These partnerships are more about optics than substance,” Darwich said. “But they’re meant to show Washington that Egypt has alternatives.”

So far, the US has refrained from serious retaliation. “Despite everything, there have been no punitive measures,” said Abdel Gawad. “Washington still sees Egypt as a core regional player.”

Yet a shift could be looming. “If Israel’s far-right government collapses,” said Darwich, “the whole regional equation could change again.”

Egypt’s fraught position amid the Gaza war reveals the limits of its regional influence and the fragility of its ties with the United States under Trump.

Once seen as a central mediator, Cairo now finds itself reacting to events it can no longer shape - caught between domestic red lines, shifting Gulf alliances, and a US administration driven by transactional politics.

As pressure mounts on all fronts, Egypt’s strategy of cautious defiance may preserve short-term stability, but it risks long-term marginalisation in a region undergoing rapid and unpredictable transformation.

This piece was published in collaboration with Egab.