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Disarming Hezbollah: A pathway to sovereignty or recipe for war?

Disarming Hezbollah: A pathway to sovereignty or recipe for war?
6 min read
11 August, 2025
The success or failure of disarming Hezbollah could determine whether Lebanon establishes full state sovereignty or returns to a cycle of war

Lebanon faces a potential constitutional crisis as Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's government takes its boldest step yet to assert state authority over the country's fractured security landscape.

The cabinet's decision to order the Lebanese Army to draft a comprehensive plan for disarming all non-state actors by the year's end has triggered fierce backlash from Iran-backed Hezbollah and its Shia allies, who view the move as a direct assault on their decades-old military apparatus and political influence.

The Lebanese government's decision has received strong backing from Washington, with State Department spokesperson Thomas Bigot welcoming the move as a step toward Lebanese sovereignty. US envoy Tom Barrack went further, describing the Lebanese authorities' decision as "bold, historic, and correct".

However, this international endorsement contrasts sharply with domestic political reality.

Shia ministers left both Tuesday's and Thursday's cabinet sessions in protest, while Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem and its Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc leader, Mohammed Raad, have adopted increasingly confrontational rhetoric.

The tension reflects deeper questions about Lebanon's sovereignty and the role of non-state armed groups that have persisted since the 1989 Taif Agreement, which officially ended the Lebanese civil war but left the issue of Hezbollah's weapons unresolved.

Hezbollah has maintained an extensive military arsenal parallel to the Lebanese state since the civil war ended in 1990, justified by its resistance to Israeli occupation.

Tensions in the street

Recognising the explosive potential of the situation, the Amal Movement, Hezbollah's key Shia ally, has taken steps to prevent street confrontations from spiralling out of control.

Following uncontrolled demonstrations in Beirut and southern suburbs since Thursday evening, Amal's executive body head, Mustafa al-Fawwani, issued a directive prohibiting party members from participating in "any provocative popular movement that contradicts the movement's leadership directives," threatening organisational accountability and expulsion for violations.

Despite this internal discipline, fears remain that street tensions could escalate beyond political control. Hezbollah MP Mohammed Raad warned in a television interview that "the goal of this decision is to make the problem internal instead of Lebanese-Israeli" and ominously stated that "we are keen on peace, but after this decision, we don't know what the guarantee is for civil peace," setting an ominous tone for the coming period.

Hezbollah has maintained an extensive military arsenal parallel to the Lebanese state since the civil war ended in 1990. [Getty]

Divergent assessments

Political analysts offer contrasting views on the current crisis and its implications.

Lebanese political writer close to Hezbollah decision-making circles, Qassem Qasir, acknowledges popular tensions but emphasises to The New Arab that political and partisan forces remain committed to avoiding street conflict.

However, he characterises the government's decisions as "a response to American and external demands that don't take Lebanese interests into consideration".

The Lebanese Army, while respected as a national institution, has historically avoided confronting Hezbollah directly due to sectarian sensitivities and the group's superior military capabilities. Regarding the army's capacity to develop and implement the required plan within August, Qasir expressed scepticism.

"No one knows if the army is capable of that, and if it develops a plan, whether it will be implemented," he said, pointing to the ongoing Israeli occupation of lands in the south as a complicating factor.

A pathway to sovereignty?

Journalist and political writer Tony Boulos presented a more optimistic assessment, viewing recent government decisions as opening "the door to radical transformation in the state's approach to sovereignty issues, after years of consensus, paralysis, and political and security blackmail".

The Tom Barrack paper refers to a comprehensive US-brokered framework for Lebanese-Israeli relations and internal Lebanese reforms. Boulos argued that the government has, for the first time, adopted "a clear roadmap with international supervision, where internal executive decisions integrate with American-Arab-international sponsorship".

He characterises the US paper not as a diktat but as "a comprehensive political-security agreement that constitutes the only lifeline available to Lebanon today". This framework, according to Boulos, represents "a balanced document that guarantees Lebanon international and Arab support in exchange for its commitment to its provisions".

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Crucially, it would require Israeli withdrawal according to a "step-for-step" principle while providing Lebanon protection from Syrian attacks, border demarcation support, and - most importantly - economic support and reconstruction assistance.

While not ruling out that Hezbollah might threaten civil war, Boulos argued that "the party knows this threat is empty. No one else in Lebanon is armed besides it, and there's no civil war equation when one side is heavily armed and the others are defenceless".

Therefore, any rejection by Hezbollah of the government's decision would, in Boulos's view, "clearly mean rebellion against the state, not civil conflict. The government must call things by their names: either the party surrenders its weapons, or it's classified as an outlaw party outside the constitution".

Strategic stakes and timeline pressures

Dr Sami Nader, Director of the Levant Center for Strategic Studies, emphasises the urgency facing Lebanon.

"The government is well aware that the alternative to the decision on weapons exclusivity is a return to war, where there's no longer room for postponing or diluting the problem or even trying to buy time," Nader told The New Arab.

Nader noted that "the Lebanese government is 25 years late in implementing weapons exclusivity, since the Taif Agreement, not to mention that the issue was approved in all international resolutions concerning Lebanon".

The current government's ability to act, according to Nader, stems from changed power dynamics. "The Lebanese government today doesn't include a blocking third in its composition, and with the popular and external support it possesses, and with the existing balance of power, it has become able to implement weapons exclusivity".

The Lebanese army's role and capabilities

Nader emphasises that the army won't confront Hezbollah directly, but if Hezbollah chooses to confront the army, "it would be like rebelling against Lebanese legitimacy".

He highlights that military support is a key element of the Barrack paper, noting that "once the army begins implementing the plan, we'll see the support it will receive".

The approaching UNIFIL mandate renewal provides additional leverage, with expectations that "after a decision of this type, support for UNIFIL will increase militarily and in terms of mission scope".

UNIFIL is the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, established in 1978 and expanded after the 2006 war. Its mandate is renewed annually by the UN Security Council at the end of August.

Regarding the Lebanese Army's role, Nader expresses confidence in the army's capabilities, citing its successful operations in Nahr al-Bared northern Palestinian refugee camp in 2007 and the border village of Arsal in 2017 against extremist groups.

The international community's sustained support and Hezbollah's ultimate response will prove decisive in shaping Lebanon's future trajectory. [Getty]

Critical juncture

The November 2024 ceasefire agreement ended the most recent escalation between Israel and Hezbollah but left key implementation issues unresolved.

Environment Minister Tamara al-Zein, representing the Shia ministers' position, clarified to The New Arab that their withdrawal from recent sessions sends "a clear message meaning disagreement with proceeding with concessions that would drag more concessions before Israel's commitment to stabilising the ceasefire and withdrawing from Lebanon".

Their objection, she added, was over “entering into discussion about extending and consolidating the November 2024 agreement before its implementation by the Israeli side," stressing that "the decision to monopolise weapons isn't the problem, especially since it was mentioned in the ministerial statement on which we participated in the government".

However, she raised concerns about the Barrack paper's provisions, citing "traps that affect sovereignty" including "some hardline formulations with Lebanon and lenient ones with Israel," and risks of losing territory through demarcation processes, particularly regarding Shebaa Farms, where the word "Lebanese" was deleted, and water resources, including the Wazzani River.

The Shebaa Farms is a disputed territory claimed by Lebanon but occupied by Israel since 1967.

As Lebanon navigates this critical juncture, the outcome will likely determine whether the country can finally establish full state sovereignty over its territory or face a return to the cycles of conflict that have plagued it for decades.

The international community's sustained support and Hezbollah's ultimate response will prove decisive in shaping Lebanon's future trajectory.

This article is published in collaboration with Egab.