Diplomacy or a bomb? The future of Iran's nuclear program

US and Israeli attacks on Iran during the recent conflict have raised questions about what is left of Tehran’s nuclear program.

Since a fragile US- and Qatari-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Iran took effect on 24 June to end the 12-day war, conflicting assessments of the scale of damage have begun to emerge.

A leaked intelligence assessment by the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), a US agency of the Department of Defence, reportedly concluded that the attacks did not destroy the core components of Iran’s nuclear program and likely delayed the potential development of a nuclear weapon by only a few months.

This contrasted with earlier claims by US President Donald Trump, who said the attacks “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also said the operation eliminated the nuclear threat posed by Iran.

However, doubts over what is left of Iran’s nuclear program have become a flashpoint in US politics. The Trump administration and senior officials rejected the DIA assessment that downplayed the damage. Trump also accused CNN and the New York Times of undermining the mission.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said the administration’s strong claims of success may reflect a desire to avoid further military engagement.

“They want to give diplomacy a shot, and they recognise that the Israelis have been trying to trap them into a prolonged state of war, which Trump is not interested in,” he told The New Arab.

In Tehran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Thursday that the US and Israel’s attacks had gained no achievements. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Iran’s state television that they sustained significant and serious damages.

While both Washington and Tehran acknowledge that Iran’s nuclear sites were damaged, they differ on the extent, an assessment seen as key to understanding the future direction of Iran's nuclear program.

The 12-day war began on 13 June with Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and the killing of top commanders and scientists. Iran responded with missile attacks on Israel. On 22 June, the US joined, hitting Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan with bunker-busters and cruise missiles.

Iran retaliated on 23 June by targeting Al Udeid air base in Qatar, with no damage reported. A US- and Qatari-brokered ceasefire took effect on 24 June. By that time, Israel reportedly killed over 900 people in Iran, with 28 killed in Israel.

Decades of dispute: Iran's nuclear program

The Israeli and US war marked a dramatic escalation in a decades-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.

Since the US withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018, Iran has allegedly expanded its nuclear program, breaching enrichment and stockpile limits. Tehran, however, denies seeking nuclear weapons, insisting its program is civilian and peaceful.

Initial assessments of the US and Israeli strikes have primarily focused on Iran’s uranium enrichment sites at Fordow and Natanz and the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. The findings appear to be based on satellite imagery and intelligence reports, concluding that they suffered heavy damage from precise military strikes, severely disrupting enrichment and processing operations.

Nevertheless, the exact damage inside remains unclear without Iran’s assessment, which has not been provided.

On CBS News on Sunday, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief, Rafael Mariano Grossi, said US and Israeli strikes caused “severe” but not total damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities, and that Iran could restart uranium enrichment within months.

The fate of Iran’s 408.6 kg uranium stockpile enriched to 60% - with near weapons-grade levels set at 90% - is, in fact, another uncertainty. Some reports suggest Iran may have relocated uranium to protect it from attacks.

The IAEA reported in May that Iran had allegedly increased its uranium stockpile. Iran denied these allegations.

Highly enriched uranium was last verified at Isfahan before the Israeli attacks. Bloomberg reported that Iran sent a note to the IAEA three weeks earlier stating it would relocate the uranium to fortified sites if attacked, but has not disclosed the new location.

Regardless of whether its facilities are severely damaged, Iran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear program.

Iran could rebuild destroyed centrifuges fairly quickly, but replacing any lost uranium stockpile would take much longer. Moreover, despite scientist assassinations and airstrikes on nuclear facilities, Iran likely still retains the knowledge and industrial capacity to continue its nuclear program.

Mohsen Milani, a professor at the University of South Florida and the author of a newly released book, 'Iran’s Rise and Rivalry with the United States in the Middle East', told TNA that while Iran’s nuclear program has not been the central component of its defence doctrine, “it has become the symbol of the Islamic Republic’s defiance and pride”.

One of Iran’s first steps after the 12-day war with Israel and the US was the Guardian Council approving a Parliament bill to suspend, but not end, its cooperation with the IAEA.

During the 12-day war, Iran also threatened to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but has so far taken no action.

The UN’s nuclear watchdog has long faced criticism within Iran. Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told TNA that many in Iran criticised IAEA chief Grossi, believing the agency’s May report gave Israel a pretext to launch its attack as it cited Iran’s “rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium” as a “serious concern.”

After the Israeli strikes began, Grossi clarified there was no evidence Iran was developing a nuclear weapon.

“There are attacks against Grossi, seen as responsible for creating the conditions for Israel’s attacks,” he said. “Many ask why he didn’t stress earlier that there was no evidence of weaponisation.”

Trita Parsi said that if Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile was not destroyed, Israel is likely to renew pressure on the US to take further military action, although not immediately. But even if destroyed, Israel would likely shift its focus to urging strikes on Iran’s missile program or Iran’s broader conventional military capabilities.

“I believe the US administration has understood that Israel’s push for continued military action against Iran may not stop, and if it is not interested in doing so, it may choose to draw a line early rather than allow the cycle to escalate,” he said.

Nuclear deterrent or diplomacy?

The US-Israeli attack has also shocked both Iran’s leadership and public, prompting some hardliners to call for advancing nuclear weaponisation.

Milani explained that there is now a stronger push among some Iranians to move in that direction, “but just because you want to do something doesn’t mean you’ll succeed,” he said.

“The Israelis and the Americans will be watching very closely what Iran does in the coming months, and perhaps even years.”

Parsi similarly said that the desire to develop a nuclear deterrent appears significantly stronger than in the past.

“The internal debate is likely to shift in favour of those advocating for building nuclear weapons rather than using the program as a bargaining tool,” he said. “However, there is still a path to prevent this outcome, but it would require a new agreement that likely offers Iran significantly more sanctions relief than previous deals.”

Returning to nuclear negotiations with the US, however, may remain difficult for Tehran, as caution is growing, given that they were already negotiating with the US through Omani mediation when Israel launched its attack with US approval.

But diplomacy with Iran remains necessary, as military strikes have not resolved the nuclear issue, said Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King’s College London’s School of Security Studies.

He told TNA that efforts by Qatar and US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff are laying the groundwork for renewed talks. Iran may return to negotiations if post-war conditions include security guarantees, economic relief, and an expanded regional role.

Any new talks would likely go beyond previous agreements, balancing Iran’s enrichment rights with Western oversight.

“The war has altered the psychological landscape of diplomacy: future negotiations would need to be tougher, broader, and rooted in a clearer understanding that the absence of diplomacy now carries a cost neither side can afford,” he said.

If negotiations resume, uranium enrichment will likely be at the centre of the dispute.

“As long as Trump and Witkoff maintain the zero-enrichment stance, it will remain a non-starter for Iran and a major sticking point in negotiations,” Eric Lob, associate professor at Florida International University, told TNA.

However, efforts to resume negotiations are still hindered by lingering post-war tensions between the US and Iran, reflected by an array of contradictory reports and shifting positions.

Last week, for example, Trump said the US was ready to resume talks with Iran this week, but Araghchi denied any plans to restart discussions.

At the NATO Summit, the US president also signalled a possible easing of sanctions enforcement to support Iran’s post-war recovery, with CNN reporting that the Trump administration might grant Iran access to up to $30 billion in frozen funds to support a civilian nuclear program.

Trump, however, dismissed the report. After Khamenei’s speech on Thursday, he also criticised the Supreme Leader, adding that he would consider dropping plans to lift sanctions. At the White House, he said he would consider renewed airstrikes if necessary.

In response, Araghchi warned Trump to “put aside the disrespectful and unacceptable tone” toward Khamenei. Other reports over the weekend said that Witkoff is expected to hold talks with Iran on a possible deal to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.

The uncertainty over a possible return to negotiations, along with the ongoing war of words, suggests both countries are reassessing their strategies and redefining their positions after the 12-day war, before diplomacy can eventually begin to work.

Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights. 

Follow him on Twitter: @DarioSabaghi