Can Russia convert closer relations with Oman into Iran nuclear talks leverage?

From 21-22 April, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tarik travelled to Russia for a state visit. During his meeting with President Vladimir Putin, Sultan Haitham agreed to bolster Oman-Russia investment cooperation and discussed the pathway to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

After expressing support for a two-state solution that recognised East Jerusalem as Palestine’s capital, Putin and Sultan Haitham called for a “full withdrawal of occupying forces from the Gaza Strip and all other Palestinian territories”.

The cordial spirit of Sultan Haitham’s engagement with Putin reflected Oman and Russia’s strengthening bilateral partnership and shared positions on critical regional issues. It also had broader strategic significance for the security of the Gulf region.

As Oman is the primary dialogue facilitator between the US and Iran, Putin spoke extensively with Sultan Haitham about regulating Iran’s nuclear program. Putin aide Yury Ushakov acknowledged these discussions and offered Russia’s assistance in brokering a nuclear deal.

While Russia has limited leverage and capacity to influence the US-Iran nuclear talks, it nonetheless showcases its enduring aspirations for great power status in the Middle East.

The origins of Russia and Oman's multidimensional partnership

If historical legacies were any guide, the prospects for positive Russia-Oman relations would appear slim. During the 1963-76 Dhofar Rebellion, the Soviet Union supported the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman rebels and Omani Sultan Qaboos solicited international support to stem communism’s spillover from South Yemen into bordering Dhofar.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension as General Secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985 transformed this negative dynamic. Even as its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) counterpart, Saudi Arabia participated in a proxy war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Oman normalised relations with Moscow in 1986.

While the Russia-Oman relationship struggled to develop strategic depth in the years that followed, synergistic perspectives on regional crises catalysed closer cooperation. Oman was the only GCC country to maintain consistent diplomatic relations with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad until his overthrow in December 2024.

Aside from engaging with Russia’s closest regional ally, Oman shared Moscow’s critique of the Saudi-led military intervention against the Houthis and consistently championed a diplomatic solution to the Yemen conflict. 

These shared views incentivised Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to meet with his Omani counterpart Yusuf bin Alawi in 2015 and 2019. Oman’s strategic significance for Russian officials rose further after the Saudi-led blockade against Qatar began in June 2017.

The Qatar crisis shattered Russia’s bloc-wide engagement with the GCC, and the Kremlin hoped that Oman’s quiet diplomacy would help reverse that trend. While Omani mediation did not catalyse the end of the Qatar blockade in January 2021, Muscat’s efforts to defuse regional tensions were appreciated in Moscow.

Even though Oman voted to condemn Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the UNGA in March 2022, the Sultanate has maintained workable diplomatic relations with Moscow. In May 2022, Lavrov met with Sultan Haitham and Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi in Muscat. In a subsequent interview with French newspaper Le Figaro, Al-Busaidi highlighted Oman’s neutrality in the Ukraine war and attributed the conflict’s eruption to mistakes on both sides.

Al-Busaidi also expressed doubt about the ability of Western sanctions against Russia to facilitate an end to the Ukraine war. While Oman has not matched Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar’s public arbitration roles in the Ukraine war, it strongly adhered to its time-tested non-alignment policy.

Russia strengthens its economic and security partnership with Oman

Since Sultan Haitham assumed power in January 2020, Oman’s trade with Russia has soared precipitously. From 2021-24, total trade volumes surged from $171.7 million to $346 million. While these trade volumes are modest in monetary terms, they have triggered optimism in Moscow and Muscat.

A February 2025 Russian International Affairs Council report hailed the potential for a Russia-Oman strategic partnership and expressed optimism that Gaza war-induced anti-Western sentiments in Oman would give Russia economic opportunities. Renowned Omani economist Yousuf bin Hamed al Balushi expressed hope that Russian engineers and construction companies could help develop Vision 2040 project ports, logistical hubs and smart cities.

While Russia and Oman have far-reaching ambitions for their bilateral relationship, agriculture and energy remain the cornerstones of their commercial ties. As half of Oman’s wheat purchases were from Russia and Ukraine before the 2022 invasion, Omani officials view agricultural cooperation with Russia as a strategic priority.

Despite Russia’s weaponisation of food and sabotage of the Black Sea grain export deal, Oman imported $132 million in wheat from Russia in 2023. The retention of this grain trade supply chain mitigated inflation risks and was vital for Oman’s broader economic stability.

Putin’s calls for energy sector cooperation could encourage Russian oil majors to expand their presence in Oman. They have growing foundations to build on. The port of Sohar, which is located 200km from Muscat, is a major venue for ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil and has partially replaced the commercial activities of Greek vessel owners. This trade reflects Oman’s opposition to unilateral sanctions and bolsters its strategic vitality for the Russian economy.

These economic engagements have coincided with growing security cooperation. The Sultanate has been an observer in the periodic Russia-China-Iran trilateral naval drills in the Gulf of Oman. In October 2024, Iran, Russia and Oman launched joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. While Oman remains a vital component of Britain’s East of Suez military strategy and a trusted security partner of the United States, it sees Russia as a valuable additional vector.

Russia's mediation role in the Iran nuclear negotiations 

While Russia’s claims to great power status in the Middle East were weakened by its inability to prevent Assad’s demise, the Kremlin has used diplomacy to rebuild its tarnished image.

Moscow-based Middle East expert Kirill Semenov told The New Arab that “Russia’s position in the Middle East is still strong” and noted that “Russia’s services in the security sphere may still be needed in the region”. Semenov based this argument on the belief that Middle Eastern countries are keen to diversify their international partnerships by courting non-Western powers.

To add substance to this self-professed image of strength, Russia sees diplomatic engagement on the Iran nuclear file as a productive endeavour. After Putin’s talks with Sultan Haitham, Russian officials joined their Chinese and Iranian counterparts by discussing the Iran nuclear talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad confirmed Russia’s willingness to construct phases two and three of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, the Kremlin wants a diplomatic resolution to the Iran nuclear question that does not completely dismantle its uranium enrichment capacity.  

While Russian and some US officials may disagree on the scope of acceptable Iranian uranium enrichment, they concur on the need to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb. Nikolay Kozhanov, an Associate Professor at Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Centre, told The New Arab that “Russia ultimately is not interested in Iran getting a nuclear bomb. Now, with the gradual easing of Russia-US tensions, Moscow has returned to its historical stance on the Iranian nuclear program. This is a change from its previous silence on this question”.

This stance contrasts with Russia’s public defences of North Korea’s nuclear program and reflects its desire to avoid antagonising Iran’s regional rivals. However, its ability to exert influence over the direction of the US-Iran talks is unclear. Due to its long-standing solidarity with Iran against US sanctions, Middle East Institute Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka believes that Russia has considerable leverage over Iran on the nuclear file.

Other analysts are much more sceptical of Russia’s potential to influence the talks. Kozhanov argued that “the best-case scenario is for Russia to deliver messages relating to the Iran nuclear issue to the Americans”. Vali Golmohammadi, a Professor at Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran, told The New Arab that “Russia wants to be seen as a player in the Iran-US equation but is unlikely to be much more than a symbolic actor” and emphasised Iran’s focus on bilateral talks with Trump.

Putin’s meeting with Sultan Haitham was a great leap forward for Russia-Oman bilateral relations. Despite much fanfare, Russia might not be able to convert its tightening relationship with Oman into leverage over the US-Iran nuclear talks.

Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. Samuel is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin's War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International

Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2