Before the storm: The battle for Libya's Tripoli has been averted, for now

Residents of Tripoli - and Libyans more broadly - can breathe a sigh of relief that their capital is safe, at least for now.

After weeks of military build-ups and fears of major confrontation, Tripoli was pulled back from the brink by efforts led by local dignitaries - facilitated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) - and supported by Turkey.

But the threat of fighting has not disappeared; it has simply been postponed. Tripoli still witnesses gunfire nearly every week, whether from militia clashes, shows of intimidation, or celebratory shooting.

ACLED recorded 64 armed clashes, excluding minor skirmishes, between March and June 2025, highlighting the city’s persistent volatility and the entrenched political stalemate residents have come to live with.

Rivals, roadmaps, and a fragile deal

The deal de-escalating Tripoli’s tensions includes several measures, such as a neutral, unified force, overseen by the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) Ministry of Defence, which will secure four main airports.

The head of judicial police, meanwhile, will be replaced by a consensual figure appointed by the Presidential Council, while the Attorney General’s office will manage prisons.

A “Conflict Resolution Force” is tasked with implementing the deal, halting militia mobilisation, and returning armed groups to their headquarters.

According to Ziyad Deghem, advisor to the head of the Presidential Council, the agreement is a “framework of general principles,” without a set timeline, and signing it was a formal step despite existing obstacles.

While the Radaa Force, a militia that controls the east of the city, gave up some control to maintain its turf and secure its support base in Suq al-Juma and surrounding areas, it remains strong on the ground, as the deal does not involve disarmament.

For GNU leader Abdulhamid Dbeibah, the agreement provides a reprieve, giving him time to focus on his response to UNSMIL’s roadmap, which calls for the formation of a new government - effectively requiring his replacement, a step he has repeatedly refused.

Militias vs. the government

Inside Tripoli, the GNU may have reached a peace deal with Radaa, but it still does not exercise full control over the capital - and the agreement itself does not grant the level of authority it initially sought.

A potential flashpoint remains the uneasy relationship with Radaa, which continues to dominate key areas. While the group may have relinquished Mitiga Airport, it retains influence in the surrounding vicinity.

Recent attempts by the GNU to curb Radaa’s power are now tempered by the deal, which assigns security of critical infrastructure to a neutral, unified force and tasks the Conflict Resolution Force with ensuring compliance and ending militia mobilisation.

These measures have temporarily reduced the risk of clashes in sensitive areas, yet Radaa remains strong on the ground, and underlying tensions persist beneath the fragile calm.

Against this backdrop, political manoeuvring continues. Prime Minister Dbeibeh’s nephew and National Security Advisor, Ibrahim Dbeibeh, met in Rome on 2 September 2025 with Khalifa Haftar’s son Saddam, appointed his father’s deputy in July, and US envoy Massad Boulos, who had visited both Tripoli and Benghazi in July.

Officially exploratory, the talks show that even sworn rivals are keeping channels open while calculating possible political or military realignments. Discussions reportedly focused on avoiding renewed fighting for the capital, with the memory of Haftar’s failed 2019-2020 offensives - repelled decisively with Turkish support - still influencing each side’s strategy.

External actors and UNSMIL mediation

Few details have emerged from the Rome meeting, but it is clear that both sides - encouraged by the United States and regional actors such as Turkey - seek to avoid another fight while safeguarding their interests in upcoming UNSMIL-led negotiations.

The UN mission is preparing a new round of talks to advance its recently unveiled roadmap. Ankara, the GNU’s main military backer, has focused on preventing violence in Tripoli and reportedly warned Dbeibeh against unilateral actions that could spark clashes.

Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın met Dbeibeh in early July in Tripoli and again on 1 August in Ankara, during a summit with the Italian Prime Minister, cautioning explicitly against military escalation.

In exchange, Ankara reportedly offered Dbeibeh “security guarantees” should his premiership become untenable. Despite these warnings and UNSMIL’s expressed “grave” concerns, Dbeibeh has spent over two months mobilising heavily armed militias from his Misrata stronghold, in what UK-based Libya expert Salah Ahmed describes as an “attempt to frighten Radaa, display force, and prepare for any eventual military attack”.

Dbeibeh and Radaa: A temporary reprieve

For Dbeibeh, the stakes remain high, but for now, he does not need to confront Radaa directly: the recent deal has temporarily eased tensions, allowing both sides to maintain their areas of control in Tripoli.

Both appear to favour a negotiated settlement that preserves their positions in the capital. Regarding the UNSMIL roadmap, Radaa sees it as Dbeibeh’s challenge, confident the group will outlast the GNU and continue operating under any new unified government envisioned by the UN.

Such an agreement could sideline other political actors, including militias nominally aligned with Dbeibeh that have gathered around Tripoli to exert pressure. Yet Radaa, based at Mitiga Airport and enjoying deep-rooted support in eastern neighbourhoods, particularly Souq al-Juma, remains a resilient force capable of resisting any attempt to diminish its influence.

While the recent deal and ongoing UNSMIL mediation have temporarily eased tensions, a successful negotiated settlement under the roadmap could still reshape Tripoli’s power dynamics, potentially ending the prolonged transitional period and marginalising militias and other actors who have long exploited the city’s fragmented security environment.

Yet the risk of miscalculation remains high: any premature attempt to assert control - by Dbeibeh, Radaa, or external actors such as the LNA or its potential western allies - could quickly reignite clashes, particularly around strategic sites like Mitiga Airport and the city’s eastern neighbourhoods.

Turkey's strategic hedging

While still a key backer of Dbeibeh, Ankara has recently engaged with the Haftar camp, signalling a cautious recalibration. In April 2025, Saddam Haftar visited Ankara, meeting Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and senior officials, showing openness to future cooperation.

In August, Turkish Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın met Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi and invited him to Ankara - a trip expected before the year’s end. Turkey has also reopened its consulate in Benghazi, and several major Turkish companies have signed construction deals covering four eastern Libyan cities with the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Haftar’s third son, Belkacem.

These moves underscore both sides’ aim to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties. By maintaining dialogue with the LNA, Ankara appears to be hedging its bets, ensuring that should Haftar consolidate power, Turkey’s interests in western Libya remain protected.

Backers and battlegrounds: Outlook for Tripoli

Tripoli remains a city on edge, where every political manoeuvre and military deployment carries immediate consequences for residents. The interplay between local armed groups, the GNU, and external actors such as Turkey and the United States continues to shape the capital’s fragile stability.

While forces aligned with the LNA and their potential partners are not currently active in or around the city, recent high-level meetings in Moscow - including Khaled Haftar’s visit with Russian defence officials - signal that eastern actors retain significant external backing, which could influence strategic calculations if tensions flare.

As UNSMIL advances its roadmap, the question is not whether negotiations will occur - they almost certainly will - but whether the delicate balance of power can be maintained long enough to produce a lasting settlement, beginning with a unified government within the two-month timeline envisioned in the plan.

In a city where alliances shift rapidly and miscalculations can ignite deadly clashes, Tripoli’s residents continue to navigate persistent uncertainty. The coming weeks will reveal whether the capital can avoid another violent confrontation or whether entrenched divisions will erupt into open conflict.

Mustafa Fetouri is an award-winning Libyan journalist, columnist, author, and translator, with contributions to major outlets like Middle East Monitor, Al-Monitor, and Washington Report, and a focus on North Africa and the Sahel region

Follow him on X: @MFetouri