Baku's dilemma: Will Azerbaijan be drawn into the Iran war?

With the Middle East engulfed by the US-Israeli war on Iran, a drone incident in Azerbaijan last week risked further complicating the regional conflict.

On 5 March, two drones fell in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave near the Iranian border, injuring four people and damaging a local airport. Baku quickly blamed Tehran.

Addressing an emergency meeting of the Security Council, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev condemned the strikes as an “act of terror” and demanded an explanation and apology, describing the Iranian forces allegedly behind the incident as “ugly, cowardly and disgusting".

Yet Aliyev’s anger also went beyond condemnation. He declared that “independent Azerbaijan is a place of hope for Azerbaijanis living in Iran,” referring to the estimated 15–20 million ethnic Azeris, Iran’s largest minority, concentrated in the country’s northern part.

Framing Iranian Azeris in such explicitly aspirational terms, particularly at this moment, should be viewed within a broader context. As US and Israeli officials increasingly suggest using the “ethnic card” to pressure Tehran, Aliyev’s remarks signalled that Baku views the issue as a potential lever in any future confrontation with Iran, given its implications for the country’s internal stability.

The same day, Baku also announced a ban on Iranian truck traffic through all border crossings and evacuated its embassy and consulate from Iran. Aliyev further stated that Azerbaijan would seek alternative routes to reach Nakhchivan that bypass Iranian territory.

Tehran’s response didn’t take long. Iranian officials categorically denied any role in the incident, instead suggesting that the strikes - including an intercepted missile heading towards Turkey, reportedly aiming at the Incirlik airbase - could have been an Israeli false flag operation to undermine relations between the neighbouring countries.

Azerbaijani-Iranian relations have long been shaped by underlying tensions dating back to the 1990s. Tehran has repeatedly accused Baku - a close partner of Israel - of allowing its territory to be used as a launchpad for Israeli covert operations, including the assassinations of Iranian nuclear physicists between 2010 and 2012.

Following the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war, Tehran’s security concerns intensified amid fears that Baku might attempt to unilaterally establish a land corridor to Nakhchivan through Armenia, potentially cutting the Iran-Armenia direct land link.

Despite these concerns, bilateral ties have shown signs of improvement in recent years. Economic cooperation projects and two visits by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Baku in 2025 helped reinforce a fragile rapprochement.

Tehran even welcomed the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace declaration signed in Washington last year, which envisages the so-called “Trump Route” - a transport corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, for which the United States would hold exclusive development rights.

Azerbaijan's strategic calculations - and the Turkey question

Against this backdrop, Baku’s unusually harsh reaction fuelled speculation that Azerbaijan may consider a “high-risk, high-reward” strategy by adopting a more confrontational posture toward Iran.

This comes as Washington and Tel Aviv have not ruled out putting “boots on the ground” and are increasingly calling on regional states to join the war against Tehran, which has proven more resilient than many expected.

In such a scenario, Baku might rely on the support of its closest ally, Turkey. The Baku-Ankara military partnership was formalised in the 2021 Shusha Declaration, which stipulates that if the independence or territorial integrity of either country is threatened by a third state, the two governments will consult and provide the necessary support, including potential military assistance.

In theory, therefore, a military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Iran could risk drawing Ankara into direct conflict with Tehran.

However, Turkey appears to have its own calculations and has shown little appetite for involvement in a war with Iran. Even when Iranian missiles reportedly entered Turkish airspace on three occasions, Ankara’s response did not go beyond condemnation and warnings.

Likewise, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, while expressing solidarity with Azerbaijan, also cautioned about the risks of being dragged into a wider conflict.

So far, there are few indications that Baku enjoys Ankara’s backing on this issue. This can also be seen in the rhetoric of Azerbaijani politicians and pro-government media.

After Aliyev’s remarks drew criticism in Turkish media and on social networks, Azerbaijani state-linked outlets and political figures began targeting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law, Berat Albayrak. They accused him of fuelling an anti-Azerbaijani disinformation campaign through media organisations allegedly linked to him.

The limits of escalation

Under such circumstances, Azerbaijan’s options in a direct military confrontation with Iran remain limited. Even with potential Turkish support, Baku is well aware that its air defence capabilities are modest compared with those of the Gulf states.

Any escalation could lead not only to significant casualties but also to devastating strikes on Azerbaijan’s economic backbone - its oil and gas infrastructure - by Iranian missiles and drones.

Baku is also mindful that Iran’s military establishment has assumed a leading role amid the ongoing war, overshadowing the country’s civilian administration. Reflecting these risks, Iranian officials have issued warnings alongside diplomatic signals.

In parallel with President Pezeshkian’s apology to neighbouring countries for unintended harm caused by Iranian strikes, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) warned Baku to “expel the Zionists” and “not endanger the security of your people and Islamic Iran”.

The delicacy of the situation is further underscored by Iran’s newly adopted “mosaic defence" strategy - a wartime doctrine designed to ensure continued military operations even if senior leadership, communications, or major command centres are targeted.

This decentralised command-and-control structure grants lower-ranking IRGC commanders greater authority to respond to perceived threats. While the approach allows Tehran to maintain operational capacity in worst-case scenarios, it also increases the risk of uncoordinated drone or missile launches - raising the likelihood of miscalculation and unintended escalation in an already volatile region.

These dynamics were also reflected in the trajectory of the escalation between Baku and Tehran. Following a phone call between Aliyev and Pezeshkian on 8 March, Baku restored Iranian truck traffic through its territory and resumed direct flights to Nakhchivan via Iranian airspace.

The following day, Aliyev congratulated Mojtaba Khamenei on his election as Iran’s new Supreme Leader and dispatched humanitarian aid to Iran. These moves suggest that, despite the earlier rhetoric, the government in Baku is reluctant to pursue a course that could jeopardise its own stability.

Nonetheless, regardless of whether the strikes were intentional, accidental, or the result of a false-flag operation, neither Baku nor Tehran appears interested in escalation at this stage. Azerbaijan is unlikely to risk dragging the country into a devastating war, while Iran has little interest in opening a new front along its northern border.

Instead, both sides appear to be sending calibrated signals. Like Iran, Azerbaijan has also issued mixed messages - demonstrating resolve and security sensitivity while avoiding steps that could dramatically escalate the situation.

Yet with Iran’s military on heightened alert amid the ongoing US-Israeli aggression, even small miscalculations could quickly spiral into unintended consequences in a region already on edge.

Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. Holding a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies, he focuses on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus

Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan

Edited by Charlie Hoyle