Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords: A new phase in Baku's alliance with Israel?

Azerbaijan’s close relationship with Israel is no longer a well-kept secret. Since the 1990s, a strategic “energy-for-arms” partnership has formed the backbone of their ties.

Together with Kazakhstan, Baku supplies over 60% of Tel Aviv’s oil needs - a figure that has only surged amid Israel’s brutal military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon since 7 October 2023.

In exchange, Israel provides Azerbaijan with advanced weaponry, which played a significant role in Baku’s victories over Armenia in the 2020 and 2023 wars.

Between 2016 and 2021, nearly 69% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports came from Israel, a fact underscored by the nearly 100 Israeli arms flights that landed in Baku during that period.

Moreover, Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role in Israel’s broader strategy of "moving closer to Iran," aimed at encircling Tehran by deepening ties with its neighbouring states. Iranian authorities have repeatedly accused its northern neighbour of serving as a forward base for Israeli reconnaissance and sabotage operations targeting Tehran.

Azerbaijan in the Abraham Accords?

What’s new, however, is the emerging push - gaining momentum in recent weeks in both the US and Israel - to bring Azerbaijan into the fold of the Abraham Accords - the Trump-brokered 2020 “normalisation agreements” between Israel and several Arab nations, including the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.

On 5 March, a motion was introduced in the Knesset calling for a strengthened “strategic alliance with Azerbaijan,” advocating for Baku’s inclusion in the Accords. The next day, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that discussions are ongoing with the US to establish “a solid framework for trilateral cooperation between Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United States”. The initiative has since been echoed by influential Jewish religious leaders and think tanks.

Baku, for its part, is also reinforcing its already close ties with Israel. In December 2024, AIPAC leaders Michael Tuchin and Bernie Kaminetsky visited Baku for the first time, assuring President Ilham Aliyev that “your support for Israel will be recognised”. Earlier that year, Israel and Azerbaijan’s state oil company, SOCAR, signed a significant energy agreement. By March, SOCAR had also secured a gas exploration license with Tel Aviv.

In a notable development, Azerbaijan became the first Muslim-majority country to adopt a definition of antisemitism in its school textbooks - one that aligns with pro-Israel narratives of the conflict with Palestinians under the guise of neutrality. Meanwhile, earlier in April, Baku hosted Turkish-Israeli talks aimed at defusing tensions between its two allies in Syria.

It’s worth noting that Azerbaijan officially formalised its relationship with Israel after defeating Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, opening an embassy in Tel Aviv. For years, Baku had refrained from this move, wary of alienating support from Muslim-majority countries over the conflict with Yerevan.

Yet with bilateral ties now more open than ever, a new question arises: why is there a push to integrate Azerbaijan into the Abraham Accords, especially considering that it is not an Arab country and already maintains robust relations with Israel?

A key part of the answer lies in Section 907 of the US “Freedom Support Act.” Passed by Congress during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war after the fall of the Soviet Union, the provision prohibits direct US aid and arms sales to Azerbaijan.

While successive US administrations have waived this restriction annually since the early 2000s, Baku is now seeking a full repeal - something it hopes to achieve with Israel’s support and through closer integration into US-backed regional frameworks like the Abraham Accords.

Peace with Armenia delayed, tensions managed

However, there’s a major hurdle: the lack of a formal peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. To secure the full benefits of US support, including the repeal of Section 907, Baku must finalise a peace deal with Yerevan. Yet, following its full reclamation of Karabakh in 2023, Azerbaijan seems intent on using its strengthened position to extract further concessions from Armenia, delaying the peace process.

The unexpected visit of Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff to Baku on 14 March was widely interpreted as a signal of renewed US interest in resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict - possibly as a step toward establishing a new trilateral alliance involving the US, Israel, and Azerbaijan.

Much like it secured annual waivers of Section 907 in the early 2000s by demonstrating its strategic value to the US during the ‘War on Terror,’ Baku now hopes to permanently eliminate the restriction by proving its worth as a reliable partner to Israel. In return, Azerbaijan would gain broader US support, while Israel would strengthen its geopolitical counterweight against Tehran through a deepened alliance.

Especially after the 2020 war, Israeli officials visiting Azerbaijan have increased their emphasis on the perceived ‘Iranian threat.’ Even in 2023, during a period of heightened tensions between Baku and Tehran, then-Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen declared that he had "agreed" with his Azerbaijani counterpart to form a "united front" against Iran - remarks that drew a sharp rebuke from Iranian officials.

However, since the beginning of 2024, particularly after Masoud Pezeshkian assumed the presidency in Iran, relations between the two neighbours have begun to de-escalate. The renewed dialogue has focused on joint economic initiatives, yet deep-rooted mistrust continues to linger beneath the surface.

Iran’s primary concern in this context remains Baku’s controversial “Zangazur Corridor” project - an overland route aimed at connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia’s Syunik province, which borders Iran. Baku’s past pressure on Yerevan to open the corridor, at times hinting at the use of force, was the main source of unprecedented tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran from 2021 to 2023.

While Azerbaijan has officially withdrawn its demand for the Zangazur Corridor from ongoing peace negotiations with Armenia, it has not abandoned its broader strategic ambition. Concerning a potential surprise military move by Baku, Tehran continues to express strong opposition to any “geopolitical changes” in the region and has deepened its defence cooperation with Armenia in response.

In recent weeks, Iran and Armenia conducted joint military exercises and are reportedly finalising a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, further signalling Tehran’s cautious yet firm stance on preserving the regional balance.

However, Iran has remained conspicuously silent about the recent push to integrate Azerbaijan into the Abraham Accords. This calculated restraint suggests Tehran’s desire to preserve its fragile, recently revived relationship with Baku, especially at a time when sensitive nuclear negotiations with the US are ongoing.

As long as no immediate security threat emerges, Tehran appears willing to tolerate the US-backed alliance’s expansion into the South Caucasus.

Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. Holding a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies, he focuses on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus. 

Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan