Algeria-Mali tensions: A growing power struggle in the Sahel

The downing of a Malian drone by Algerian forces on 1 April has dramatically escalated tensions between the two neighbours, culminating in the recall of ambassadors and a flurry of sharp public exchanges.

Observers argue that what began as a local incident is fast evolving into a test of whether regional actors can manage their differences diplomatically, or if the Sahel will become the next theatre for great power rivalry.

The incident saw Algeria’s air defence units near Tin Zaouatine, a small town near Mali’s northern border, shoot down an “armed reconnaissance drone” that had allegedly violated Algerian airspace. Mali, meanwhile, has condemned the act as an “aggression” against its sovereignty, claiming that the wreckage was found nearly 10 kilometres inside its territory.

Bamako and the two other Sahel Alliance (AES) states, Niger and Burkina Faso, recalled their ambassadors from Algeria, prompting Algeria to reciprocate. Both countries also closed their respective airspaces to each other’s flights.

This latest flare-up is yet another episode of a slow but steady deterioration in bilateral relations, fuelled by strategic disagreements and years of mounting mistrust, further sowing the seeds of conflict in an already troubled region.

At its core, the crisis reflected a change in the long-established status quo that saw the breakdown of trust in old mediation efforts, the emergence of new military-led alliances in the Sahel, and the increasing influence of foreign powers carving out space in the region.

The origins of the current tensions can be traced back to January 2024, when Malian officials withdrew from the Algiers Accord, a 2015 peace deal brokered by Algeria that helped end the war with Tuareg rebels in the country’s north, who sought autonomy from the former French colony.

The move was viewed in Algiers as a significant blow to a “decade of painstaking diplomatic mediation and a breach of vital regional security arrangements,” Raouf Farrah, a Sahel and North Africa specialist at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, told The New Arab.

“Mali’s withdrawal reignited Algerian concerns over a potential political and security vacuum along its southern border,” said Farrah.

Signed by the Malian government and two rival coalitions of armed groups: the pro-government Platform and the Coordination of Azawad Movements, a Tuareg-led alliance, the 2015 agreement sought to bring lasting calm to northern Mali through decentralisation, disarmament, and development programs.

A recalibration of the status quo

But the Malian government has since taken “a more unilateral stance,” argued Farrah, in an attempt to reassert central authority across the entire country, particularly in the north, where the agreement had granted local autonomy. Bamako justifies its withdrawal by accusing the other parties of failing to uphold their commitments.

“The military leadership in Mali, especially after the August 2020 coup, began questioning the relevance of the accord and the impartiality of Algeria and other international mediators,” he told The New Arab. 

A rise in nationalist rhetoric further hardened the Malian junta's posture, coinciding with France’s military exit from the country and Mali’s pivot toward new partners, most notably, Russia’s Wagner Group.

Now rebranded as the African Corps, Wagner has become a central pillar in Mali’s campaign to reclaim control of its territory. The government has deployed Turkish-made drones and leaned heavily on the Russian paramilitary organisation, which claims to assist African nations in fighting terrorism, organised crime, and drug trafficking, while also safeguarding Moscow’s strategic interests.

But according to Farrah, Algeria sees the expanding footprint of the African Corps near its borders as a long-term national security threat. The concern has been echoed in official Algerian statements warning against the presence of foreign paramilitary forces in the volatile north.

Assef Molhem, a Moscow-based strategic analyst, argues that Russia will likely seek to “contain the fallout”. 

“Losing Algeria would be a significant blow to Moscow. Algeria purchases over 70 percent of its arms from Russia; it is a key partner that Russia would not want to lose,” he said.

Beyond geopolitics, Algeria has also grown wary of Bamako’s increasingly confrontational rhetoric. Mali’s transitional authorities have accused Algeria of meddling in its internal affairs and even supporting groups that Bamako labels as “terrorist”.

This narrative has intensified since the departure of French forces and the termination of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) mission in 2023.

“This crisis must be seen in a broader context,” said Farrah. “It’s tied to the emergence of the so-called Alliance of Sahel States, a new regional bloc made up of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. They’ve recently withdrawn from [the Economic Community of West African States] ECOWAS and are now reshaping regional cooperation on their own terms, which looks very different from the traditional models Algeria has long supported.”

Still, Algeria views stability in northern Mali as inseparable from its national security. 

“In border regions like Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Tin Zaouatine, and In Khalil, the only separation is a dry riverbed or a narrow strip of sand,” Farrah said. “Any unrest there is a direct threat to Algeria.”

Nigerian writer and politician Oumar Moctar Alansary argued that the current crisis reflects more than just “a border dispute. 

“It signals shifting strategic priorities among some regional actors, though it doesn’t yet amount to a wholesale redrawing of alliances,” he explained.

Alansary stressed that Algeria has long been “a central player in regional stability,” and the Sahel’s emerging military-led bloc recognises the importance of cooperation on shared threats like terrorism and transnational crime. But he noted that Niger, in particular, may face pressure to reconsider its position in the alliance if internal rifts or external tensions continue to escalate.

“The formation of the Sahel Alliance and the withdrawal of these countries from ECOWAS represent an effort to construct a new model of regional relations,” Farrah said in agreement.

“It’s a sovereigntist narrative, outwardly fuelled by popular calls for dignity and an end to foreign tutelage. But domestically, that same rhetoric often serves to justify military rule and suppress dissent.”

In this recalibrated landscape, Algeria’s role as a stabilising force is being increasingly questioned. The mediation tools it once championed are now viewed with scepticism, if not outright dismissal, by the new political order.

Potential de-escalation

Complicating matters further is the geopolitical chessboard unfolding in the background. Western military bases established in the Sahel to combat terrorism and curb irregular migration have long drawn criticism for masking deeper strategic ambitions, but Molhem argued that the ongoing gradual retreat of the West from the region has harmed its influence, most notably that of France.

“France, in particular, has suffered a serious strategic blow, especially given its dependency on Niger’s uranium, which powers a significant portion of its nuclear reactors,” he explained. “Russia, by contrast, is seeking to fill the void. Through the deployment of the African Corps, Moscow is consolidating its presence in a region where Western sway is in retreat.”

Molhem noted that while the rivalry between global powers is intensifying, it remains, so far, short of confrontation,” a scenario Algeria is keen to avoid.”

Still, Alansary believed Niger will aim to avoid escalation. 

“Despite its close ties with Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger prefers to resolve disputes bilaterally and transparently. The goal remains collective security and development, which necessitates avoiding unnecessary provocations,” he told The New Arab.

“Burkina Faso, which shares a long border with Mali, may lean more closely toward Bamako due to geographic and security interests, but that does not necessarily equate to hostility toward Algeria.”

Farrah noted that Algeria’s challenge now is to maintain strong bilateral ties with each Sahelian state without falling into a broader confrontation with the bloc, arguing that “neither Niger nor Burkina Faso should be treated as politically or diplomatically monolithic. Each has its own calculus.”

Despite the sharp rhetoric, military escalation remains unlikely. 

“Algeria has no interest in opening a southern front,” Farrah said. “And Mali, given its current situation, is in no position to confront a more powerful neighbour.”

Instead, the greater risk lies in the “unintended consequences of Mali’s internal conflicts”, including cross-border militancy, arms proliferation, and the potential radicalisation of armed factions.

Alansary echoed the call for de-escalation, arguing that diplomacy still offers a viable path forward if both sides commit to transparency and open investigations into recent incidents.

“Lowering the political temperature and reactivating regional dialogue mechanisms are essential steps toward securing long-term stability,” he said.

Alansary sees a path to de-escalation through balanced diplomacy, noting that countries like Nigeria and Mauritania, with their carefully managed relationships across the region, are well-positioned to play a constructive role in reducing tensions. 

He also highlights the potential involvement of regional organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS, given their institutional experience in political dialogue and conflict mediation, while, beyond Africa, Gulf states may bring valuable influence to bear. 

“Saudi Arabia and Qatar, given their strong ties with both Algeria and Mali, could support mediation efforts,” Alansary added, suggesting they join forces with the United Nations or any neutral, credible third party with regional standing.

Farrah highlighted that the shared interests of Algeria and Mali make a return to dialogue not just desirable but necessary.

“The path to de-escalation begins with small symbolic gestures that help rebuild trust, followed by the reactivation of both formal and informal diplomatic channels,” he said. “What’s needed most is political will from both sides.”

This article is published in collaboration with Egab.