From Aleppo to Iran: A split-screen moment for Kurdish anxieties

Over the course of the past week, Kurds around the world watched two simultaneous events with trepidation: the siege of the Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhood in Aleppo by Syrian transitional government forces, and the growing protests in Iran.

This split-screen moment reinforced the centrality of Kurds in the enormous changes that are taking place in the Middle East, but also the precarity of their position.

Both events are being felt acutely by those at a relative distance. At a protest in Erbil on 9 January, for example, one demonstrator held a sign that read “West and East, Kurdistan is one country.” Another sign referred to the Kurdish parts of Iran and Syria, respectively: “Rojhelat rebellion, Rojava resistance.”

Similar sentiments were on display at protests across Europe, with rallies in Germany, France, and the UK. Protesters also gathered in Turkey’s Diyarbakir and outside a base hosting soldiers from the International Coalition in Al-Hasakah.

“One quiet miracle of a non-state nation like the Kurds is how tightly they remain connected across borders,” Kamaran Palani, a researcher for PeaceRep Iraq at LSE’s Middle East Centre, told The New Arab.

“Kurdish media now treats Kurdistan as one shared public space, with news, debates, and voices from every part. It shows that for people who share identity and history, state borders have real limits in disconnecting them from one another,” he added.

Nevertheless, Kurds in places like Aleppo and Kermanshah in Iran are vulnerable to the political and security strategies of the states where they live - a fact that is playing out live on television and over social media.

Syria

Throughout the Syrian war, Kurdish forces held the neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafieh in northern Aleppo city and resisted the advances of both Islamist militants like al-Nusra Front and the Assad regime.

Although the Kurdish authorities and the Syrian transitional government agreed last year to integrate their forces, implementation has been slow. Throughout the autumn of 2025, Damascus increased pressure on the neighbourhood in an effort to bring it under central control.

This culminated in a ground assault of the area by former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Jabha al-Shamiya fighters between 6 and 10 January. The attack included extensive use of artillery against the civilian areas.

At least 21 civilians were killed and 155,000 people were displaced as a result of the fighting. The government succeeded in taking the neighbourhood on 10 January, as hundreds of Kurdish fighters and civilians were evacuated to the east.

As the violence intensified, prominent politicians from the neighbouring Kurdistan Region of Iraq expressed alarm about the developments.

“The targeting of Kurds in an effort to change the demography of the area and create threats to the lives of civilians raises questions about the authorities in Damascus and the conscience of the international community,” Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said in an official statement on  8 January. “No justification or pretext should allow ethnic cleansing,” he added.

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani spoke by phone with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to express his concerns, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani called on all parties to “deal wisely with this unwanted incident and resolve the issues through dialogue and responsible discussions.”

Fortunately, the type of massacres that occurred in Latakia and Suweida in the last year did not happen, as many Kurds had feared. However, Kurdish sources highlighted a number of abuses that took place during the ground campaign, including attacks on a hospital, alleged extrajudicial executions, and the mistreatment of prisoners.

Images of these violations - in particular one of a dead female fighter being thrown from a damaged building - sparked outrage across Kurdish social media.

Palani told The New Arab that Damascus viewed its operation to take control of Sheikh Maqsoud as necessary for achieving Syrian unity and demilitarising the city. For Kurds, however, it indicated a dangerous continuity with the old regime.

“The region has never really escaped the legacy of dictatorship, and in Syria, it has worsened. The old Baathist denial of Kurdish rights is back, now reinforced by ethnic chauvinism and religious extremism,” Palani warned.

“With this mentality, building a civil and peaceful state is difficult, not just for Kurds but for Syria as a whole,” he added.

Iran

As events in Aleppo played out, residents of Iran’s Kurdish provinces launched a general strike on 8 January and continued to participate in the weeks-long protests gripping the country.

Unlike in Syria, the situation there is ongoing and may escalate further. In a further difference, the continuing internet blackout imposed by Tehran has made it far more difficult to see what has happened, leaving many in the diaspora desperate for information about their families inside Iran.

Iranian Kurdish opposition parties have expressed strong support for the protests. They have released statements individually and through the Dialogue Center for Cooperation, a seven-member cross-party coordinating committee.

“The goal is to see the regime in Iran fall,” Amir Babakhani, a representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), told a newspaper in Norway. “Our aim is to have a democratic country - one with freedom, where we can live together in a true democracy.”

In a statement on 11 January, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) accused the Iranian security forces of “carrying out mass killings” and characterised the government’s crackdown as “a crime against humanity.”

The Iranian Kurdish opposition parties do not represent the full range of opinion or perspectives about the protests, but have been the most vocal so far.

In contrast to the situation in Syria, Iraqi Kurdish leaders like Barzani and Talabani have been silent about the protests. This reflects the Kurdistan Region’s far more precarious position with regard to Iran and the close political and economic relations that the major parties in Iraq have with Iran.

As the situation in Sheikh Maqsoud becomes less volatile, popular attention is likely to shift to the protests in Iran. News and verifiable information from inside Iran and evidence of bloody crackdowns on Kurdish provinces will likely drive discussions online as it emerges.

“What Kurds in the other parts are doing for their fellow Kurds in Iran, Aleppo, and elsewhere is largely grassroots - protests, social media activism, and public mobilisation,” Palani said.

“Over the past few days, we’ve seen intense online activity and gatherings everywhere, all aimed at influencing decision-makers. These actions may be symbolic, but they revive the Kurdish cause inside Kurdish society itself,” he added.

Tehran and Damascus, as well as Baghdad and Ankara, may have the power to restrict Kurdish power at home, but it is clear that Kurds continue to play a highly relevant role.

The Syrian transitional government may have taken control of Sheikh Maqsoud in just a few days, but doing so may make the larger challenge of how to integrate ethnic and religious minorities into the new Syria all the more difficult.

The Kurds still maintain control of wide swathes of the country east of the Euphrates, and Damascus has shown them that it is more interested in antagonism than partnership.

Should the Iranian government fall as a result of the latest wave of protests or be weakened by them, Kurds will want to substantive say in the shape of the country’s future governance. Even if it is merely weakened, those demands will remain the same.

“Even tragic moments can become a form of renewal when they generate mobilisation and keep the struggle alive,” Palani said.

Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist and analyst based in Sulaymaniyah in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. He focuses on politics, human rights, and political economy.

Follow him on Twitter and Instagram: @wrodgers2

Edited by Charlie Hoyle