Airspace and ambiguity: Azerbaijan's role in the Iran-Israel war

During the 12-day war sparked by Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran on 13 June, one of Tehran’s key vulnerabilities was Israel’s unrestricted use of Iraqi airspace to conduct airstrikes.

Recognising that Iraq’s skies are effectively under US control - leaving Baghdad unable to intercept or deter Israeli fighter jets - Iran nonetheless expressed satisfaction with Iraq’s formal complaint to the United Nations over the airspace violation.

As the conflict escalated, Iranian media began reporting that Israel may have also utilised Azerbaijani airspace, particularly over the Caspian Sea, to launch strikes on Tehran and other locations.

Reports suggested that rather than conducting risky deep-penetration missions solely through Iranian airspace, Israeli jets flew over northern Iraq and Iran, entered Azerbaijani airspace, and then re-entered Iran over the Caspian Sea to deliver their strikes.

The discovery of Israeli fuel drop tanks along the Caspian coast was presented as circumstantial evidence, alongside claims from numerous Iranian civilians who allegedly witnessed Israeli jets and drones crossing from Azerbaijani airspace into Iran.

Allegations of Israeli access to Azerbaijani territory for military purposes are not new. For years, Tehran has seen Azerbaijan as not just a northern neighbor but a potential launchpad for adversarial operations, particularly given Israel’s deepening security footprint in Baku.

As early as 2012, Foreign Policy reported that Israel had secured access to airbases near Iran’s northern border for either launching strikes or conducting search-and-rescue missions for downed aircraft. Iranian authorities have also periodically accused Baku of enabling covert surveillance operations, including the launch of Israeli-manufactured drones from Azerbaijani airbases.

This time, however, Iranian officials refrained from making direct accusations, instead calling for transparency and further investigation. On 26 June, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, during which he urged a thorough inquiry into the allegations that Israeli drones and micro air vehicles may have used Azerbaijani airspace to carry out attacks on Iran.

Notably, Iran’s readout of the call avoided direct accusations, citing only concerns over drone activity while omitting any mention of manned jets. The following day, Iran’s Ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, hinted at possible Azerbaijani complicity, stating, “We all know [Israel] very well: they do not follow any rules, they do not observe any laws. Therefore, there is still a possibility that they were able to take advantage of the moment”.

Baku promptly and categorically denied any involvement, asserting that its airspace had not been used to launch attacks on Iran or any other country. In a strongly worded response, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry condemned Ambassador Sobhani’s remarks as an “open provocation,” accusing him of promoting a “pro-Armenian position rather than representing his country”.

Despite these tensions, President Pezeshkian’s subsequent participation in the 17th Summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Azerbaijan - his second official visit to the country this year - signalled Tehran’s desire to preserve the fragile détente. His cosy public interactions with Aliyev underscored Iran’s interest in de-escalation.

Tehran’s cautious diplomacy can be attributed in part to strategic calculations: a confrontational stance toward Azerbaijan could fracture the already delicate bilateral relationship, push Baku even closer to Israel, and create new security threats on Iran’s northern frontier, especially at a time when Tehran is increasingly entangled in multiple regional crises.

Moreover, the renewed focus on joint economic initiatives, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Aras Corridor, further incentivises cooperation over confrontation despite deep mutual distrust.

Baku eyes opportunity amid chaos

Since the onset of the Israel-Iran war, Azerbaijan’s position has followed a consistent pattern of strategic neutrality.

Much like its reaction to Israel’s war on Gaza, even as that campaign began to be recognised as a genocide, Baku refrained from direct condemnation. Throughout the 12-day conflict and during earlier escalations in April and October 2024, Azerbaijan limited its response to generic expressions of concern and calls for de-escalation, pointedly avoiding any criticism of Israel’s actions.

This approach stood in stark contrast to the reactions of most of Iran’s neighbours: even Armenia, Baku’s regional rival, joined Azerbaijan’s close allies, Turkey and Pakistan, in unequivocally denouncing Israel’s aggression.

Tensions escalated further when Israel launched airstrikes on Tabriz - an Iranian city with a significant ethnic Azeri population and a symbolic stronghold in Azerbaijani nationalist discourse.

On Azerbaijani social media, concern surged over the fate of their ethnic kin, mirroring the broader narrative that Baku has carefully cultivated in recent years. During past episodes of strained Iran-Azerbaijan relations, President Ilham Aliyev notably cast himself as the protector of “South Azerbaijanis,” referring to ethnic Azeris living in Iran.

Against this backdrop, Azerbaijani media reported that Baku had privately urged Israel to avoid striking Azeri-populated regions.

Yet in the absence of any official confirmation - and as Israeli bombardment of ethnic Azeri-majority cities such as Bostan Abad, Maragheh, and Tabriz continued - these reports appeared primarily aimed at calming public sentiment and sustaining the image that Azerbaijan is attentive to the plight of Iranian Azeris, without jeopardising its close ties with Israel.

This episode once again highlighted the fine line Baku walks between public sentiment and strategic alignment.

However, with tensions between Israel and Iran still high and the ceasefire on shaky ground, Azerbaijan faces the persistent risk of being drawn into a broader conflict.

While Baku may see strategic value in a weakened Iran, direct involvement in renewed hostilities would carry serious risks. Even a limited Iranian missile strike on Azerbaijan’s vital energy infrastructure could severely destabilise its oil- and gas-dependent economy.

A deepening war or a potential collapse of the Islamic Republic could trigger major instability across the South Caucasus.

Even without direct participation, Baku could face fallout in the form of refugee flows, trade disruptions, and logistical challenges. Moreover, its current positioning as a strategic bulwark against Iran - valued by Israel and the United States - could be compromised.

Instead, Baku appears intent on leveraging the regional distraction to advance its long-standing goal of establishing the “Zangezur Corridor”.

Media reports suggest that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has adopted a more “flexible approach” to the opening of this contentious transit route following his meetings with Turkish President Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev in the UAE - effectively sidelining Russia from the conversation.

In this shifting geopolitical environment, Baku may seek Tehran’s tacit approval to push the corridor project forward.

Yet without articulating a coherent and proactive regional strategy, Tehran risks being sidelined altogether - whether through Azerbaijan’s eventual accession to the Abraham Accords, Armenia’s deeper alignment with the West, or the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor in ways that bypass Iranian interests.

Rovshan Mammadli is a Baku-based journalist and independent analyst. Holding a BA in Israel and Middle East Studies and an MA in International Policy Studies, he focuses on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Middle East politics, and peace and security in the South Caucasus

Follow him on X: @MammadliRovshan