Afghanistan and Pakistan have avoided a war, but for how long?

Marking one of the most serious escalations in years, recent border clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan almost erupted into a full-scale war.

Though a ceasefire agreement was recently finalised in Doha, the Afghan Taliban’s inability to rein in one of its militant offshoots could undermine their own grip on power in Kabul.

On 8 October, 11 Pakistani military personnel lost their lives during clashes with Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) fighters in Pakistan’s north-western province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Islamabad reportedly responded by conducting air attacks on high-value targets inside Afghanistan, and a tit-for-tat pattern of hostilities has continued ever since.

After a bloody week of violence and more airstrikes by Pakistan, talks were held in Doha on 18 October, with Pakistan and Afghanistan agreeing to an immediate ceasefire. Notably, though, Islamabad has linked the agreement to the Taliban’s ability to control Pakistani militants it claims are launching attacks from Afghan soil. Kabul has denied these charges.

A joint mechanism for peace and stability has been established, and regular meetings will be held to ensure its implementation. The next meeting is scheduled in Istanbul on 25 October.

Analysts say it will be challenging for the Afghan Taliban to take action, as there are multiple actors involved, including many who were not part of the talks in Doha and therefore not subject to the agreement.

Jan Achakzai, former Minister for Information and Public Relations for the government of Baluchistan, told The New Arab that the Taliban must “curb the TTP per the 2025 Doha Agreement, or face isolation and potential regime change”.

At present, Islamabad is officially referring to the Afghan Taliban as a “regime”, and there has been no international criticism of Pakistan’s current stance.

Openly hinting towards the need for elections in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Foreign Office has expressed hope that “the Afghan people would be emancipated” and governed by a “true representative government”.

Achakzai added that “stable trade and security ties are unlikely without alteration in Taliban behaviour as the October clashes were the deadliest since 2021”.

With Afghanistan a landlocked country, Pakistan remains the main source of goods and food supplies, and major losses are expected for Afghanistan’s economy as a result of current tensions.

All Afghan refugees, both legal and illegal, are being expelled from Pakistan, border crossings are closed, and vehicles loaded with goods are stranded.

Zubair Faisal Abbasi, a development policy and management advisor based in Islamabad, told TNA that “iron in a velvet glove” should be Islamabad’s policy orientation from now on, but that “Qatar and Turkey are welcome as guarantors of peace to oversee the Taliban regime”.

While stressing the need for constant vigilance, he said he hoped the second round of talks in Istanbul would “help create satisfactory oversight and compliance mechanisms”.

Zeeshan Shah, an analyst at FINRA in Washington, told TNA that previous attempts to solve the Pakistan-Afghan dispute through the UAE and China had failed, and current attempts by Qatar and Turkey may not have much success either.

What are Islamabad's main issues with Kabul?

The Afghan Taliban’s links with the TTP, a US-designated “terrorist” group that is banned in Pakistan, have become a top security threat. As per a 2024 UN report, an estimated 6,000-6,500 TTP militants are present in Afghanistan, with access to abandoned NATO weapons.

Since its founding in 2007, TTP has carried out numerous deadly attacks across Pakistan, such as the deadly 2014 Army Public School (APS) massacre in Peshawar. The Afghan Taliban, however, is reluctant to confront them, as this group fought alongside them in the past.

According to a recent report by the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), the TTP has conducted 600 attacks against Pakistani forces in the past year.

Now, Islamabad has alleged coordination between the Afghan Taliban in Kabul, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Baloch separatist groups in carrying out planned terrorist attacks within Pakistan.

To tackle this situation, Shah suggested that “special operations modelled after the Turkish military strategy against the PKK in Northern Iraq should be carried out, or economic pressure could be applied against Afghan exports,” as 40% of them still go through Pakistan.

“Given the seriousness in Pakistan’s response to the Taliban, without the regime showing tangible and credible improvements in destroying the TTP, normal ties are not possible, and Pakistan has drawn a very clear line,” Abbasi noted.

Islamabad has alleged that India is backing cross-border terror attacks to create ‘pressure from two fronts’, charges New Delhi has denied. In May this year, regional rivals India and Pakistan engaged in a short war, and some observers suggest New Delhi could be using Kabul as a proxy in ongoing tensions.

As violent clashes escalated between Kabul and Islamabad in early October, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India on a week-long trip, the first since the Taliban seized power in 2021.

In a sudden volte-face, Muttaqi endorsed India’s stance on Kashmir, a Himalayan region partially administered by India and Pakistan, but claimed in full by both, in a joint statement with the Indian External Affairs Minister S.Jaishankar.

This move elicited strong condemnation from Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry. During their first stint in power from 1996-2001, the Taliban had sided with Islamabad on the issue of the Kashmir dispute, but now India-Taliban ties are deepening.

Achakzai observed that “the India-Taliban alignment, seen in recent diplomacy, threatens Pakistan and requires diplomatic countermeasures”.

He advised that Pakistan should continue “using targeted strikes on TTP, phase out Afghan refugees, and counter India-Taliban ties via the SCO and UN diplomacy, blocking Taliban recognition and backing Afghan opposition without direct intervention”.

A history of border disputes

For Afghanistan, perceived historical injustices that remain unresolved also weigh heavily on current tensions.

Drawn up in 1893 by British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand and Afghan ruler Amir Abdul Rahman Khan through a treaty, the Durand Line legally demarcates the 2,640km-long border between present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan inherited the internationally recognised border and the agreement from the British at independence in 1947 as the successor state, but various Afghan governments, including the Taliban regime, have refused to accept what they call a colonially-imposed border.

All of Afghanistan’s other frontiers, with Iran, China, and Central Asia, were also drawn by the British Empire during the same period, yet none face similar claims.

In Achakzai’s opinion, Islamabad must affirm the Durand Line as an international border with UN support and concrete fencing by 2026, “rejecting talk on its status, counterclaims with historical evidence, and linking non-recognition to sanctions. Patrolling and Pashtun economic integration can deter incursions and reduce irredentist appeal”.

He observed that the Taliban’s rejection of the Durand Line, “fuelled by Pashtunistan ambitions, destabilises the region and their hypocrisy - demanding sovereignty while violating Pakistan’s - has strained ties since 2021”.

The Durand Line international border is “rooted in the Vienna Convention”, Abbasi said, and there is no border dispute with Afghanistan.

“The borders were settled at the time of the British territorial handover to the successor state of Pakistan,” and this matter “must not have any bearing on the need for halting terrorism from Afghanistan into Pakistan”.

According to Shah, Pakistan and Afghanistan have never had normal ties since Pakistan gained independence in 1947, “whether under Daud Khan, the communists, Karzai/Ghani, they have always been hostile, not accepting the internationally recognised border and supporting subversive activities against Pakistan since the 1960s”.

For sustainable ties, Shah said they should “recognise the Durand Line as a permanent border, stop allowing groups opposed to Pakistan from using Afghan territory, and stop trying to speak on behalf of Pakistan’s Pashtun population”.

The Pashtun factor

In Shah’s opinion, the biggest irritant in Pakistan-Afghan ties has been “the Afghan claim to speak on behalf of Pakistan’s Pashtuns and claim territory up until the Indus River”.

Shah pointed out that the Pashtun population in Pakistan is larger than Afghanistan’s, which stands at around 40 million. “Pashtuns in Pakistan are the second largest ethnic group in the country, well-integrated into the Pakistani state with significant representation in the bureaucracy, military, and business,” he said.

“They have their own political unit in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP] and significant political clout in Baluchistan and Karachi.”

He noted that Pashtun nationalist parties have never won an outright majority in KP, so the belief by Afghanistan that “Pashtuns in Pakistan are marginalised and want to join Afghanistan could not be further from the truth".

Sabena Siddiqui is a foreign affairs journalist, lawyer, and geopolitical analyst specialising in modern China, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Follow her on X: @sabena_siddiqi